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A Restorative Signaling Theory of Punitive Desert 
by 
Jim C. Staihar 
Chair:  Elizabeth S. Anderson 
 I explain why and how much criminals deserve to be punished on the basis of a 
novel theory of punitive desert.  Criminals deserve to be punished in the negative sense 
that the state would not violate their rights by punishing them against their will.  
Explaining why this is so is challenging because punishing someone involves 
intentionally harming her, and people have a prima facie right not to be intentionally 
harmed against their will.  My restorative signaling theory avoids the shortcomings but 
incorporates the insights of the main competing theories in the literature, including 
expressive, consensual, unfair advantage, annulment, oral education, and deterrence 
theories of punitive desert.  
 My theory draws on the fact that when someone commits a crime without an 
exculpatory defense, she undermines conditions of trust, which are the conditions 
necessary for others' being justified in believing that she is not disposed to commit 
crimes.  The criminal is obligated to restore such conditions because unless she does so, 
she will cause others to incur certain costs of insecurity.  To restore the conditions of 
trust, the criminal must demonstrate to others that s e has a good will, and to do so, she 
must sacrifice some of her sufficiently important personal interests for a sufficiently long 
time for the sake of benefiting others.  According to the theory's main principle, a 
criminal deserves to be punished for her crime no more severely than the burdens she is 
obligated to undertake to restore the conditions of trust she undermined by committing 
her crime.  
 The theory explains why punishments should ideally t ke the form of labor 
intensive community service performed under reasonable conditions of incapacitation.  I 
 vii 
 
argue that the theory best explains why the state would not be justified in punishing all 
criminals extremely severely even though doing so could be the most efficient means of 
achieving deterrence.  I also argue that it best explains the mitigating effects of 
exculpatory defenses on how much criminal actors not o ly deserve to be punished, but 
also are blameworthy.  Finally, I argue that the theory illuminates what it means and when 








 Chapter 1   
 A Restorative Signaling Theory of Punitive Desert 
 I.  Introduction 
 When someone commits a crime, we standardly assume he1 deserves to be 
punished for it in the sense that the state would not violate her rights by punishing her for 
it against her will.2  If the punishment were not too severe, the criminal would not have 
an individual complaint in justice against suffering it, and the state would not owe her any 
compensation for the resulting harm.  Our assumption, hough, stands in acute need of 
justification.  Punishing someone involves intentioally harming her, and people have a 
prima facie right not to be intentionally harmed against their will.3  So punishing even a 
criminal against her will is prima facie to violate h r rights.   
 In this chapter, I seek to explain why and how much criminals deserve to be 
punished.  More specifically, I seek to justify a pro ortionality principle of punitive 
desert, which I call 'PP'.  According to the principle, when someone commits a crime, she 
                         
1.  Throughout the dissertation, I intend to use personal pronouns, such as 'he' or 'she', in a gender neut al 
sense.   
2.  My non-retributive sense of punitive desert is an instance of J.L.A. Garcia's more general conception of 
"negative desert" in Two Concepts of Desert, 5 L. & PHIL. 219 (1986).  According to Garcia, the point of 
claiming that someone deserves something harmful to her is not to claim that there would be anything good 
about imposing it on her.  There might not be.  According to Garcia, the point is merely to claim that 
imposing it on her against her will would not violate her rights.  On a retributive sense of punitive desert, 
though, the point of claiming that someone deserves to be punished is precisely to claim that punishing her 
would be intrinsically good.  See Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISRAEL L. REV. 15, 19-
20 (1993); cf. G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 82, 262-65 (Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993) 
(claiming that the organic whole of a criminal's suffering some punishment is better than the organic whole 
of her suffering no punishment).  Because I eschew t  retributive sense, I am not committed to 
retributivism by claiming that criminals deserve to be punished.   
3.  In other words, people have a prima facie claim or entitlement against such treatment.  See JOEL 
FEINBERG, Duties, Rights, and Claims, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY:  





deserves some punishment for it; however, the seriousness of her crime entails an upper 
limit on the severity of the punishment she deserves.  A criminal deserves a particular 
severity of punishment for her crime if and only if the severity does not exceed the 
relevant upper limit.  Three aspects of PP need clarifi ation.    
 First, PP concerns only first time criminals who have no exculpatory defenses.  
Unless I note otherwise, I focus only on such criminals in this chapter.  Second, the 
seriousness of a crime, in the sense relevant to punitive desert, corresponds to how badly 
the criminal disrespected the rights of others in committing it.4  How badly she 
disrespected their rights corresponds to how badly she flouted the moral reasons against 
violating them.  And how badly she flouted such reasons corresponds to how 
inappropriately she responded to them.  In general, how inappropriately she responded to 
them depends on the beliefs, intentions, and motives with which she committed the 
crime.  More precisely, it depends on a) what she int nded in committing the crime, b) 
what motivated her to intend to commit it, c) how strongly she was motivated to intend to 
commit it, and d) the relative strength of the reasons she had for and against intending to 
commit it.  What reasons she had depends on what she believed when she committed it.   
 Thus, a reason is meant here in a subjective sense that is relative to one's beliefs.  
In this sense, the reasons a criminal had for and against intending to commit her crime 
were provided by what she believed when she committed .5  In this sense, the fact that 
                         
4.  See Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 40-41 (1977) (describing the concept of 
"moral recognition respect" whose denial captures th  sense of disrespect at issue); Benjamin B. Sendor, 
Mistakes of Fact:  A Study in the Structure of Criminal Conduct, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 707, 720-36 
(1990) (suggesting that disrespect for the rights of others is standardly constitutive of a crime).  Throughout 
the dissertation, I focus only on crimes that are mala in se.  I leave it an open question whether and how 
much people deserve to be punished for crimes that are mala prohibita.  
5.  In an objective sense, someone's reasons for and against intending to perform an act are not relative to 
what she believes.  They are provided by facts that are rue independently of what she believes.  See Derek 
Parfit, Rationality and Reasons, in EXPLORING PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY:  FROM ACTION TO 
VALUES 17, 17 (Dan Egonsson, Jonas Josefsson, Bjorn Petersson & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen eds., 2001) 
(noting the objective sense of reasons).  Although they are conceptually distinct, subjective and objectiv  
reasons are related.  A fact provides someone with an objective reason if and only if her believing that it 
obtains would provide her with a subjective reason.     





someone believes that her performing a particular act would directly cause another to die 
provides her with a strong moral reason against intending to do it.  And this fact provides 
her with such a reason even if her belief is false, or she believes that it does not provide 
her with such a reason.  So if she were to perform the act without believing it would have 
any consequences that would count in favor of it, she would flout very badly the moral 
reasons against violating the putative victim's right not to be killed.  Hence, the act would 
constitute a very serious crime because she would disrespect very badly the rights of 
others in performing it.   
 Third, the upper limits of PP have both an ordinal and a cardinal ranking.  
According to the ordinal ranking, a criminal's upper limit is relatively higher for 
committing relatively more serious crimes.  In other words, a criminal deserves to be 
punished more severely for committing more serious crimes.  For any crime, the cardinal 
ranking specifies the absolute magnitude of the upper limit on the severity of punishment 
that someone deserves for committing it.  In other words, for any crime, the cardinal 
ranking specifies the absolute severity of the most severe punishment that someone 
deserves for committing it.  
 In seeking a justification of PP, I begin by consider ng five theories of punitive 
desert.  I show that a consideration of their shortcomings and insights motivates a 
restorative signaling theory of punitive desert, which I call 'RS'.  After providing an initial 
defense of RS, I respond to several objections that critics might raise against it.  I 
conclude that RS plausibly justifies PP and so plays an important role in constraining the 
conditions under which the state may punish a criminal against her will.  For this reason, 
RS should play an important role in any general theory of the justification of punishment.  
 
                                                             
be justified for them to provide her with a subjective reason.  Similarly, I set aside for further analysis the 
issue of whether someone's subjective reasons are provided not by her beliefs, but more precisely, by the 





 II.  A General Theory of the Justification of Punishment 
 Before attempting to justify PP, let us identify its role in my general theory of the 
justification of punishment.  My general theory specifi s the general conditions under 
which the state would be justified in punishing some ne against her will.  On the strong 
sense of justification at issue here, it specifies th  general conditions under which the 
state would not be open to any warranted attitude of moral disapproval for punishing 
someone against her will.  So the theory specifies th  general conditions under which the 
state has most reason to punish someone against her will.   
 According to the theory, the state is justified in imposing a punishment on 
someone against her will if and only if five requirements are satisfied.  First, according to 
the desert requirement, the person must deserve the punishment.  The desert requirement 
is warranted because if the state were to impose an undeserved punishment on someone 
against her will, it would violate her rights.  The fact that the state would violate 
someone's rights by doing something provides the stat  with an overriding reason not to 
do it.6  Second, according to the general rights requirement, imposing the punishment on 
the person must not violate the rights of anyone els .  Third, according to the value 
requirement, the expected value of the consequences of imposing the punishment on the 
person must be at least as high as the expected value of the consequences of any other 
available act that would not violate anyone's rights.  The value requirement is warranted 
because if the expected value of such an alternative ct were higher than the expected 
value of imposing the punishment on her, the state would have more reason to perform 
the alternative act instead.  Fourth, according to the epistemic requirement, the state must 
know that the first three requirements are satisfied in imposing the punishment on her.  
                         
6.  To keep matters simple, I set aside the fact that rights standardly have thresholds such that the stat  
might have most reason to violate someone's rights w en the consequences of not violating them would be 
sufficiently bad.  So I set aside the possibility that in some emergency situations, the state might have most 
reason to impose an undeserved punishment on someone against her will because doing so would be 
necessary to "avoid catastrophic moral horror."  ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 





Fifth, according to the motivation requirement, thestate must be appropriately motivated 
by its knowledge that the first three requirements are satisfied in imposing the punishment 
on her.  
 Within my general theory, PP determines whether punishing a criminal would 
satisfy the desert requirement.  It does not determine whether the punishment would 
satisfy the general rights requirement or the value requirement.  The mere fact that a 
criminal deserves a punishment does not entail that it s isfies the other two 
requirements.7  To determine whether a deserved punishment satisfies them, we need, 
among other things, to know more about the actual consequences of the punishment, and 
we need a more general theory of rights and a theory of the valuable aims of punishment, 
which are the important values that the state might promote by imposing a deserved 
punishment on someone.8  Thus, PP plays an important but also limited rolein 
determining whether the state would be justified in pu ishing a criminal against her will.  
PP only determines whether the punishment would violate the criminal's rights.    
 III.  Presuppositions 
 In spelling out a theory of punitive desert, I make several presuppositions that I 
assume obtain at the time a criminal is assessed for punitive desert.  First, a criminal is 
unavoidably a member of a large community of persons over which the state governs as 
their agent.  Second, any justifiable means of reducing the degree of interaction between a 
                         
7.  So the state might not be justified in imposing a deserved punishment on a criminal.  We might inquire 
into the practical difference between a) the state's imposing a deserved punishment on a criminal when it is 
not justified in doing so and b) its imposing an undeserved punishment on a criminal when it is not justified 
in doing so.  In the latter but not the former case, th  state would violate the criminal's rights by imposing 
the punishment on her.  Hence, in the latter but not he former case, the criminal would have an individual 
complaint in justice against suffering the punishment, and the state would owe her compensation for the 
resulting harm.  
8.  My use of the term 'valuable aims of punishment' is similar to H.L.A. Hart's use of the term 'general 
justifying aims of punishment.'  However, I use my term to refer to the valuable aims of punishing a 
particular person, whereas Hart uses his term to refer to the valuable aims of a general system of punishi g 
persons.  See H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 





criminal and others would unavoidably leave a signif cant degree of interaction between 
them and so would unavoidably leave others vulnerabl  to her to a significant degree.  
Third, there are no extraordinary means of obtaining epistemic access to a criminal's 
dispositions.  So I assume there are no extraordinary means of obtaining epistemic access 
to whether she has a particular disposition to commit crimes.   
 I make presuppositions 1-3 because I seek a practical explanation of why and how 
much criminals deserve to be punished.  That is, I seek to explain why and how much 
they deserve to be punished in the actual world given the natural facts that generally 
characterize the unavoidable conditions under which people actually live.  
Presuppositions 1-3 are such facts.  I leave it an open question whether and how much 
criminals would deserve to be punished in other worlds in which those presuppositions do 
not obtain.9   
 Fourth, everyone knows all the external and internal facts about all the acts the 
criminal has performed, including the external and psychological causes of her acts and 
their consequences.  Fifth, everyone knows all the facts about her physical and 
psychological capacities.  Sixth, everyone forms justified beliefs about her dispositions on 
the basis of his knowledge specified in presuppositions 4-5.  So if everyone's knowledge 
of the relevant facts justifies him in believing tha  she has a particularly bad disposition to 
commit crimes, I assume he justifiably believes that she has such a disposition.  Seventh, 
everyone responds rationally to his justified beliefs about her dispositions.  So if others 
are justified in believing that she has a particularly bad disposition to commit crimes, and 
they are rationally required to incur certain costs in response, I assume they incur such 
costs.    
 I make presuppositions 4-6 because I seek to explain why and how much 
                         
9.  Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 157-61 (1971) (developing a theory of distributive 






criminals deserve to be punished on the assumption that others fulfill their epistemic 
duties to each other and to the criminal before they punish her.  Before they do so, they 
have a duty to discover that no facts about her acts or capacities entail that she does not 
deserve the punishment.  They also have a duty to form justified beliefs about her 
dispositions to commit crimes.  And when others discover facts that make someone 
deserving of punishment, they have a duty to promulgate such facts to those with an 
interest in them but are unaware of them.  Presuppositions 4-6 entail that others fulfill 
such duties.  
 Also I make presuppositions 4-7 because the concept of punitive desert is 
plausibly defined conditionally on the assumption that they obtain at the time of 
assessment.  On this definition, someone deserves a punishment for an act if and only if 
she did it, and the state would not violate her rights by imposing the punishment on her 
against her will for doing it if presuppositions 4-7 were to obtain.  The definition is 
plausible because how much someone deserves to be punished for doing something does 
not seem to depend essentially on the moral status of punishing her under less idealized 
conditions.  For example, whether someone deserves a particular punishment for doing 
something does not seem to depend essentially on whether the state would violate her 
rights by imposing it on her under conditions in which a) others do not know what she 
has done or is capable of doing; b) they have unjustified beliefs about her dispositions; or 
c) they are disposed to respond irrationally to their b liefs about her dispositions.   
 IV.  Five Theories of Punitive Desert 
A.  An Expressive Theory   
 Consider an expressive theory, which I call 'E.'  Punishing someone expresses an 
attitude of moral blame toward her.10  Such an attitude might consist in resentment or 
                         
10.  See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, i  DOING AND DESERVING:  





indignation.11  According to E, a person deserves a punishment if a d only if imposing it 
on her would be the least harmful means of expressing a warranted attitude of moral 
blame toward her.12  A criminal deserves some punishment because everyon  is 
warranted in feeling an attitude of moral blame toward her, and punishing her to some 
degree would be the least harmful means of expressing that attitude toward her.    
 E's defense of PP is problematic for at least three reasons.  First, E is circular.  E 
merely assumes that punishing a criminal would exprss a warranted attitude of moral 
blame toward her.  On a standard view, an attitude of moral blame consists at least partly 
in certain demands.13  Feeling an attitude of moral blame toward someone involves 
feeling or making certain demands on her.  One demand that is constitutive of an attitude 
of moral blame is the demand to undertake a punishment.14  Punishing someone 
expresses an attitude of moral blame toward her by xpressing its constitutive demand on 
her to undertake the punishment.  So to claim that punishing a criminal would express a 
warranted attitude of moral blame toward her is to claim that the punishment would 
                         
11.  See, e.g., P.F. STRAWSON, Freedom and Resentment, i  FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 1 (1974).   
12.  In addition, some theories might insist on the punishment's expressing moral blame in a way that 
communicates it or makes it understandable to the criminal.  See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, 
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001); Igor Primoratz, Punishment as Language, 64 PHIL. 
187 (1989).  
13.  See STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 17 (2006); STRAWSON, supra note 11, at 14-15, 21-22; Gary Watson, 
Responsibility and the Limits of Evil:  Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 121, 126-28 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1993). 
14.  I take attitudes of moral blame to be sentiments of justice.  See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, 87-107 
(Oxford, 1998).  As such, they are a subset of all attitudes of moral disapproval.  I do not claim that a 
demand to undertake a punishment is constitutive of all the latter.  I only claim that such a demand is 
constitutive of moral blame.  See id. at 93, 95 (claiming that attitudes of moral blame as sentiments of 
justice involve both a desire to punish their objects and the judgment that their objects can be properly 
punished); cf. Thomas Baldwin, Punishment, Communication, and Resentment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 124, 128, 130, 132 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999) (claiming that resenting someone 
involves the judgment that she should be punished); JOSEPH BUTLER, Sermon VIII:  Upon Resentment, 
in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH BUTLER 141 (W.E. Gladstone ed., 1896) (suggesting that attitudes of 





express a warranted demand on her to undertake it.  But to claim that a demand on a 
criminal to undertake a punishment is warranted presupposes that she deserves the 
punishment.  The claim that a criminal deserves a punishment is precisely the claim to be 
explained.  Because E presupposes the claim it aims to explain, it is circular.15       
 Second, punishing a criminal is not the least harmful eans of expressing a 
warranted attitude of moral blame toward her.  Punishi g a criminal involves significantly 
harmful treatment, which might consist in the deprivation of an important liberty or harm 
to some other important personal interest.  It does not seem that any attitude of moral 
blame is ever expressible only through such harmful treatment.  Blame seems expressible 
through behavior that does not significantly harm the criminal.16  For example, we might 
express blame toward a criminal by simply a) communicating our feelings to her verbally 
in a sufficiently solemn ceremony or ritual17 and b) refraining from interacting with her in 
various ways for some time.  Because any attitude of moral blame seems expressible 
through behavior that is not significantly harmful, punishing a criminal never seems to be 
the least harmful means of expressing such an attitude toward her.   
 Third, suppose for the sake of argument that a warranted attitude of moral blame 
does not contain a warranted demand to undertake a punishment.  Suppose also that 
punishing a criminal is the least harmful means of expressing such an attitude toward her. 
 It is still not clear why she would deserve the expr ssion of the attitude.  There is no 
problem with our merely feeling the attitude toward her.  Our merely feeling it would not 
                         
15.  Cf. Baldwin, supra note 14, at 130, 132 (expounding a similar circularity objection to attempts to 
justify punishing someone on the grounds that punishi g her would express a warranted attitude of 
resentment toward her).  
16.  As S.I. Benn asserts, expressing an attitude of moral blame or "denunciation does not imply the 
deliberate imposition of suffering, which is the feature of punishment usually felt to need justification."  S.I. 
Benn, An Approach to the Problems of Punishment 33 PHIL. 328 n.1 (1958). 
17.  As Feinberg writes:  "Such a ritual might condemn so very emphatically that there could be no doubt f 
its genuineness, thus rendering symbolically superfluous any further hard physical treatment."  FEINBERG, 





harm her and so would not violate her rights.  However, if punishing her is the least 
harmful means of expressing the attitude, then the stat 's expressing the attitude would 
involve intentionally harming her.  Because the state's expressing the attitude would 
involve intentionally harming, it would prima facie violate her rights.  Unless 
expressivists can explain why criminals do not have  right to be free from the 
intentionally harmful expression of a warranted attitude of moral blame, their theory does 
not explain why they deserve to be punished.  
 Although E does not justify PP, it yields an important insight into the type of 
theory that could.  We can show that a criminal deserves to be punished for her crime by 
showing that others would be warranted in demanding her to undertake a punishment for 
her crime.  To show this, we must show that she is obligated to undertake a punishment 
for her crime.18  If she is, then she has no right to be free from the punishment.19  So if 
she is obligated to undertake a punishment, and refuses to do so voluntarily, then the state 
would not violate her rights by imposing the punishment on her against her will.  The 
challenge is to explain why criminals are obligated to undertake punishments for their 
crimes.   
B.  An Actual Consent Theory     
 Consider an actual consent theory, which I call 'AC.20  If someone consents to 
certain treatment, and her consent is irrevocable, then imposing the treatment on her 
                         
18.  Cf. David Copp, 'Ought' Implies 'Can', Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, 
in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES 265, 271-75 (David Widerker & 
Michael McKenna eds., 2003) (noting the relation betwe n what a person is obligated to do and what others 
are warranted in demanding her to do or can fairly demand her to do); DARWALL, supra note 13, at 96-99 
(same).  
19.  I take this point to be basic for the purposes of this dissertation.  In general, if someone is obligated to 
undertake a burden, she has no right to be free from it.  In other words, she has no claim or entitlement to be 
free from the burden.  Cf. MILL, supra note 14, at 93 (stating that "Duty is a thing which may be exacted 
from a person, as one exacts a debt. ... Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other people, may militate 
against actually exacting it; but the person himself ... would not be entitled to complain.").  
20.  See C.S. Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 289, 297-300 (1983) 





against her will would not violate her rights.  According to AC, someone consents to a 
consequence if she freely performs an act under conditi s in which she knows the act 
would have the consequence.  When someone freely commits a crime, she knows her 
crime will have the consequence of forfeiting her legal right against being punished.  So 
by freely committing her crime, she consents to forfeit this legal right.  In general, if 
someone consents to forfeit her legal right against certain treatment, she consents to 
forfeit her moral right against it.  Thus, by freely committing her crime, the criminal 
consents to forfeit not only her legal right, but also her moral right against being 
punished.  Therefore, criminals deserve to be punished.    
 In response, AC is objectionable for at least three reasons.  First, its main 
principle about consent is false.  As a conceptual tr th, a person consents to something 
only if she intends to consent to it in the sense of intending to authorize or agree to it.  As 
a consequence, a person consents to something only if she believes she consents to it.  A 
person cannot unintentionally consent to something or consent to it by accident.21  So the 
mere fact that someone freely performs an act knowig it will have a particular 
consequence does not entail that she consents to the consequence, because this fact does 
not entail that she intends to consent to the consequence or believes she consents to it.   
 To illustrate, suppose I know someone will destroy my home if I attend a political 
rally.  The mere fact that I freely attend the rally does not entail that I consent to the 
destruction of my home, because this fact does not e tail that I intend to consent to this 
consequence or believe I consent to it.  Hence, even if someone commits a crime knowing 
her crime will the consequence of forfeiting her legal right against being punished, this 
fact does not entail that she consents to forfeit th  right.  Because criminals do not intend 
to consent to forfeit any of their rights when they commit their crimes, they do not 
consent to forfeit their legal or moral rights against being punished.   
                         





 Second, suppose for the sake of argument that AC's main principle about consent 
is correct.  Still some criminals do not know that they forfeit their legal right against 
being punished when they commit their crimes.22  They are mistaken about what the 
criminal laws of the state prohibit.  For example, someone might kill her spouse's lover 
on the mistaken assumption that paramour killings are not crimes.   
 Third, AC does not account for PP's ordinal or cardinal rankings.23  For example, 
suppose everyone knows that the state punishes some mildly serious crimes extremely 
severely, but it punishes moderately serious crimes only moderately severely.  Then when 
people freely commit such mildly serious crimes, ACentails that they consent to forfeit 
their legal and moral rights against being punished extremely severely for them.  So AC 
unacceptably entails that those mildly serious criminals deserve to be punished more 
severely than moderately serious criminals, and they deserve to be punished extremely 
severely.24  Under PP's ordinal ranking, mildly serious criminals deserve to be punished 
less severely than more serious criminals, and under its cardinal ranking, they deserve no 
more than mildly severe punishments for their crimes.     
 Although AC does not justify PP, it yields an important insight into the type of 
theory that could.  AC tries to prove that criminals deserve to be punished because they 
actually consent to forfeit their moral right against being punished.  Although criminals 
do not actually consent to forfeit any of their rights by committing their crimes, the 
concept of consent might still play a role in explaining why they deserve to be punished.  
Even though criminals do not actually consent to be punished, they might be obligated to 
                         
22.  See T.M. SCANLON, Punishment and the Rule of Law, in THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE:  
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 219, 219-33 (2003).  
23.  See Larry Alexander, Consent, Punishment, and Proportionality, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 178 (1986).  
24.  The consequences of punishing mildly serious criminals extremely severely might be worse than the 
consequences of punishing them less severely.  Hence, punishing them so severely might be unjustified on 
the grounds that it would violate the value requirement of my general theory.  But whether or not punishi g 
them so severely would be unjustified on these grounds is irrelevant to whether they deserve to be punished 





consent to be punished.  More precisely, they might be obligated to consent to undertake 
a punishment.  If so, then they deserve to be punished.  For in general, if someone is 
obligated to consent to undertake certain burdens, then she has no right to be free from 
them.25  The challenge is to explain why criminals are obligated to consent to undertake 
punishments for their crimes.   
C.  An Unfair Advantage Theory   
 Consider an unfair advantage theory, which I call 'UA.'26  UA assumes a 
"principle of fair play."27  According to this principle, if people undertake a burden to 
maintain a just scheme of social cooperation from which they benefit, then anyone else 
who accepts benefits from the scheme is obligated to do her fair share to maintain it.28  
Doing her fair share to maintain the scheme involves h r undertaking a fair share of the 
burdens that maintain it.  Given the principle of fair play, UA assumes that in the state, a 
group of cooperators maintains a just scheme of social cooperation by undertaking the 
burden of restraining themselves from committing crimes.  And each of the state's 
citizens accepts from the scheme the benefit of the cooperators' not committing crimes 
against her.  As a consequence, each of the state's citizens is obligated to do her fair share 
to maintain the scheme.  And doing her fair share to maintain the scheme involves her 
assuming the burden of self-restraint, restraining herself from committing crimes.     
                         
25.  On one interpretation, if criminals are obligated to consent to undertake a punishment, then this makes 
punishing them even against their will consistent with Kant's categorical imperative to treat others as ends in 
themselves and never as mere means to an end.  See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 4:433 (Mary Gregor ed., 1997); cf. DEREK PARFIT, CLIMBING THE 
MOUNTAIN, chapters 4-5 (forthcoming) (discussing interpretations of this formulation of Kant's 
categorical imperative and its relation to various principles of consent). 
26.  For examples of such theories, see Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT 76, 79 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971); Jeffrie Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 217, 228-29 (1973); GEORGE SHER, DESERT 69-90 (1987); Richard Dagger, Playing Fair 
with Punishment, 103 ETHICS 473 (1993).  
27.  JOHN RAWLS, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in COLLECTED PAPERS 117, 122 
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). 
28.  John Rawls endorses the "principle of fair play" in id. at 122.  H.L.A. Hart endorses a similar principle 





 By committing a crime, a criminal obtains an unfair advantage over the 
cooperators that consists in the benefit of her renouncing the burden of self-restraint.  
Unless the benefit is removed, the benefit will constitute an unjust enrichment.  For the 
criminal obtains the benefit by violating her obligation not to commit the crime.  And in 
general, if someone obtains a benefit from violating a  obligation to others, the benefit 
constitutes an unjust enrichment.  To remove the ben fit, the criminal must undertake a 
burden that is as severe as the burden of self-restraint she renounced by committing her 
crime.  Because she would be unjustly enriched unless she undertakes such a burden, the 
state may impose the burden on her as a punishment against her will without violating her 
rights.  For in general, if someone would be unjustly enriched by not undertaking a 
burden, and refuses to undertake it voluntarily, then the state would not violate her rights 
by imposing the burden on her against her will.29  According to the main principle of UA, 
a criminal deserves a punishment that is no more sev re than the burden of self-restraint 
she renounced by committing her crime.   
 UA does not justify PP.  On the most natural interpr tation of the burden of self-
restraint that a criminal renounces by committing her crime, the severity of the burden is 
proportional to the strength of the average cooperator's desire to commit the crime.30  On 
this interpretation, UA does not justify PP's cardinal or ordinal ranking.  UA does not 
justify PP's cardinal ranking because for very serious crimes, such as murder and rape, the 
average cooperator has no desire to commit them, so restraining herself from committing 
them is no burden at all.  Thus, UA does not explain why many serious criminals deserve 
                         
29.  This principle reflects the norm that a person may not profit from her own crime.  See, e.g., Riggs v. 
Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889) (claiming that "[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own 
fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire 
property by his own crime").  
30.  Richard Burgh discusses this interpretation of the burden of self-restraint and its objectionable 
consequences for UA in Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. PHIL. 193, 209-10 (1982).  See also 
David Dolinko, Some Thoughts about Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 545-49 (1991) (same); MATT 






any punishment at all.  UA does not justify PP's ordinal ranking because the average 
cooperator has a stronger desire to commit less seriou  crimes, like tax evasion and theft, 
than more serious crimes, like murder and rape.  So the average cooperator assumes a 
greater burden in restraining herself from committing relatively less serious crimes.  
Hence, UA does not explain why criminals deserve to be punished more severely for 
committing more serious crimes.   
 Although UA does not justify PP, it yields an important insight into the type of 
theory that could.  UA tries to prove that a criminal deserves a punishment because she 
would be unjustly enriched by not undertaking it.  But unlike UA, the unjust enrichment 
does not consist in a benefit that she obtains fromc mitting her crime.  Contrary to UA, 
there might not be such a benefit.  Rather the unjust enrichment consists in a benefit that 
she stands to obtain from violating an obligation she incurs from committing her crime.  
The challenge is to identify this obligation.   
D.  An Annulment Theory   
 Consider an annulment theory, which I call 'AN.'31  According to AN, someone's 
committing a crime expresses the false proposition that her victim lacks the right to be 
free from the crime.  By expressing the false proposition about her victim, the criminal 
imposes on him a moral harm that consists in her falsely representing him as not having 
the right.  The moral harm will persist until the false proposition is annulled.  Because the 
criminal caused her victim the harm, she is obligated to annul it by annulling the false 
proposition about him.  So she is obligated to undertak  any means necessary to annul the 
false proposition.  For in general, if someone has an obligation to do something, she has a 
derivative obligation to undertake the means necessary to her doing it.32  Hence, the 
                         
31.  Hegel seems to endorse a similar annulment theory in HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 90-103 
(T.M. Knox trans., 1942).  My interpretation of Hegel follows David Cooper's interpretation of him in 
Hegel's Theory of Punishment, in HEGEL'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:  PROBLEMS AND 
PERSPECTIVES 151 (Z.A. Pelczynski ed., 1971).  Jean H mpton endorses such a theory in Correcting 
Harms Versus Righting Wrongs:  The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659-702 (1991-92).   





criminal is obligated to undertake any burdens that are necessary to annul the false 
proposition.  So assuming she must undertake certain burdens to annul it, the state may 
impose those burdens on her as a punishment against her will without violating her rights. 
 According to the main principle of AN, a criminal deserves a punishment for her crime 
that is no more severe than the burdens she must undertake to annul the false proposition 
she expressed about her victim by committing it.    
 AN does not justify PP.  A criminal need not undertake any burdens to annul the 
false proposition about her victim.  To annul it, a criminal need only comply with a non-
punitive policy:  a) assert the negation of the false proposition, b) apologize to her victim, 
and c) compensate her victim for any material or psychological harm she caused him.  A 
criminal's complying with this policy would annul the false proposition by expressing the 
fact that her victim had the right to be free from the crime.33  Because a criminal can 
annul the false proposition by complying with a non-punitive policy, AN does not justify 
PP's cardinal or ordinal ranking.   
 AN does not justify PP's cardinal ranking because complying with the non-
punitive policy does not require many serious criminals to undertake any significant 
burdens.  Neither asserting the negation of the false proposition nor merely apologizing to 
her victim requires a criminal to undertake any signif cant burdens.  And requiring a 
criminal to compensate her victim for any material or psychological harm she caused him 
does not require many serious criminals to undertak any burdens because many serious 
crimes, like some unsuccessful attempts at murder, do not cause much or any such harm 
to their victims.34  Thus, AN does not explain why many serious criminals deserve any 
                                                             
"oughts," see Mark Schroeder, Means-end Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons, PHIL. STUD. 
(forthcoming).  
33.  See Deidre Golash, The Retributive Paradox, 54 ANALYSIS 72, 75 (1994); Dolinko, supra note 30, at 
545-49.  
34.  For example, consider a case in which someone unsuccessfully tries to murder a person under 
conditions in which he is unaware of the attempt and would not experience much, if any, trauma upon 





punishment at all.   
 AN does not justify PP's ordinal ranking because complying with the non-punitive 
policy does not require many serious criminals to undertake more severe burdens than 
less serious criminals.  As we noted, the policy does not require many serious criminals, 
like some who unsuccessfully attempt to commit murder, to undertake any significant 
burdens.  However, the policy might require some less serious criminals to undertake 
significant burdens.  For some less serious crimes, like vandalism, cause their victims 
significant material harms, and the criminals who commit them might need to undertake 
significant burdens to compensate their victims for th se harms.35  Thus, AN does not 
explain why criminals deserve to be punished more sev rely for committing more serious 
crimes.    
 Although AN does not justify PP, it yields an important insight into the content of 
an obligation that could.  AN tries to prove that a criminal deserves to be punished 
because she is obligated to undertake a punishment as means to annulling something that 
her crime expresses.  However, what justifies PP is not a criminal's obligation to annul a 
false proposition about her victim, rather it seems to be her obligation to annul something 
her crime indicates about herself that is of greater social importance.  The challenge is to 
identify what her crime indicates about herself that she has an obligation to annul by 
undertaking a punishment.      
E.  A Prevention Theory   
 Consider a prevention theory, which I call 'P.'  According to P, someone's 
committing a crime indicates that she is disposed to commit crimes in the sense that she 
is willing and able to commit them.  Unless she annuls her disposition to commit crimes 
in the sense of extinguishing it, she will commit cr mes in the future.  Everyone is 
                         
35.  Vandalism is a less serious crime than an unsuccessful attempt at murder because an attempted 
murderer disrespects to a worse degree the rights of others.  For the right to life protects more important 





obligated to undertake the means that are necessary to p event herself from committing 
crimes.  Hence, a criminal is obligated to undertake the means that are necessary to annul 
her disposition to commit crimes.  So she is obligated to undertake any burdens that are 
necessary to annul it.  Thus, assuming she must undertake certain burdens to annul it, the 
state may impose those burdens on her as a punishment against her will without violating 
her rights.  According to the main principle of P, a criminal deserves a punishment that is 
no more severe than the burdens she must undertake to nnul her disposition to commit 
crimes.    
 Assuming a criminal is disposed to commit crimes, there are three reasons why 
she might need to undertake certain burdens to annul the disposition at least partially.  
First, if she is incapable of annulling her willingness to commit crimes, she might need to 
incapacitate herself, placing herself under conditions that would hinder her ability to 
commit crimes.36  Second, if she would annul her willingness to commit crimes by having 
a sufficiently strong prudential incentive not to commit them, she might need to follow a 
policy of undertaking certain burdens after she commits crimes.  By following such a 
policy, she might deter herself from committing them out of fear of suffering the 
burdens.37  Third, if she would annul her willingness to commit crimes by undertaking a 
course in moral education, she might need to do so t develop a good will, which is a 
stable disposition to be appropriately motivated by the moral reasons against violating the 
rights of others.38  To be effective, such a course might need to be burdensome, in some 
                         
36.  Conditions of incapacitation as such are not necessarily burdensome.  Nevertheless, their burdensome 
nature is standardly unavoidable to some degree. 
37.  If a person were to follow a policy of undertaking certain burdens after she commits crimes, she might 
deter herself from committing a crime in the present out of fear that her future self would otherwise be 
harmed.  To prevent her future self from opting out, she might need to implement the policy through a 
device that would automatically impose the burdens on her future self if she were to commit a crime in the 
present.  For the related concept of an "automatic re aliation device," see Lawrence Alexander, The 
Doomsday Machine:  Proportionality, Punishment and Prevention, 63 THE MONIST 199, 209 (1980); 
Warren Quinn, The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 327, 337-38 (1985); 
Claire Finkelstein, Threats and Preemptive Practices, 5 LEGAL THEORY 311, 315-16 (1999).  





way, to prevent her from opting out and to encourage her to take the content of the course 
seriously.   
 In response, if a criminal must undertake certain burdens to annul her disposition 
to commit crimes, then P does explain why she deserv  some punishment.  However, P 
does not justify PP's cardinal or ordinal ranking.  It does not justify the cardinal ranking 
because some criminals who deserve some punishment ne d not undertake any burdens to 
annul their dispositions to commit crimes.  For example, consider immediately reformed 
criminals who perform serious crimes, like murder, but who immediately reform 
themselves afterward.  They immediately annul their dispositions to commit crimes by 
simply recognizing, appreciating, and becoming appro riately motivated by the moral 
reasons against committing them.39  Immediately reformed criminals deserve some 
punishment.  But because they annulled their dispostion  to commit crimes without 
undertaking any burdens, they are not obligated to undertake any as a means to annulling 
such a disposition.  Thus, P does not explain why some serious criminals deserve any 
punishment.   
 P does not justify the ordinal ranking because some less serious criminals must 
undertake more severe burdens than more serious criminals to annul their dispositions to 
commit crimes.  As we noted, very serious criminals, like murderers, who immediately 
reform themselves need not undertake any burdens to annul their dispositions to commit 
crimes.  However, less serious criminals, like non-violent thieves, who do not 
immediately reform themselves might need to undertak  some burdens to annul theirs.  
Nevertheless, very serious criminals who are immediat ly reformed still deserve to be 
punished more severely than less serious criminals who are not reformed.  Thus, P does 
not generally explain why criminals deserve to be punished more severely for committing 
                                                             
Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263 (1981).  
39.  Cases of immediately reformed criminals are not prevalent.  Nevertheless, they are not fantastic or 





more serious crimes.   
 Although the theory does not justify PP, it yields an important insight into the 
content of an obligation that could.  P points out that someone's committing a crime is 
strong evidence that she is disposed to commit crimes.  However, what justifies PP is not 
a criminal's obligation to annul her disposition to commit crimes; it is her obligation to 
annul something that even immediately reformed criminals retain an obligation to annul.   
 V.  A Restorative Signaling Theory of Punitive Desert   
 In light of the insights from the previous theories, RS assumes that someone 
deserves a punishment for an act if and only if her undertaking the punishment is 
necessary to fulfill an obligation she incurs from performing the act.  If the latter 
condition obtains, she deserves the punishment for three related reasons.  First, she is 
obligated to undertake the punishment.  For in general, if someone has an obligation to do 
something, she has a derivative obligation to undertak  the means necessary to her doing 
it.  Second, she is obligated to consent to undertak  the punishment.40  In general, if 
someone is obligated to undertake something or mustundertake something to fulfill an 
obligation, then she has an obligation to consent to undertake it.  Third, she would be 
unjustly enriched by not undertaking the punishment.41  For by not undertaking the 
punishment, she would not only violate her obligation to others, but also obtain a benefit 
from the violation consisting in her freedom from the punishment necessary to fulfill the 
obligation.  In general, if someone obtains a benefit from violating an obligation to others, 
                         
40.  Since RS is grounded in a principle of consent, it could be considered a consent based theory of 
punitive desert.  However, RS is not grounded in a principle of actual consent.  It does not assume that 
criminals deserve to be punished because they actually consent to undertake a punishment.  Even if 
criminals do not actually consent to undertake a punishment, RS assumes they deserve to be punished 
because they are obligated to consent to undertake a punishment.  
41.  Insofar as an unjust enrichment constitutes an unfair advantage, RS could be considered a type of unfair 
advantage theory of punitive desert.  Unlike UA, though, RS does not assume that criminals obtain a benefit 
from committing their crimes.  They might not.  Rather RS assumes that criminals stand to obtain a benefit 
from violating an obligation they incur from committing their crimes.  Relatedly, RS does not assume that 
the wrong for which criminals deserve to be punished consists in their obtaining an unfair advantage or an 
unjust enrichment.  Rather RS assumes that the wrong c sists in their disrespecting the rights of others.  





the benefit constitutes an unjust enrichment.  Each of t ese related claims entails that she 
has no right to be free from the punishment.  So if she refuses to undertake the 
punishment voluntarily, the state would not violate her rights by imposing the punishment 
on her against her will.   
  Given its basic principle, RS explains why criminals deserve to be punished by 
explaining why they must undertake a punishment to fulfill an obligation they incur from 
committing their crimes.  According to RS, a person has an obligation of trust not to 
undermine the conditions that are necessary for others' being justified in believing that 
she is not disposed to commit crimes.  Call such conditions 'conditions of trust.'  A 
person's obligation of trust is grounded in the fact that she would standardly cause others 
to incur at least three costs of insecurity by undermining conditions of trust.42  First, if 
someone undermines them, others rationally must invest in costly precautionary measures 
to protect themselves from her.  For example, others might need to engage in costly 
surveillance schemes to reduce their interactions with her and to employ costly protective 
services when interacting with her is unavoidable.  S cond, if someone undermines 
conditions of trust, others rationally must forgo pursuing some personally and socially 
valuable activities that would invariably leave them too vulnerable to her.  Third, if 
someone undermines conditions of trust, others will rationally experience fear in response 
to their higher subjective probability of her committing crimes against them.  To avoid 
imposing such costs on others, a person has not only he obligation of trust, but also an 
obligation of restoration.  According to the obligation of restoration, if someone 
undermines conditions of trust, she is obligated to restore those conditions as quickly as is 
reasonably possible by demonstrating to others that s e is no longer disposed to commit 
crimes.  She must restore them as quickly as is reasonably possible because the longer she 
                         
42.  Cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chap. 13 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge 1996) (noting the 
costs of insecurity that someone rationally must incur in response to being justified in believing that others 





takes to restore them the longer others must incur the costs of insecurity.43    
 When someone commits a crime, she undermines conditions of trust.44  Her crime 
is strong evidence that she is disposed to commit crimes; therefore, others are not 
justified in believing otherwise.  So she is obligated to restore the conditions of trust she 
undermined by committing her crime.  Given her obligation of restoration, she is 
obligated to undertake any means that are necessary to fulfill it.  Hence, she is obligated 
to undertake any burdens that are necessary to fulfill it.  So assuming she must undertake 
certain burdens to fulfill her obligation of restoration, the state may impose them on her 
as a punishment against her will without violating her rights.  According to the main 
principle of RS, a criminal deserves a punishment for her crime that is no more severe 
than the burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation of restoration she incurs from 
committing her crime.  In other words, a criminal deserves to be punished for her crime 
no more severely than the burdens she is obligated to undertake to restore the conditions 
of trust she undermined by committing her crime.45  
 A criminal must in fact undertake some burdens to fulfill her obligation of 
restoration.  By committing her crime, she undermined conditions of trust by providing 
others with strong evidence that she is disposed to commit crimes.  To fulfill her 
obligation of restoration, she must annul such evidnce by providing others with strong 
countervailing evidence that she is no longer disposed to commit crimes.  To provide 
others with such countervailing evidence, she must demonstrate that she has a good 
                         
43.  To be concise, I leave the quickness condition mplicit in my following discussion of the obligation of 
restoration.  
44.  David Hoekema and Susan Dimock also point out hat criminals undermine conditions of trust by 
committing their crimes.  See Susan Dimock, Retributivism and Trust, 16 L. & PHIL. 37 (1997); David A. 
Hoekema, Trust and Obey:  Toward a New Theory of Punishment, 25 ISRAEL L. REV. 332 (1991).   
45.  As a corollary, a criminal does not deserve a punishment for her crime that is more severe than te 
burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation of restoration she incurs from committing it.  In other 
words, a criminal does not deserve to be punished for her crime more severely than the burdens she is 





will. 46  Assuming she has a good will, she has a stable disposition not to commit crimes 
even under conditions in which she could commit them without fear of being detected 
and punished.    
 To demonstrate that she has a good will, a criminal must demonstrate that she has 
a stable disposition to be appropriately motivated by the moral reasons against 
committing crimes.  Hence, she must demonstrate tha she has a stable disposition to be 
appropriately motivated by the moral reasons against v olating the rights of others.  To 
demonstrate this, she must demonstrate that she has a st ble disposition to care highly 
about the interests of others.47  Such a stable disposition to care is strong evidence of a 
stable disposition to respect the rights of others.  For the moral reasons against violating 
the rights of others are grounded in the interests of others.  To demonstrate that she has 
such a disposition to care, she must demonstrate th she has acted with a sufficiently 
high degree of benevolence for a sufficiently long time after committing her crime.48  For 
the fact that someone acts with a sufficiently high degree of benevolence for a sufficiently 
long time is strong evidence that she has a stable disposition to care highly about the 
                         
46.  As Annette Baier states, when we trust others, we are confident that they have a good will toward us; 
therefore, "reasonable trust will require grounds for such confidence in another's good will...."  Annette 
Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 235 (1986).  
47.  Two points of clarification are in order.  First, the attitude of care at issue is one of respectful care.  It is 
an attitude of caring about others only in ways that respect them as persons.  SeeDARWALL, supra note 
13, at 126-30 (distinguishing an attitude of respect from an attitude of mere care).  Second, I mean only a 
thin sense of care, which might consist in an austere attitude of other regard.  On this sense, for someone to 
care about the interests of others just is for her to place weight on their interests in deliberating about what 
to do.  On this sense, for someone to care highly about the interests of others just is for her to weight their 
interests to a sufficiently high degree relative to her own in deliberating about what to do.  This thn sense of 
care does not have some of the implications of a thicker sense.  For example, on the thin sense, someone 
might care highly about the interests of others without being disposed to grieve when they are harmed or 
rejoice when they are benefited.  Cf. LAWRENCE A. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM AND 
MORALITY 12-15, 146-49 (1980) (discussing a thicker s nse of care and other altruistic emotions in 
which these attitudes do involve dispositions to respond toward their objects with particular feelings). 
48.  I refer here only to a thin sense of benevolence that consists in caring about the interests of others in the 
same thin sense I spell out in supra note 47.  On this sense, a high degree of benevolence involves 
weighting the interests of others to a sufficiently high degree relative to one's own in deliberating about 





interests of others.49  To demonstrate that she has acted with such benevolence, she must 
sacrifice some of her sufficiently important personal i terests for a sufficiently long time 
for the sake of benefiting others.  To make such a sacrifice for others, the criminal must 
standardly engage in labor intensive community servic , and she must standardly do so 
while incapacitated in some form to mitigate the costs of insecurity that others rationally 
must incur during the interim.  Thus, to fulfill her obligation of restoration, a criminal 
must undertake some burdens.50   
 At this point, we have shown that RS explains why criminals deserve some 
punishment for their crimes.  Now we can show that it plausibly justifies PP's ordinal and 
cardinal rankings.  With respect to its ordinal ranking, RS explains why criminals deserve 
to be punished more severely for committing more seious crimes.  Suppose a criminal 
commits a more serious crime and, thus, disrespects the rights of others to a worse degree 
in committing it.  Then her crime is strong evidenc that she has a worse disposition to 
commit crimes.  Her crime is strong evidence that se has a worse disposition to 
disrespect the rights of others.  Hence, the crime is strong evidence that there is a worse 
deficiency in the degree to which she cares about the interests of others.  On reflection, to 
annul this evidence and demonstrate that she has a st ble disposition to care highly about 
the interests of others, she must demonstrate that she has acted with a higher degree of 
benevolence for a longer time after committing her crime.  To demonstrate this, she must 
sacrifice more of her important personal interests for a longer time for the sake of 
benefiting others.  So she must undertake a more severe burden to restore the conditions 
                         
49.  See, e.g., Michael Bacharach & Diego Gambetta, Trust in Signs, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 148, 154 
(Karen S. Cook ed., 2001) (noting benevolence as a trust-warranting property).  
50.  Like other trust building or maintaining process s, the process of a criminal's fulfilling her obligation of 
restoration has a "multi-layered inferential structure."  Id. at 162.  In addition to undertaking the required 
burdens, other steps might also be necessary to restore the conditions of trust, like apologizing for the crime 
and compensating any victims.  The criminal also might need to undergo some form of therapy and take 
steps to eliminate aspects of her situation that pressure her to commit crimes, such as unemployment and 
corrupting social influences.  Much will depend on the specifics of the case.  Because these other steps ar  





of trust she undermined by committing her crime.  Thus, she must undertake a more 
severe burden to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  So she deserves a more severe 
punishment.  In general, someone who commits a more serious crime deserves a more 
severe punishment for her crime because she must undertake a more severe burden to 
fulfill the obligation of restoration she incurs from committing the crime.   
 With respect to PP's cardinal ranking, RS accounts for the absolute severity of the 
punishments that criminals deserve.  According to RS, the absolute severity of the most 
severe punishment that a criminal deserves for her crime corresponds to the absolute 
severity of the burdens she must undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  In 
general, the absolute severity of such burdens does correspond to the absolute severity of 
the most severe punishment that a criminal seems to deserve for her crime.   
 To illustrate, consider someone who commits a moderately serious crime and, 
thus, disrespects the rights of others to a moderately bad degree in committing it.  Her 
crime is strong evidence that she has a moderately bad disposition to commit crimes.  
Thus, her crime is strong evidence that she has a moderately bad disposition to disrespect 
the rights of others.  So her crime is strong evidence that there is a moderately bad 
deficiency in the degree to which she cares about others.  On reflection, to annul this 
evidence and demonstrate that she has a stable disposit on to care highly about others, she 
must demonstrate that she has acted with a moderately high degree of benevolence for a 
moderately long time after committing her crime.  To demonstrate this, she must sacrifice 
some of her moderately important personal interests for a moderately long time for the 
sake of benefiting others.  So she must undertake no more than a moderately severe 
burden to restore the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime.  
Hence, she deserves no more than a moderately severe punishment for her crime.  By 
parity of reasoning, a mildly serious criminal deserves no more than a mildly severe 
punishment for her crime, and an extremely serious criminal deserves an extremely 





 VI.  Critical Discussion 
A.  A Specific Deterrence Theory     
 Critics might argue that RS is at best only one among two theories that each 
justifies PP.  They might concede that criminals have n obligation of restoration.  But 
contrary to RS, they might argue that criminals need not demonstrate that they have a 
good will to fulfill it.  Rather they can fulfill it merely by demonstrating that they have a 
deterred will in the sense that they have a stable disposition not to commit crimes out of 
fear of being punished for committing them.  The critics might claim that a criminal 
deserves a punishment that is no more severe than the one she must undertake to 
demonstrate that she has a deterred will.  Call this specific deterrence theory 'SD.'  
 In response, SD does identify an important potential value of imposing a deserved 
punishment on a criminal:  the punishment might deter her from committing some crimes 
in the future.  But SD does not justify PP.  A criminal will be deterred from committing a 
crime by its expected punishment.  The crime's expected punishment is the product of its 
severity and probability of punishment.  Its severity of punishment is the severity of the 
punishment that the state would impose on her for committing it.  Its probability of 
punishment is the criminal's subjective probability that the state would detect and punish 
her if she were to commit it.  Given that a criminal will be deterred by a crime's expected 
punishment, it is not practically feasible to use sp cific deterrence as the basis for 
determining how much to punish her because there is no practically feasible way to 
control precisely a crime's probability of punishment across all the situations in which she 
will find herself.  As a consequence of the inevitable variability in a crime's probability of 
punishment, SD does not justify PP's cardinal ranking.  In many situations, a crime's 
probability of punishment will be too low to justify a deserved punishment on specific 
deterrence grounds, whereas in many others, it will be too high.  Contrary to SD, how 
much a criminal deserves to be punished does not vary with any crime's probability of 





 To illustrate, consider a moderately serious criminal who deserves to be punished 
no more than moderately severely.  On the one hand, she will commonly find herself in 
situations in which her crime's probability of punishment is insignificant.  In these 
situations, she will be significantly confident that she can commit the crime without being 
detected or punished.  Such situations are frequent and unavoidable because states do not 
have the resources to maintain a significant probability of punishment for criminals 
across all the situations in which they will find themselves.51  Maintaining such a 
probability is especially difficult given that a criminal might ignore or be overly 
optimistic about her ability to avoid detection.  In such situations, there is no strong 
reason to believe that the threat of a moderately severe punishment will be sufficient to 
deter the criminal from committing the crime:  it is likely that only the threat of a much 
more severe punishment will deter her if any will.  So with respect to these situations, SD 
entails that the criminal deserves either no punishment at all or a punishment that is much 
more than moderately severe.  Either way SD's consequences for her are either too lenient 
or too harsh.    
 On the other hand, the criminal will also commonly find herself in situations in 
which her crime's probability of punishment is significant.  In these situations, she will be 
significantly confident that she cannot commit the crime without being detected and 
punished.  In these situations, there is no strong eason to believe that the threat of a 
moderately severe punishment will be necessary to deter her from committing the crime:  
it is likely that the threat of a much less severe punishment will be sufficient.  In general, 
criminals have little incentive to commit a crime in situations in which its probability of 
punishment is significant given that they will inevitably find themselves in situations in 
which its probability of punishment is insignificant.  So with respect to situations in 
                         
51.  See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?  A Behavioral Science 
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 184 (2004); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The 
Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Lw Rules:  At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. 





which a crime's probability of punishment is significant, SD entails that the criminal 
deserves at most a punishment that is much less than moderately severe.  Here SD's 
consequences for her are too lenient.       
 The critics might concede that SD does not justify PP's cardinal ranking but argue 
that it still justifies the ordinal ranking.  They might argue that to reduce the costs of 
insecurity that others must incur because she undermin d conditions of trust, a criminal 
must demonstrate that she has a marginally deterred will in the sense that she has a stable 
disposition to minimize the harm she would cause in pursuing her criminal objectives.  In 
general, more serious crimes are more harmful than less serious crimes.  So to 
demonstrate that she is marginally deterred, a criminal must demonstrate that she is 
disposed to choose a less serious crime over a more serious crime in pursuing her 
criminal objectives.  In general, a criminal will be marginally deterred if the punishments 
for more serious crimes are more severe than those for l ss serious crimes.  So to 
demonstrate that she is marginally deterred, a criminal must undertake more severe 
punishments for committing more serious crimes.  Thus, a criminal deserves to be 
punished more severely for committing more serious crimes.     
 In response, SD does not even justify PP's ordinal ranking for two reasons.  First, 
to reduce the costs of insecurity that others must incur because she undermined conditions 
of trust, a criminal at most must demonstrate that s e is marginally deterred only with 
respect to crimes that are substitutes.52  Two crimes are substitutes just in case increasing 
the expected punishment of one will increase the demand for the other.53  For example, 
armed robbery and unarmed robbery are substitutes because increasing the expected 
punishment of unarmed robbery beyond that of armed robbery will increase the demand 
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for armed robbery, as criminals will have no incentive not to use firearms to facilitate 
their robberies.  For another example, suppose "a murder-theft" consists in someone's 
murdering another in the course of a theft, and "a mere theft" consists in someone's 
committing a theft without murdering anyone.54  Murder-theft and mere theft are 
substitutes because increasing the expected punishment of mere theft beyond that of 
murder-theft will increase the demand for murder-theft, as criminals will have no 
incentive not to use murder to facilitate their thef s.  Not all crimes, though, are 
substitutes.  For example, rape is much more serious than theft, but presumably they are 
not substitutes because increasing the expected punishment of one will not increase the 
demand for the other, since a criminal's decision to commit one does not depend on the 
expected punishment of the other.  If two crimes are not substitutes, then a criminal 
would not choose between them, and so no one would rationally incur any costs of 
insecurity on the assumption that she would choose between them.  Hence, if two crimes 
are not substitutes, a criminal need not demonstrate h t she is disposed to choose the less 
serious one over the more serious one.  And so if two crimes are not substitutes, SD does 
not explain why a criminal who performs the more serious one deserves to be punished 
more severely than a criminal who performs the less s rious one. 
 Second, even if a criminal must demonstrate that se is marginally deterred with 
respect to all crimes, SD still does not justify PP's ordinal ranking.  As we have noted, a 
criminal is deterred by a crime's expected punishment, not by its severity of punishment 
considered by itself.  So to demonstrate that she i marginally deterred, a criminal need 
only undertake higher expected punishments for committing more serious crimes.  But 
she need not undertake more severe punishments to undertake higher expected 
punishments.  Assuming the probability of punishment is higher for more serious crimes, 
such crimes can have higher expected punishments than less serious crimes even though 
                         





their severity of punishment is lower.55  Because states devote more resources to 
investigating and prosecuting more serious crimes, their probability of punishment is 
generally higher than the probability of punishment of less serious crimes.  As a 
consequence, a criminal need not undertake more severe punishments for committing 
more serious crimes to demonstrate that she is marginally deterred.  For even if the 
severity of punishment for two crimes were the same, th  lower probability of punishment 
of the less serious crime would be an incentive to ch ose it over the more serious crime.  
Thus, SD does not explain why a criminal deserves to be punished more severely for 
committing more serious crimes.   
B.  A General Deterrence Theory    
 Critics might argue that RS is implausible because its obligation of restoration is 
too narrow.  When someone commits a crime, she does undermine conditions of trust 
regarding herself.  However, she also undermines conditi ns of trust between others.  For 
her crime is strong evidence that others are also disposed to commit crimes.  As a 
consequence of her crime, others are not justified in believing of each other that they are 
not disposed to commit crimes.  More precisely, they ar  not justified in believing this 
with as high a credence as they would have been justified in believing it if she had not 
committed her crime.  As a result, others will incur additional costs of insecurity.  To 
avoid causing others to incur these additional costs, the criminal is obligated to restore 
not only the conditions of trust regarding herself, but also the ones between others that 
she undermined by committing her crime.  Because RS claims that she is obligated to 
restore only the former conditions, its obligation of restoration is too narrow.  To restore 
the latter conditions, the criminal must undertake  punishment to signal to others that 
they too stand to be punished if they commit crimes.  Undertaking the punishment would 
restore the conditions of trust between others by justifying others in believing of each 
                         





other that they are generally deterred from committing crimes.  Call this general 
deterrence theory 'GD.'56   
 In response, GD does identify an important potential value of imposing a deserved 
punishment on a criminal:  the punishment might deter o hers from committing some 
crimes in the future.  But as a theory of punitive desert, GD is implausible for at least four 
reasons.  First, when someone commits a crime, her crime is strong evidence that she is 
disposed to commit crimes.  Because her disposition are in some sense causally 
responsible for her acts, she was disposed to commit cri es at the time of her crime.  And 
the fact that she was so disposed at the time of her crime is strong evidence that she is 
similarly disposed at later times.  Contrary to GD, though, her crime is not strong 
evidence that others are disposed to commit crimes.  Their dispositions were not causally 
responsible for her crime.  And the mere fact that one person has a particular disposition 
is not strong inductive evidence on which to infer that others are similarly disposed.  So 
by committing her crime, the criminal did not undermine conditions of trust between 
others to any significant degree.  Her crime did not significantly reduce the credence with 
which others are justified in believing of each other that they are not disposed to commit 
crimes.  So in response to her crime, others are not rati nally required to incur any 
significant costs of insecurity on the grounds thatey are no longer warranted in trusting 
each other not to commit crimes.     
 Second, suppose for the sake of argument that everyon  knows others will commit 
future crimes unless a criminal is punished for her crime.  The criminal is still not 
obligated to undertake a punishment as a means to deterring them.  In general, a person is 
obligated to prevent herself only from causing others harm; a person is not obligated to 
                         
56.  GD is similar to the trust based theories of punitive desert defended by both Dimock and Hoekema.  
They suggest that a criminal deserves to be punished because punishing her is necessary to restore or 
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punishing the criminal restores or maintains such conditions by deterring people generally from committing 
crimes.  See Dimock, supra note 44, at 51-54; Hoekema, supra note 44, at 345-50.  Unlike RS, neither 





prevent herself from merely allowing others harm.57  Presumably, if the criminal were not 
to undertake a punishment, she would merely allow the potential criminals to commit the 
future crimes, and she would merely allow everyone t  incur additional costs of insecurity 
in response to the fact that they would not be justified in believing that the potential 
criminals are not disposed to commit crimes.  The pot ntial criminals would be the sole 
cause of both harms.  For in general, a person is responsible only for whether she 
commits crimes and only for what others are justified in believing about her own 
dispositions.  In general, a person is not responsible for whether someone else commits 
crimes or for what others are justified in believing about the dispositions of someone else.  
 Third, suppose for the sake of argument that a criminal does cause conditions of 
trust between others to be undermined or would cause them to be undermined by not 
undertaking a punishment.  GD still does not justify PP for the same reasons SD does not. 
 People are generally deterred from committing a crime by its expected punishment.  
Because it is not practically feasible to control precisely a crime's probability of 
punishment across all situations, it is not practiclly feasible to use general deterrence as 
the basis for determining how much to punish a criminal.  In many situations, a crime's 
probability of punishment will be too low to justify a deserved punishment on general 
deterrence grounds, whereas in many others, it will be too high.   
 Fourth, GD violates a conceptual truth about punitive desert.  According to the 
constraint on penal substitution, the fact that a criminal deserves a punishment cannot be 
annulled by others undertaking burdens on her behalf.58  Thus, a criminal's obligation to 
undertake certain burdens that makes her deserving of punishment cannot be fulfilled 
                         
57.  See, e.g., Warren Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences:  The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 
98 PHIL. REV. 287 (1989); Samuel Scheffler, Doing and Allowing, 114 ETHICS 215 (2004); BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM:  FOR AND AGAINST 75, 93-95, 99 
(J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973). 
58.  Cf. DAVID LEWIS, Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?, in PAPERS IN ETHICS AND SOCIAL 





vicariously by others undertaking burdens on her behalf.  RS satisfies the constraint on 
penal substitution.  When a criminal undermines conditions of trust regarding herself, 
only she can restore those conditions by sacrificing some of her own personal interests for 
the sake of benefiting others.  Only by making such a sacrifice can she demonstrate to 
others that she has a good will.  So only she can fulfill her obligation of restoration under 
RS by undertaking the relevant burdens on her own.  GD, however, violates the constraint 
on penal substitution.  For suppose a criminal does undermine conditions of trust between 
others, and suppose she is obligated to restore them.  Even so, others could restore those 
conditions on her behalf by sacrificing some of their own personal interests for the sake 
of benefiting others.  By doing so, they would demonstrate to each other that they each 
have a good will.  So others could vicariously fulfill the criminal's wider obligation of 
restoration under GD by undertaking burdens on her behalf.  As a consequence, even if a 
criminal is obligated to restore conditions of trus between others, this obligation does not 
make her deserving of punishment because the obligation could be fulfilled by penal 
substitution.59   
C.  The Gradational Character of Conditions of Trust 
 Critics might argue that RS is too lenient.  Consider a repeat criminal who 
commits two crimes at two different times.  Because sh  undermined conditions of trust 
by committing her first crime, she did not undermine any by committing her second.  
They were already undermined when she committed her second.  So her second crime 
does not generate an obligation of restoration.  Thus, RS unacceptably entails that she 
does not deserve to be punished for her second crime.     
 In response, RS does entail that the repeat criminal deserves to be punished for her 
second crime because she did undermine conditions of trust by committing it.  Under the 
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conditions of trust regarding someone, others are justified in believing with a particular 
credence that she is not disposed to commit crimes.60  As such, conditions of trust have a 
gradational character and can be undermined to varius degrees in various ways.  By 
committing her first crime, the criminal undermined conditions of trust only to a degree:  
her first crime justifies others in believing with an unduly high credence that she has a 
particularly bad disposition to commit crimes.  So her first crime provides others with 
particularly strong evidence that she has a particularly bad deficiency in the degree to 
which she cares about others.  By committing her second crime, she undermined 
conditions of trust to an even worse degree:  her second crime justifies others in believing 
with an even higher credence that she is disposed to commit crimes.  Depending on the 
seriousness and timing of her second crime, it might also justify others in believing that 
she has an even worse disposition to commit crimes.  For example, she might be disposed 
to commit more serious crimes, and she might be disposed to commit crimes with a 
higher frequency, in a broader range of situations, a d against a broader range of people.  
Hence, her second crime provides others with even stro ger evidence that she has the 
same or worse deficiency in the degree to which she car s about others.  Because the 
repeat criminal did undermine conditions of trust by committing her second crime, RS 
entails that she is obligated to restore them and so de erves to be punished for her second 
crime.61       
                         
60.  A person's credence in a belief is her subjectiv  probability or degree of confidence that the belief is 
true.  For discussion on the concept of subjective probabilities and their relation to objective probabilities, 
see DAVID LEWIS, A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS:  
VOLUME II 83 (1986). 
61.  Assuming repeat criminals deserve to be punished more severely than first time criminals, the repeat 
criminal deserves to be punished more severely for her second crime than a first time criminal would 
deserve for committing the same crime.  Cf. Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in 
Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591, 593 (1981).  RS might explain this by, for example, assuming the 
increasing marginal difficulty of restoring conditions of trust:  the worse someone undermines conditis of 
trust the more burdens she must undertake to restore them to a degree.  In this paper, though, I focus 
primarily on first time criminals.  I set aside for further analysis the issue of how much repeat criminals 





 The critics might still argue that RS is too lenient.  Suppose someone commits an 
extremely serious crime late in life.  By doing so,he undermines conditions of trust to an 
extremely bad degree.  To restore them, she must sacrifice some of her extremely 
important personal interests for an extremely long time for the sake of benefiting others.  
However, suppose she cannot make such a lengthy sacrifice given the unavoidable 
constraints on the duration of her life.  Hence, sh cannot restore the conditions of trust 
and so is not obligated to restore them.  For if some ne cannot do something, she is not 
obligated to do it.62  Thus, RS unacceptably entails that she does not deserve to be 
punished.    
 In response, RS does entail that the older extremely serious criminal deserves to 
be punished.  Although she cannot restore the conditi s of trust completely, she can 
restore them partially and so is obligated to restor  hem as much as she can.  Just as 
someone can undermine conditions of trust to a degree, she can restore them to a degree.  
To fulfill her obligation of restoration, she must sacrifice some of her extremely 
important personal interests for as long as she can for the sake of benefiting others.  By 
doing so, she will provide others with strong evidenc  that she has partially rectified the 
extreme deficiency in the degree to which she cares bout others.  As a consequence, 
others will rationally reduce the costs of insecurity they incur in response to her crime.  
Given her obligation of restoration, RS entails shedo s deserve to be punished.      
D.  Timing    
 Critics might still suspect that RS is too lenient.  In a standard case, a person's 
crime is detected shortly after she commits it.  To restore the conditions of trust as 
quickly as is reasonably possible, she must demonstrate that she has acted with a high 
degree of benevolence for a long time after her crime.  To do so, she must sacrifice some 
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of her important personal interests for a long time for the sake of benefiting others.  
However, suppose someone commits a crime that goes undetected for a very long time.  
In the interim, she avoids any criminal activity but does not act with a high degree of 
benevolence and so does not undertake any significant burdens.  By merely avoiding 
criminal activity for so long, though, she restores the conditions of trust she undermined 
by committing her crime.63  Thus, RS unacceptably entails that she does not deserve to be 
punished when her crime is eventually detected.   
 In response, either RS does not have this implication or it is acceptable.  On the 
one hand, if the criminal committed a very serious crime, she cannot restore the 
conditions of trust by merely avoiding criminal activity for a very long time.  Her crime is 
such strong evidence that she has such a serious deficiency in the degree to which she 
cares about others that she cannot annul such evidence unless she acts with a high degree 
of benevolence for a long time after committing hercrime.  To demonstrate that she has a 
stable disposition to care highly about others, she must sacrifice some of her important 
personal interests for a long time for the sake of benefiting others.  Thus, if she is a very 
serious criminal, RS entails that she does deserve to b punished because she must 
undertake some burdens to restore the conditions of trust.      
 On the other hand, if the criminal did not commit a very serious crime, she might 
have restored the conditions of trust by merely avoiding criminal activity for a very long 
time.  If so, then RS does entail that she does not deserve to be punished when her crime 
is eventually detected.  In this case, she is merely obligated to compensate her victims for 
any harm she caused them.  Contrary to the critics, this implication is acceptable.  Its 
intuitive plausibility is reflected in the widespread adoption of statutes of limitation, 
which generally bar states from prosecuting someone f r a mildly or moderately serious 
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crime that she committed a sufficiently long time before the prosecution would begin.  RS 
reflects one rationale behind such statutes:  they pr vent states from punishing criminals 
who have restored the conditions of trust by avoiding criminal activity for a sufficiently 
long time.64    
E.  Restorative Signaling    
 Critics might again argue that RS is too lenient.  According to RS, a criminal 
deserves to be punished no more severely than the burd ns she must undertake to fulfill 
her obligation of restoration.  To fulfill it, she must send others a restorative signal, which 
is a directly observable property that is strong evid nce of her acting with the required 
degree of benevolence for the required time after committing her crime.65  The critics 
might contend that some restorative signals are costless and so do not require criminals to 
undertake any burdens.  For example, a restorative signal might consist in one's merely 
apologizing verbally for her crime and claiming to care highly about others for a long 
time.  If some restorative signals are costless, then RS unacceptably entails that criminals 
do not deserve to be punished.   
 In response, a restorative signal cannot be costless.  By definition, a restorative 
signal is credible; it justifies others in believing that the criminal has acted with the 
                         
64.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  
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limitation "prevent the prosecution of those who have been law abiding for some years").  States do have
other more pragmatic reasons for adopting statutes of limitation.  See id. at 875-77.  But if they are 
defensible on the basis of punitive desert, they ar not defensible merely on the basis of "purely public 
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required degree of benevolence for the required time.  To be credible and not excessively 
burdensome, a restorative signal must satisfy two conditions.  According to "the incentive 
compatibility condition,"66 a restorative signal cannot be too costly for criminals who are 
benevolent to the required degree for the required t me.  So the all-in costs of a restorative 
signal must not be greater than its all-in benefits for criminals who are benevolent to the 
required degree for the required time.  The all-in be efits of a restorative signal for a 
criminal consist in all the expected consequences of her sending it that she desires to 
obtain; its all-in costs for her consist in all the expected consequences of her sending it 
that she desires not to obtain.67  According to "the non-pooling condition,"68 a restorative 
signal must be too costly for criminals who are not benevolent to the required degree for 
the required time.  So the all-in costs of a restorative signal must be greater than its all-in 
benefits for criminals who are not benevolent to the required degree for the required 
time.69      
 Any apparent restorative signal that is costless would not be credible because it 
would violate the non-pooling condition.  If an act is costless, it is not too costly for 
people who are not at all benevolent.  Any costless act might be performed by criminals 
who do not place any weight on the interests of others relative to their own in deliberating 
                         
66.  Bacharach & Gambetta, supra note 49, at 160.  
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anomalous exceptions are consistent with its being sufficiently credible.  Thus, a restorative signal c n have 





about what to do.  For example, criminals who do not care at all about others might 
merely apologize verbally for their crimes and claim to care highly about others.  Thus, 
restorative signals cannot be costless.  Because they must be costly and, hence, 
burdensome for the criminals obligated to send them, RS does not entail that criminals 
deserve no punishment.   
 Exactly how burdensome a restorative signal must be depends on how 
benevolently a criminal must act and for how long to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  
Suppose a criminal must act with a particular degre of benevolence, B, for a particular 
time, t, to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  Suppose a person who is B cares equally 
about promoting a particular amount, S, of her own interests and promoting a minimal 
interest, M, of others.  B's benevolence factor, f, equals S/M, where S>>M.70  So a person 
who is B is willing to sacrifice S of her own interests solely for the sake of promoting M 
interests of others.71  To demonstrate that she has acted with B for t, she must sacrifice tS 
of her own interests solely for the sake of promoting M interests of others.72  Hence, a 
burden with a severity of -tS is the least severe burden she must undertake to demonstrate 
that she has acted with B for t.  For this is the least severe burden that would satisfy the 
                         
70.  Other things being equal, people are not obligated to act with such a high degree of benevolence.  
Indeed, other things being equal, acting with such a high degree of benevolence would constitute a 
rationally deficient form of self-abnegation.  But when a person commits a crime, other things are not qual. 
 The criminal incurs an obligation of restoration, a d she must act with such a high degree of benevolence 
to fulfill it.  
71.  In clarification, two conditions determine the required absolute magnitudes of S and M.  First, the 
absolute magnitude of the ratio S/M must be sufficiently high.  Second, the absolute magnitude of the 
difference between S and M must also be sufficiently high.  A criminal's sacrificing S of her own interests 
solely for the sake of promoting M interests of others will demonstrate the required degree of benevolence 
only if S/M and S-M are both sufficiently high.   
 On a related note, the badness of the deficiency in the degree to which a criminal cares about 
others depends on two similar conditions.  Suppose the criminal is willing to harm M interests of others to 
promote S of her own interests.  The badness of her deficiency depends on the absolute magnitude of both 
S/M and S-M.  The lower they are the worse the deficiency. 
72.  The units of t consist in the time required for the criminal to sacrifice S of her own interests for the sake 
of promoting M interests of others.  So t corresponds to the number of benevolent acts she must undertake 
to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  As a corollary, t corresponds to the number of times the criminal 





incentive compatibility and non-pooling conditions on the credibility of a restorative 
signal.   
 First, the burden would satisfy the incentive compatibility condition because for a 
criminal who is B for t, sacrificing tS of her own i terests solely for the sake of 
promoting tM interests of others would not be too cstly.  For her, the all-in costs of 
doing so would not be greater than the all-in benefits o  doing so; they would be equal.  
The all-in benefits to her would equal the degree to which she cares about the interests 
she would promote in others:  ftM.  The all-in costs to her would equal the degree to 
which she cares about the interests she would sacrifice in herself:  tS.  Because f=S/M, 
ftM=tS.    
 Second, the burden would satisfy the non-pooling condition because for a criminal 
who is not B for t, sacrificing tS of her own interests solely for the sake of promoting tM 
interests of others would be too costly.  For her, the all-in costs of doing so would be 
greater than the all-in benefits of doing so.  To consider a simple case, suppose for t she is 
benevolent to a lesser degree B" whose benevolence factor, f", is such that f"<f.  The all-
in benefits to her would equal f"tM.  The all-in costs to her would equal tS.  Because 
f=S/M and f"<f, tS>f"tM.   
 Third, any less severe burden would violate the non-p oling condition because for 
a criminal who is not B for t, sacrificing any less than tS of her own interests solely for 
the sake of promoting tM interests of others would not be too costly.  For her, the all-in 
costs of doing so would be less than or equal to the all-in benefits of doing so.  Suppose 
the lesser sacrifice is tS-E.  Suppose also that for t she is benevolent to a lesser degree B" 
whose benevolence factor, f", is such that (tS-E)/tM≤f"<f.  The all-in benefits to her 
would equal f"tM.  The all-in costs to her would equal tS-E.  Because f"≥(tS-E)/tM, tS-
E≤f"tM.     
 Given why and how much a restorative signal must be burdensome, we can see 





hand, a restorative signal could standardly consist in labor intensive community service in 
which the criminal labors in gratis to benefit others.  Such labor could consist in the 
burdensome production, maintenance, or distribution of resources that benefit others.  
Such resources could range from large scale public resources, such as buildings, parks, 
and roads, to small scale private resources, such as food, health care, or education.  The 
direct beneficiaries of such labor could range from the direct victims of her crime to third 
parties.  So under RS, punishments should ideally take he form of labor intensive 
community service performed under reasonable conditi s of incapacitation to minimize 
the costs of insecurity that others must rationally must incur while the service is 
performed.      
 On the other hand, a restorative signal could not standardly consist in a criminal's 
merely resisting the temptation to commit crimes.  In a standard case of resisting 
temptation, a person sacrifices some of her own interes s for the sake of promoting the 
interests of others whom she would otherwise harm.  So by resisting temptation, a 
criminal could demonstrate that she cares about the in erests of others to some degree and 
has the ability to restrain herself to some degree from promoting her own interests at the 
expense of others.  Hence, resisting temptation could restore to some degree the 
conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime.  But that said, merely 
resisting temptation would standardly be neither a p actical nor an effective means of 
fulfilling a criminal's obligation of restoration.   
 It would be impractical for a very serious criminal in the state's custody because 
the conditions under which her resisting temptation might constitute a restorative signal 
would standardly be too risky to others or too difficult to devise and implement once or 
repeatedly.  For resisting temptation to constitute a r storative signal, the criminal must 
have an apparent opportunity to commit other crimes with impunity.  To provide her with 
one, the state must put her in a position in which she believes can commit a crime with 





degree, putting her in a position in which she actully can commit a crime with impunity 
would standardly pose an unacceptably high risk to her potential victims.  Alternatively, 
devising and implementing conditions under which she cannot commit a crime with 
impunity but nevertheless believes she can would standardly be too difficult to do once or 
repeatedly, especially for very serious crimes.     
 Merely resisting temptation would also be an ineffective means of fulfilling a 
criminal's obligation of restoration in a timely manner because it would standardly not 
demonstrate that she has acted with a sufficiently high degree of benevolence.  In a 
standard case of resisting temptation, a person sacrifices only her minor interests that she 
cares about to a minor degree.  Consider standard cases of resisting the temptation to steal 
from, cheat, or assault another.  Her sacrifice will standardly seem especially minor to her 
because it is a mere "foregone gain" as opposed to a loss of something to which she has 
been entitled.  Other things being equal, a person tends to care much less about foregoing 
goods to which she has not been entitled than losing goods to which she has.73   
 Given that merely resisting temptation could not standardly constitute a 
restorative signal, critics might argue that labor intensive community service also could 
not.  An act is a restorative signal only if it justifies others in believing that in performing 
it, the actor sacrificed some of her important personal interests for the sake of benefiting 
others.  Unless the actor made the sacrifices with the right motive, her act would not 
justify others in believing that she is disposed to care highly about others.  In performing 
labor intensive community service, a criminal does sacrifice some of her important 
personal interests.  However, the critics might argue that the service could not be a 
restorative signal because there is no way for others to verify that the criminal performed 
it with the right motive.  For all they know, the criminal might have performed it merely 
                         
73.  This is an instance of the "endowment effect."  See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. 






for the sake of convincing others that she is trustworthy in order to obtain the personal 
benefits of being trusted.  Such benefits might include close friendships and highly 
valuable employment.  Assuming labor intensive community service cannot constitute a 
restorative signal, then nothing can.  So RS does nt explain why any criminals deserve to 
be punished.   
 In response, labor intensive community service could be a restorative signal 
because there are two ways in which others could be justified in believing that it was 
performed with the right motive.  First, people might have a mechanism for directly 
detecting the motive with which the service was performed.  For example, people seem to 
have a mechanism for directly detecting the intention with which others perform their 
acts.  As Oliver Wendell Holmes said, even a dog can distinguish between being kicked 
and merely tripped over.74  Assuming people can directly detect the intention with which 
a criminal performs labor intensive community service, they might be able to detect 
directly the motive with which she performs it.  Inothers words, they might be able to 
detect directly whether she performs it for the sake of benefiting others or for the sake of 
something else, like her own long-term personal interests.     
 Second, even if people cannot detect directly the motives with which a criminal 
performs labor intensive community service, they can still be justified in believing that 
she performed it with the right motive.  For the conditions under which she performs the 
service might be structured such that she does not know whether others would extend her 
the personal benefits of trust if she were to perform the service.  Assuming the criminal 
performs the service under such conditions of ignora ce, then her performing it for the 
sake of benefiting others can be the inference to the best explanation of what motivated 
her in performing it.75  To facilitate such conditions, others should not treat a criminal's 
                         
74.  See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881) (stating that "even a dog distinguishes being 
stumbled over and being kicked"). 





punishment as a quid pro quo in which they promise to xtend her the personal benefits of 
trust in exchange for her undertaking the punishment.    
 Suppose, though, that a criminal performs the requi d labor intensive community 
service, but she does so without the right motive.  She sacrifices some of her important 
personal interests not for the sake of benefiting others, but for the sake of promoting her 
own long-term personal interests in anticipation of receiving the benefits of trust.  Her 
service might still be a weak restorative signal in the sense that it is still some evidence 
she is not disposed to commit crimes.  Criminals tend to be impulsive, lacking self-
control.76  They tend to act on the basis of what would best promote their own short term 
personal interests.  So in deliberation, they tend to iscount highly the value of future 
benefits and harms relative to the value of those more present.  They tend not to make 
significant short term sacrifices for the sake of promoting long term gains even for 
themselves.  Their impulsiveness significantly weakens the deterrent effect of the threat 
of punishment since they are much more concerned with realizing the more immediate 
gains of crime than avoiding the more distant harm of punishment.  And as a result of 
their impulsiveness, they give priority to their own present interests over the interests of 
others.   
 When a criminal performs labor intensive community service even for the sake of 
benefiting her own long term personal interests, she demonstrates greater self-control and 
a lack of impulsiveness.  By making significant short term sacrifices for the sake of 
promoting long term gains even for herself, she demonstrates that she no longer tends to 
act merely on the basis of what would best promote her own present interests.  As a 
consequence, her service is still some evidence that she is no longer disposed to commit 
crimes.  For it is evidence that the threat of punishment will have a greater deterrent effect 
                         
76.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON:  THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE 
EMOTIONS 161-62 (1988) (noting that criminals are typically impulsive); MICHAEL R. 
GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 85-120 (1990) (noting that 





on her, and it is evidence that she is in a better position to resist promoting her own short 
term interests at the expense of others.  So labor intensive community service performed 
even from self-interested motives might restore partially the conditions of trust a criminal 
undermined by committing her crime.  
F.  The Character of Criminals    
 Critics might argue that RS's assumptions about the character of criminals are 
implausible because they are in tension with the situationist research tradition in social 
psychology.77  Situationists contend that most people do not have global character traits.78 
 A global character trait is such that if a person p ssesses it, she is highly likely to engage 
in trait-relevant behavior in each trait-relevant eliciting situation in which she might be.79 
 Situationists also contend that most people's chara ter is not evaluatively integrated.80  
An evaluatively integrated character consists of almost all good traits or almost all bad 
ones.81  Unlike an evaluatively integrated character, most people's character contains 
many good traits and many bad ones.82   
 Assuming situationism, the critics might infer that most criminals do not have a 
global character trait of criminal deviance:  a criminal is not highly likely to commit any 
type of crime in any situation in which she could do so.  Assuming most criminals do not 
have a global character trait of criminal deviance, th  critics might argue that no one 
could rationally incur the costs of insecurity to any significant degree in response to 
                         
77.  On situationism, see, e.g, JOHN DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER:  PERSONALITY AND MORAL 
BEHAVIOR (2002); WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASESSMENT (1968); LEE ROSS & 
RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991); Peter B. M. Vranas, The 
Indeterminacy Paradox:  Character Evaluations and Human Psychology, 39 NOUS 1 (2005).  
78.  See DORIS, supra note 77, at 24-25. 
79.  See id. at 19, 22.  
80.  See id. at 25. 
81.  See id. at 22.    





someone's committing a crime.  So criminals do not have an obligation of restoration.   
 In response, RS does not rest on the implausible assumption that most criminals 
have a global character trait of criminal deviance.  It assumes only that most criminals 
have a general character trait of criminal deviance:  for a broad range of crimes and 
common situations, a criminal is too likely to perform any of them over a significant run 
of such situations.  Unlike a global character trait of criminal deviance, a general one does 
not range over all possible crimes and situations.  It ranges over only a broad subset of 
crimes and situations in which a criminal will commonly find herself.83  Unlike a global 
character trait of criminal deviance, a general one do s not assume that a criminal is 
highly likely to commit a crime in any particular situation.  Indeed, it does not even 
assume that a criminal is highly likely to commit a crime in any run of situations.  It 
merely assumes that a criminal is too likely to commit one in a significant run of common 
situations.84  What is too likely is what is so likely that others are rationally required to 
incur the costs of insecurity to a significant degree.  Because crimes are so harmful to 
others, what is too likely could be significantly less than what is highly likely, assuming a 
high probability is greater than 0.5.  Even if the probability of a criminal's committing a 
crime over a significant run of common situations is less than 0.5, the expected harm of 
her doing so could still be fearful.   
 Assuming most criminals have a general character trait of criminal deviance, 
criminals have an obligation of restoration because they will cause others to incur the 
costs of insecurity to a significant degree by not res oring the conditions of trust they 
                         
83.  Some crimes under some descriptions are literal y unrepeatable, like matricide or patricide.  But even 
these undermine conditions of trust because even these are strong evidence that their perpetrator is disposed 
to commit crimes.  For when someone commits a crime without a full exculpatory defense, her specific 
crime is strong evidence that she is disposed to commit a broader range of crimes comparable in 
seriousness. 
 
84.  Unlike a global character trait of criminal deviance, a general one concerns the probability of a person's 
committing a crime over a run or aggregate of situations rather than in a single situation.  On the rol of 
aggregation in determining a person's general charater traits, see, e.g, Seymour Epstein, Aggregation and 





undermined by committing their crimes.  Three empirical findings support RS's 
assumption about the character of criminals.  First, there is a high rate of recidivism 
among criminals:  a high percentage of criminals commit multiple crimes at different 
times.85  Second, there is a high rate of versatility or, in other words, a low rate of 
specialization among criminals:  a high percentage of criminals commit multiple types of 
crimes.86  Third, studies indicate that a high percentage of criminals have a stable and 
broad serious deficiency in the degree to which they care about others.87   
 Critics might concede that most criminals have a gneral character trait of 
criminal deviance.  But they still might deny  that a criminal has an obligation of 
                         
85.  See, e.g., Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics Special Report, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (among 300,000 
prisoners released in 15 U.S. states, 67.5% were rea rested for a new offense, and 46.9% were reconvicted 
for a new crime within 3 years of their release); GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 76, at 107-08, 
177, 230-31, 253 (noting the high stability of criminals' dispositions to commit crimes, and citing numerous 
research studies in support); cf. Dan Olweus, Stability of Aggressive Reaction Patterns in Males:  A Review, 
86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 852 (1979) (finding a high stability in people's dispositions to engage in antisocial 
aggressive behavior). 
86.  See, e.g., GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 76, at 91-94, 256, 266 (discussing the high rate of 
versatility among criminals, and noting numerous research studies in support); Chester L. Britt, Versatility, 
in THE GENERALITY OF DEVIANCE 173 (Travis Hirschi & Michael R. Gottfredson eds., 1994) (same); 
Alex Piquero, Raymond Paternoster, Paul Mazerolle, Robert Brame & Charles W. Dean, Onset Age and 
Offense Specialization, 36 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 275, 275-76 (1999) (same, stating "[r]esearchers 
investigating the sequencing of offense types over time in criminal offending have generally found that 
offenders exhibit some specialization amid a great d l of versatility"); Leonore M. J. Simon, Do Criminal 
Offenders Specialize in Crime Types?, 6 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 35 (1997) (same, noting 
the high rate of versatility even among white collar criminals, sex offenders, and those who commit crimes 
of domestic violence). 
87.  See, e.g., GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 76, at 89 (stating that criminals tend to be acutely 
"self-centered, indifferent, or insensitive to the suffering and needs of others"); Joshua D. Miller & Donald 
Lynam, Structural Models of Personality and their Relation t  Antisocial Behavior:  A Meta-Analytic 
Review, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 765 (2001) (finding that criminals tend to be acutely unconcerned about the 
interests of others); Michael J. Vitacco & Craig S. Neumann, Angela A. Robertson & Sarah L. Durrant, 
Contributions of Impulsivity and Callousness in theAssessment of Adjudicated Male Adolescents:  A 
Prospective Study, 78 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 87 (2002) (same); cf. Larry Alexander, 
Insufficient Concern:  A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931 (2000) 
(arguing that the mens rea of a crime involves having an insufficient concern for the interests of others); 
Joan McCord, Understanding Motivations:  Considering Altruism and Aggression, in FACTS, 
FRAMEWORKS, AND FORECASTS 115, 126 (Joan McCord ed., 1992) (stating that "crime is a 






restoration because there is nothing she could do to emonstrate that she no longer has 
such a trait.  Assuming situationism, most people have a character that is evaluatively 
integrated to an extremely low degree.  So the fact that someone has one good trait is not 
strong evidence that she has any other good trait.  As a consequence, there is nothing a 
criminal could do that would be strong evidence that she has a good will.  She can 
demonstrate that she has a stable disposition to care highly about others by sacrificing 
some of her sufficiently important personal interests for a sufficiently long time for the 
sake of benefiting others.  But the critics might argue that even this is not strong evidence 
of a stable disposition to be appropriately motivated by the moral reasons against 
violating the rights of others.    
 In response, the critics overestimate the limits on the evaluative integration of 
most people's character.  There are limits.  But none undermines the claim that a stable 
disposition to care highly about others is strong evid nce of a good will.  So none 
undermines the claim that a criminal has an obligation of restoration.  Consider two 
limits.  First, a stable disposition to care highly about others is not strong evidence of a 
perfect will in the sense of a stable disposition t govern oneself perfectly in every 
possible situation.  Almost anyone is disposed to be moderately rude or unkind to others 
in certain stressful situations.  And almost anyone is disposed to perform acts of very 
serious wrongdoing in certain extraordinary situations in which almost anyone would 
"lose her moral compass."88  These situations involve an exculpatory defense.  But a 
stable disposition to care highly about others is still strong evidence of a good will in the 
sense of a stable disposition not to disrespect the rig ts of others in situations not 
involving an exculpatory defense.  For violating the rights of others would standardly 
cause them serious harm, and a stable disposition to care highly about others naturally 
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generates a stable disposition not to harm them so seri usly.  Moreover, the state 
normally issues a standing authoritative demand not to violate people's rights through its 
laws.  For someone with a stable disposition to care highly about others, the state's 
demand only strengthens her disposition not to violate them by anchoring more securely 
her proper moral bearing.89  So although a stable disposition to care highly about others is 
not identical with a stable disposition not to disrespect the rights of others, the former is 
still strong evidence of the latter.90     
 Second, a stable disposition to care highly about s me is not necessarily strong 
evidence of a stable disposition to care highly about others or, therefore, not to commit 
crimes against them.  For example, consider someone who commits a hate crime against 
those of a particular race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, nationality, or socioeconomic 
status.  Although she might have a stable disposition to care highly about some, she does 
not care highly about those in her disfavored group.  She can, though, still demonstrate 
that she has a good will because she can still demonstrate that she has a stable disposition 
not to commit crimes against those in her disfavored group.  To do so, she must 
demonstrate that she has a stable disposition to care highly about them.  She can 
demonstrate this by sacrificing some of her sufficiently important personal interests for a 
sufficiently long time for the sake of benefiting those in the disfavored group.   
G.  The Death Penalty   
 Critics might argue that RS is too harsh because it unacceptably entails that 
criminals standardly deserve the death penalty.  According to the critics, to fulfill her 
                         
89.  Cf. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 179-89 (1974) (discussing the strong 
influence of a state's demands on the motivations of it citizens).  
90.  Thus, it is logically possible that someone could be disposed both to care highly about someone and to 
disrespect her rights.  Such a person might be in the grip of an overly consequentialist or paternalistic 
conception of morality.  In practice, though, criminals tend not to manifest such a motivational defici n y.  
In practice, the disposition to care highly about someone naturally generates a disposition to respect her 
rights, especially those rights protected by the state's law.  Further confirmation for this assumption must 
await the results of longitudinal studies in the social sciences that track the long term behavior of criminals 





obligation of restoration, a criminal must justify others in believing with certainty that she 
is no longer disposed to commit crimes.  To do so, she must undertake the death penalty.   
 In response, RS does not entail that a criminal must justify others in believing 
with certainty that she is no longer disposed to commit crimes.  In other words, RS does 
not entail that a criminal must restore the conditions of trust to a degree of certainty.  To 
fulfill her obligation of restoration, she must restore the conditions of trust only to the 
baseline degree.  In other words, she must justify o hers in believing that she is no longer 
disposed to commit crimes only with the credence with hich they would have been 
justified in believing this if she had not committed her crime.  For if others were justified 
in believing with the baseline credence that she is no longer disposed to commit crimes, 
they would no longer be rationally required to incur additional costs of insecurity in 
response to her crime.  Although the baseline credence must be sufficiently high, it is not 
certainty.  No one is justified in being certain that any living person is not disposed to 
commit crimes.  So to restore the conditions of trust to the baseline degree, the criminal 
need only justify others in believing with the baselin  credence that she has a good will.  
And to do so, she need not undertake the death penalty.   
 The critics might still argue that RS unacceptably entails that criminals standardly 
deserve the death penalty.  After a criminal demonstrates that she has a good will, she 
would no longer cause others to incur the costs of insecurity.  However, during the time 
required to demonstrate that she has a good will, she would cause others to incur such 
costs even if she were incapacitated.  For example, if she were incapacitated in a state 
prison, she would cause her fellow inmates and prison officials to incur such costs.  To 
avoid imposing such costs on others, she must undertake the death penalty immediately 
after she commits her crime.  Thus, she must undertak  the death penalty to fulfill her 
obligation of restoration.      
 In response, to mitigate the costs of insecurity that she causes others to incur, a 





will.  But RS does not entail that she is obligated to undertake the death penalty to 
prevent herself from causing others to incur the costs f insecurity while she is 
incapacitated.  A person's obligation not to cause oth rs harm has a limit.  Under the 
limit, a person is obligated to undertake the means necessary to prevent herself from 
causing others harm only if the means are not extremely worse for her than the harm she 
would otherwise cause them.  Under standard conditis, the death penalty would be 
extremely worse for a criminal than the individual or aggregate costs of insecurity she 
would otherwise cause others to incur while she is incapacitated.  As a further 
consequence, a criminal does not standardly deserve to b  incapacitated under the 
conditions that would literally minimize the degree to which others would be vulnerable 
to her.  Such conditions, which might involve straightjackets and various forms of 
sensory deprivation, would also standardly run afoul of the limit at issue.  
H.  The Entailment     
 Critics might concede that RS explains why a criminal has an obligation of 
restoration.  But they might deny that it explains why she deserves to be punished.  To 
explain why a criminal deserves to be punished, a theory must explain why the state 
would not violate her rights by punishing her against her will.  Punishing a criminal 
against her will, though, would not fulfill her obligation of restoration because to fulfill it, 
she must undertake the punishment voluntarily.  Because punishing a criminal against her 
will would not fulfill her obligation of restoration, RS does not explain why she deserves 
to be punished. 
 In response, it is true that punishing a criminal against her will would not fulfill 
her obligation of restoration.  But RS still explains why a criminal deserves to be 
punished on the basis of her obligation of restorati n.  RS explains why a criminal must 
undertake certain burdens as a means to fulfilling the obligation of restoration she incurs 
from committing her crime.  For three related reasons, which we discussed earlier, the 





undertake the burdens.  She has a derivative obligation to undertake the means necessary 
to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  Second, she is obligated to consent to undertake 
the burdens.  Third, she would be unjustly enriched by not undertaking the burdens.  For 
by not undertaking them, she would not only violate her obligation of restoration, but also 
obtain a benefit from the violation consisting in her freedom from the burdens necessary 
to fulfill it.  Each of these related claims entails that the criminal has no right to be free 
from the burdens necessary to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  So if she refuses to 
undertake the burdens voluntarily and violates her obligation of restoration, the state 
would not violate her rights by imposing them on her as a punishment against her will.  
I.  One Problem with Defiant Criminals   
 Critics might argue that RS does not explain why a defiant criminal deserves a 
punishment that the state could impose on her.  A defiant criminal unconditionally refuses 
to undertake any punishment of any form.  So the state cannot impose on her a 
punishment with a restorative form, such that her voluntarily undertaking it with the right 
motive would fulfill her obligation of restoration.  Because a punishment with a 
restorative form consists in labor intensive community service, the state can impose such 
a punishment only on a criminal who is at least mini ally cooperative.  Assuming a 
defiant criminal deserves only a punishment with a restorative form, RS does not explain 
why she deserves a punishment that the state could impose on her.   
 In response, RS does entail that fully cooperative criminals deserve only 
punishments with a restorative form.  Because they ar  willing to undertake such 
punishments to fulfill their obligation of restoration, they have a right to undertake them 
instead of punishments with a non-restorative form.  Unlike fully cooperative criminals, 
however, defiant criminals deserve even punishments with a non-restorative form, which 
might consist in a mere burdensome form of incapacitation.  Because a punishment with a 
restorative form is not possible for a defiant criminal, she will be unjustly enriched unless 





the severity of the burdens she must undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  
Imposing such a punishment on her is the only means of preventing her from receiving 
the benefit of being free from the burdens necessary to fulfill her obligation of restoration. 
 Because a defiant criminal would be unjustly enriched unless she receives a punishment 
with a non-restorative form, she deserves such a punishment.   
J.  A Second Problem with Defiant Criminals 
 Critics might argue that RS is too harsh because it unacceptably entails that any 
defiant criminal deserves an endless stream of punishment.  Consider a defiant 
moderately serious criminal.  Suppose the state punishes her as severely as the burdens 
she must undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  She did not fulfill the 
obligation by undertaking the punishment because she did not undertake it voluntarily.  
So even after undertaking it, she retains the same obligation of restoration and, therefore, 
retains an obligation to undertake an additional punishment.  More generally, she will 
always retain an obligation to undertake an additional punishment no matter how much 
the state punishes her because she will always refue to undertake the punishments 
voluntarily and so will always retain the same obligat on of restoration.  As a 
consequence, she is obligated to undertake an endless stream of punishment.  Thus, RS 
unacceptably entails that she deserves an endless str am of punishment even though as a 
moderately serious criminal, she deserves no more than a moderately severe punishment.  
 In response, RS does not entail that every defiant criminal deserves an endless 
stream of punishment.  Reconsider the defiant moderately serious criminal.  For at least 
three reasons, she does not deserve an endless stream of punishment under RS.  First, her 
obligation of restoration only entails that she lacks a right to be free from a punishment 
that is no more severe than the least severe burdens she must undertake to fulfill it.  As a 
moderately serious criminal, she can fulfill her obligation of restoration by undertaking 
only a moderately severe burden.  So she deserves no more than a moderately severe 





punishment, considered collectively, is more severe than a moderately severe burden, she 
does not deserve it on the basis of the obligation.    
 Second, after the state punishes her moderately severely, the defiant moderately 
serious criminal no longer retains the obligation of restoration she incurred from 
committing her crime.  For assuming the state does n t compensate her for the harm she 
suffered from the punishment, the state is not warranted in demanding her to undertake 
any more burdens to restore the conditions of trustshe undermined by committing her 
crime.  If the state were to demand more, then colle tively it would demand the criminal 
to undertake more burdens than necessary to restore the conditions of trust.  And the state 
is warranted in demanding her to undertake only the burdens necessary to restore them.  
As a consequence, the state is not warranted in further demanding her to restore the 
conditions of trust.  Therefore, she is no longer obligated to restore them.  She merely 
ought to.   
 Third, suppose for the sake of argument that the defiant moderately serious 
criminal must undertake an endless stream of punishment to restore the conditions of trust 
she undermined by committing her crime.  Unless she undertakes such a punishment, she 
will cause others to incur additional costs of insecurity.  Nevertheless, presumably she is 
not obligated to prevent herself from causing others to incur such costs by undertaking an 
endless stream of punishment.  Such an endless stream would be extremely harmful to 
her, whereas the individual or aggregate costs of insecurity to others will presumably be 
far from constituting an extremely severe harm because she committed only a moderately 
serious crime.  Thus, an endless stream of punishment would presumably be extremely 
worse for her than the individual or aggregate costs f insecurity to others.  So she is not 
obligated to undertake an endless stream of punishment to restore the conditions of trust.  
Therefore, she does not deserve such a punishment for her crime.   
 Although RS does not entail that any defiant criminal deserves an endless stream 





than fully cooperative criminals who committed the same crimes.  Assuming a defiant 
criminal and a fully cooperative criminal committed the same crimes, they undermined 
conditions of trust to the same degree by committing their crimes.  Therefore, they do 
deserve the same punishment for their crimes.  However, the defiant criminal undermined 
conditions of trust to an additional degree by being defiant in response to her crime.  So 
she deserves an additional punishment for being defiant.  But the additional punishment 
she deserves would not amount to an endless stream of punishment because being defiant 
in response to a crime is not itself an extremely srious crime and so it does not 
undermine conditions of trust to an extremely bad degree.91 
 The hard question now is what to do with a defiant criminal after she receives all 
the punishment she deserves.  RS is consistent with o important policies for dealing 
with such cases.  One the one hand, if the defiant criminal is so untrustworthy that the 
state knows she will commit additional very serious crimes unless she is incapacitated, 
then the state might be justified in incapacitating her longer on grounds of self-defense or 
preventative detention.  The additional term of incapacitation, though, would not be an 
additional punishment.  It would be a term of civil commitment, like the quarantine of 
someone with an infectious, dangerous disease.  As such, the state would be obligated to 
minimize the degree to which the additional term would be burdensome for her.  On the 
other hand, if she is not so untrustworthy, then incapacitating her longer might not be 
justified on grounds of self-defense.  In this case, th  state must provide her with at least a 
conditional release.  For the state would no longer be warranted in demanding her to 
sacrifice anymore to prevent herself from causing others to incur additional costs of 
insecurity.  So upon her release, others might need to monitor her on a regular basis.  
They might need to forgo some valuable activities that would leave them too vulnerable 
                         
91.  In refusing to fulfill her obligation of restoration, a defiant criminal does disrespect to some degree the 
rights of others to be free from the costs of insecurity that they rationally must incur because she refuses to 
fulfill it.  But because her fulfilling the obligation would require her to undertake a severe burden, th  





to her.  And they might need to live with the additional fear of her committing crimes 
against them.   
 Some might endorse a third policy for dealing with a defiant criminal after she 
receives all the punishment she deserves.  Under this policy, the state and its citizens 
would simply trust her not to commit more crimes.  The state would not incapacitate her 
longer, and others would not incur any additional costs of insecurity.  In defense of the 
policy, people are positively responsive to trust because they desire to preserve others' 
esteem.92  By trusting her, the state and its citizens would express an attitude of esteem 
toward her that she might desire to preserve by not committing more crimes.  So by 
simply trusting her not to commit more crimes, the state and its citizens would provide 
her with a prudential incentive not to commit more.    
 This third policy is indefensible.  In general, peo le are positively responsive to 
trust, and partly for this reason, people are justified in trusting someone not to commit 
crimes if they know she has not committed any.  Butsomeone's committing a crime is 
strong evidence not only that she is not appropriately motivated by the moral reasons 
against committing crimes, but also that her desire for others' esteem is an insufficient 
incentive for her not to commit crimes.  Thus, the fact that a defiant criminal might have 
some desire for others' esteem does not justify others in simply trusting her not to commit 
more crimes.  Unless she fulfills her obligation of restoration, the state and its citizens are 
rationally required to incur the costs of insecurity or incapacitate her longer.   
K.  The Authority to Punish   
 Critics might contend that RS does not explain why the state has the exclusive 
authority to punish criminals in the following sens.  First, the state would not, but a 
private citizen would, violate a criminal's rights by punishing her.  Second, a criminal 
may not resist the state's attempt to punish her, but may resist a private citizen's attempt.  
                         





Third, a private citizen may not interfere with the state's attempt to punish a criminal, but 
the state may interfere with a private citizen's attempt.   
 In response, it is not clear that the plausibility of a theory of punitive desert 
depends on whether it can account for the state's exclusive authority to punish.  
Nevertheless, RS has the resources to account for it by justifying three related principles.  
First, the state would not violate a criminal's substantive right against intentional harm by 
punishing her.  Second, the state's criminal procedure would not, but a private citizen's 
criminal procedure would, violate a criminal's procedural rights.  Third, the state's 
criminal procedure would, but a private citizen's criminal procedure would not, be fair to 
all its citizens.  A criminal procedure is a procedure for determining how much a criminal 
deserves to be punished and for imposing a punishment on her.     
 Consider the first principle.  If someone is obligated to others to undertake certain 
burdens, then the others' agent can impose those burd ns on her without violating her 
substantive right against intentional harm.  Given that a criminal owes her obligation of 
restoration to her fellow citizens, she is obligated to them to undertake the burdens 
necessary to fulfill it.  Assuming the state acts on behalf of its citizens in a way that is 
fairly responsive to their demands, the state is their agent.  Thus, the state can impose 
such burdens on the criminal as a punishment without vi lating her substantive right 
against intentional harm.    
 Consider the second principle.  Because a criminal procedure risks imposing on a 
criminal an undeserved punishment, a criminal has a right to a procedure that is reliable 
in both a minimal and relative sense.93  A procedure is minimally reliable as applied to a 
criminal if and only if its risk of imposing on her an undeserved punishment is 
sufficiently low.  A procedure P1 is relatively reliable as applied to a criminal if and only 
if there is no other available procedure P2 such that a) P2's risk of imposing on her an 
                         





undeserved punishment is lower than P1's risk, and b) she has a right to P2 over P1.  On 
standard assumptions, the state's criminal procedure would, but a private citizen's 
procedure would not, be both minimally and relatively r liable.  Thus, the former would 
not, but the latter would, violate a criminal's procedural rights.94   
 Two aspects of the state's criminal procedure standardly make it minimally 
reliable, and their absence from a private citizen's procedure standardly make it not 
minimally reliable.  First, only the state's procedure is supported by a robust set of 
resources to determine the facts of a case.  To determine how much a criminal deserves to 
be punished and the form of punishment she deserves, the tate has ready access to the 
beliefs of many experts and a jury, which represents the beliefs of a wide cross-section of 
its citizens.  The state also has a robust set of resources to provide a criminal with the 
form of punishment she deserves, such as a restorative form.  Second, only the state's 
procedure is governed by the rule of law.95  Under the rule of law, the state actors who 
administer the state's procedure are generally impartial nd constrained by sentencing 
guidelines.  Given that some state actors will inevitably be prejudiced, the guidelines 
limit the negative effects of their prejudice on their contribution to the state's procedure.  
 Even if a private citizen's criminal procedure is minimally reliable, it is not 
relatively reliable.  The state's procedure has a lower risk of imposing on a criminal an 
undeserved punishment because it is governed by the rule of law and supported by a more 
robust set of resources.  A criminal has a right to the state's procedure over a private 
citizen's because the former's being less risky generates a prima facie claim to it over the 
latter that is not defeated by any countervailing considerations.  A consideration that 
could defeat such a prima facie claim would be the fact that the less risky procedure 
                         
94.  The state's procedure is not necessarily minimally and relatively reliable.  In arguing that it is, I 
presuppose the state is a well-working democracy operating under favorable conditions.  
95.  See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1964) (describing aspects of the 





would be infeasible to implement or use to impose on a criminal a deserved punishment.  
Because a criminal is obligated to others to undertak  a deserved punishment, she does 
not have a claim to a less risky criminal procedure if it would be so infeasible.  The state's 
procedure, though, need not be infeasible.   
 Consider the third principle.  Under a criminal's obligation of restoration, she is 
obligated to the state's citizens as a group to undertake just one punishment as a means to 
restore the conditions of trust.  For two reasons, she is not obligated to each citizen to 
undertake a separate punishment.  First, doing so would be unnecessary to restore the 
conditions of trust.  One punishment would suffice.  Second, if she were to undertake a 
separate punishment for each citizen, the resulting harm to her could be extremely worse 
than the individual or aggregate costs of insecurity she stands to cause others to incur.  
Thus, a criminal owes her obligation to undertake a punishment to the state's citizens as a 
group.  So the right to punish is held jointly by the state's citizens.96  As a jointly held 
right, only the state, as the agent of all its citizens, can exercise it in a way that would be 
fair to all its citizens.  A private citizen would exercise the right unilaterally, whereas the 
state would exercise it on behalf of all its citizens in a way that is fairly responsive to all 
their demands.  Hence, the state's criminal procedure would, but a private citizen's 
procedure would not, be fair to all its citizens.   
 Together these three principles entail that the state has the exclusive authority to 
punish criminals.  First, the state would not violate  criminal's rights by punishing her 
because it would not violate her substantive or procedural rights by doing so.  However, a 
private citizen would violate a criminal's procedural rights by punishing her.  Second, a 
criminal may not resist the state's attempt to punish her because the state would not 
violate her rights by doing so, and she is obligated to the state and its citizens to 
undertake a punishment.  However, a criminal may resist a private citizen's attempt to 
                         
96.  Cf. NOZICK, supra note 6, at 139 (claiming that the right to punish is eld jointly rather than 





punish her in order to protect her procedural rights and to prevent him from unfairly 
exercising the right to punish unilaterally.  Third, a private citizen may not interfere with 
the state's attempt to punish a criminal because his doing so would interfere with the fair 
exercise of the right to punish held jointly by thestate's citizens.  However, the state may 
interfere with a private citizen's attempt to punish a criminal in order to protect her 
procedural rights and to prevent him from unfairly exercising the right to punish 
unilaterally.97   
L.  Punishable Crimes   
 RS explains why someone deserves to be punished for committing crimes against 
others, which involve disrespecting their rights.  However, critics might contend that RS 
does not explain why someone does not deserve to be punished for committing crimes 
against herself or harmless crimes.98  A crime against self involves the criminal flouting 
only the reasons that count against harming herself.99  A crime against self might consist 
in the state's prohibition on the use of certain drugs.  A harmless crime involves the 
criminal not flouting any reasons that count against harming anyone.100  A harmless crime 
might consist in the state's prohibition of certain cts violating certain sexual taboos.     
 In response, RS does explain why someone does not deserve to be punished for 
crimes against herself or harmless crimes because it explains why such a criminal is not 
obligated to others to undertake a punishment.  When someone commits such a crime, 
she does provide others with strong evidence that she is disposed to commit such crimes. 
                         
97.  There also might be more pragmatic reasons to vest the state with the exclusive authority to punish.  
Doing so minimizes the risk of private citizens' engaging in endless cycles of retaliation in response to their 
endless disagreement over what constitutes an excessive use of force.  See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, secs 13, 124, 125 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 1980); NOZICK, 
supra note 6, at 10-12. 
98.  See, e.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 1978) (suggesting that people 
have a right against being punished for such crimes). 
99.  Cf. JOEL FEINBERG, HARMS TO SELF (1986). 





 However, she does not provide others with strong evidence that she is disposed to 
commit crimes against others.  For in committing such a crime, she does not disrespect 
the rights of others.  So she would not cause others to incur the costs of insecurity or any 
other harm by not demonstrating that she is no longer disposed to commit such crimes.  
Thus, she does not incur an obligation to undertake any punishment from committing 
those crimes.   
 The critics might argue that someone who commits a crime against herself 
deserves to be punished because she is obligated to herself to undertake a punishment as a 
means to deterring herself from committing more crimes against herself.  Unless she 
deters herself, she will harm herself.  And she is obligated to herself not to harm herself.    
 In response, all the critics' assumptions here are obj ctionable.  But even if we 
concede that a person who commits a crime against her elf is obligated to herself to 
undertake a punishment, this obligation does not entail that she deserves to be punished 
because it does not give the state the authority to punish her against her will.  Because she 
owes the obligation only to herself, only she and her agent have the authority to punish 
her.  If the state were to punish her against her will, it would not be acting as her agent 
because it would not be acting in a way that is respon ive to her demands.  As a 
consequence, the state would violate her rights by punishing her for the crime against 
herself.  
 Critics might argue that someone who commits a crime against herself deserves to 
be punished because she is obligated to others to undertake a punishment as a means to 
deterring them from committing crimes against themslves.  Unless she undertakes a 
punishment, others will commit crimes against themslves because they will be 
undeterred from doing so.  So unless she undertakes a punishment, she will cause others 
harm.  And she is obligated to others not to cause them harm.   
 In response, the critics' argument is unsound for at least three reasons.  First, by 





cause others to commit crimes against themselves.  At most, she would merely allow 
them to.  In general, she is not responsible for whether others commit crimes against 
anyone.  So by not undertaking a punishment, she would not cause others harm.  And so 
she is not obligated to others to undertake a punishment as a means to deterring them 
from committing crimes against themselves.   
 Second, suppose by not undertaking a punishment, she would cause others to 
commit crimes against themselves.  Even so, she is still not obligated to them to 
undertake a punishment as a means to deterring them from committing such crimes.  For 
she is only obligated to them not to cause them har against their will.  Even if they were 
undeterred from committing crimes against themselves, they would not commit such 
crimes against their will. 
 Third, suppose she is obligated to others to undertak  a punishment as a means to 
deterring them from committing crimes against themslves.  In the standard case, this 
obligation does not entail that she deserves to be punished because it does not give the 
state the authority to punish her against her will. Because she owes the obligation only to 
those willing to commit crimes against themselves, only they and their agent have the 
authority to punish her against her will.  If the state were to punish her, it would not 
standardly do so as their agent because it would not be acting in a way that is responsive 
to their demands.  For those willing to commit crimes against themselves do not 
standardly demand the state to punish others for such crimes.  They standardly demand 
the contrary.   
M.  Two Constraints   
 Critics might argue that RS is implausible because it violates two constraints on 
any plausible theory of punitive desert.  According to the first constraint, a plausible 
theory must explain why someone deserves to be punished for committing a crime.  
According to the second constraint, a plausible theory must explain why a criminal 





wrongful.  Any theory violating either constraint is too far removed from the essence of 
crimes to be plausible.  RS violates the first constraint because it explains why someone 
deserves to be punished only for violating her obligation of trust.  RS violates the second 
constraint because it explains why a criminal deserves to be punished only on the basis of 
the properties that make her crime a violation of her obligation of trust.101    
 In response, RS satisfies both constraints.  First, RS does explain why someone 
deserves to be punished for violating her obligation of trust.  Such a violation, though, 
consists in her committing a crime.  So RS explains why someone deserves to be 
punished for committing a crime.  Second, RS does explain why a criminal deserves to be 
punished on the basis of the properties that make her crime a violation of her obligation 
of trust.  Such properties, though, consist in partin the properties that essentially make 
her crime wrongful, namely her disrespecting the rights of others.  Hence, RS explains 
why a criminal deserves to be punished on the basis of the properties that essentially 
make her crime wrongful.  It is true that RS's explanation of why a criminal deserves to 
be punished for her crime is mediated by facts that go beyond the crime's essence.  
However, this does not make RS too far removed from it.  Any plausible theory of 
punitive desert must be mediated by such facts on pain of being explanatorily vacuous.  
 VII.  Two Concluding Remarks   
 First, in addition to explaining why criminals deserve to be punished, RS also 
explains why innocent people, who have not performed any wrongful acts, do not deserve 
any punishment.  In virtue of being innocent, they ave not undermined any conditions of 
trust.  So they do not have an obligation of restorati n.  More precisely, they have not 
undermined any conditions of trust to the sufficiently bad degree necessary to incur an 
obligation of restoration whose fulfillment would require them to undertake a 
                         
101.  R.A. Duff raises a similar objection against unfair advantage theories of punitive desert.  SeeR.A. 





punishment.102  Assuming they are not obligated to undertake a punishment, they do not 
deserve one.     
 Second, RS determines whether a punishment satisfies the desert requirement of 
my general theory of the justification of punishment.  However, it does not play a 
comprehensive role in determining whether a punishment satisfies the general rights 
requirement or the value requirement.  RS does identify a valuable aim of imposing a 
deserved punishment on a fully cooperative criminal.  But it does not identify any 
valuable aims of imposing a deserved punishment on a defiant criminal.  Thus, a deserved 
punishment might or might not be justified.  On theone hand, it might be justified 
because it would not violate the rights of others and would promote some sufficiently 
valuable aims, like deterrence.103  On the other hand, it might not be justified on either 
ground.104  So RS plays an important but also limited role in determining whether a 
punishment is all things considered justified.  
                         
102.  See GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 76, at 259-61 (noting the serious inaccuracies in the 
best available strategies for predicting future criminal behavior when applied before any criminal acts take 
place). 
103.  Although considerations of deterrence do not explain why or how much criminals deserve to be 
punished, they do identify an important potential vlue of imposing deserved punishments on them.  Cf. 
Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the Deserving?, 26 NOUS 447, 459-62 (1992) (arguing that the state is 
justified in imposing a deserved punishment on a criminal only if the punishment results in a sufficiently 
valuable reduction in crime).  
104.  For example, someone might deserve to be punished for committing the crime of defamation, 
consisting in libel or slander.  However, punishing her might not be justified because doing so might violate 
the rights of others or promote other bad consequences by having a chilling effect on people's freedom of 
expression.  See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (holding that a Louisiana criminal defamation 
statute is unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and noting its general chilling effect on people's 
freedom of expression).  To avoid such a chilling effect, defamation might be a mere tort under which a 








 Chapter 2 
 On the Optimal Enforcement of a Criminal Law 
 I.  Introduction 
 For any crime, the state must set its probability and severity of punishment.1  A 
crime's probability of punishment is the probability that the state would detect and punish 
someone who commits it.2  Its severity of punishment is the severity of the punishment 
that the state would impose on someone for committing i .3  On some fairly plausible 
assumptions, the state has strong reason to adopt an extreme enforcement policy for all 
crimes, even a moderately serious one.  Under such a policy, the crime's probability of 
punishment would be extremely low, and its severity of punishment would be extremely 
high.  Call such a policy as applied to a moderately s rious crime 'the EEP.'  Although the 
EEP seems strongly unreasonable, it is not immediatly obvious why given the reasons in 
favor of it.  Herein lies a problem.      
 To see the reasons in favor of the EEP, consider four assumptions.  First, suppose 
deterrence is an important valuable aim of a system of punishment, which consists in the 
state's threatening to punish anyone who violates its criminal laws and the state's actually 
punishing those it finds to have violated those laws.  A system of punishment promotes 
                         
1.  More precisely, the state must set a crime's probability of punishment in those situations where this is 
feasible.  Although the state cannot control a crime's probability of punishment in all the situations i  which 
people will find themselves, it might be able to contr l it in some. 
2.  At this level of description, a crime's probability of punishment is doubly ambiguous.  First, it could 
refer to an objective or a subjective probability.  Second, if it refers to a subjective probability,  could refer 
to either the state's or the individual's subjective probability that the state would detect and punish her if she 
were to commit it.  Throughout the paper, I use the term to refer to the subjective probability of both the 
state and the individual.  I assume they are the same.  I also assume that a crime's probability of punishment 
corresponds to the rate at which the state would detect and punish those who commit it.  





deterrence by providing people with a prudential incentive not to commit crimes for fear 
of being detected and punished for committing them.   
 Second, suppose people are expected value maximizers in the sense that they 
perform an act only if its expected value for them is at least as high as the expected value 
for them of any other available act.  To determine the expected value for someone of a 
particular act, determine the possible sets of consequences of the act and the value for her 
of those sets of consequences.  Call the value for her of each set of consequences, 
respectively, V1, V2, ... and Vn.  Next determine her subjective probability that each set 
of consequences will actually result from the act.  Call her subjective probability that each 
set of consequences will actually result from the act, respectively, P1, P2, ... and Pn.  The 
expected value for her of the act is the sum of the products V1*P1, V2*P2, ... and Vn*Pn.  
 Third, suppose a crime's probability of punishment varies directly with the amount 
of resources that the state devotes to enforcing the law against it.  Specifically, suppose 
the state can lower a crime's probability of punishment by devoting fewer resources to 
enforcing the law, and the state can raise the crime's probability of punishment only by 
devoting more resources to enforcing it.  For example, the state might lower the crime's 
probability of punishment by hiring fewer police officers to search for those who might 
commit it, and the state might raise the probability of punishment by hiring more police 
officers. 
 Fourth, suppose a scarcity of important resources unavoidably obtains in the state. 
 So there are not enough resources to satisfy all the critical needs of everyone, like the 
relief of suffering.  Given the scarcity, if one enforcement policy requires less resources to 
implement than another, then the resources saved under the former policy could be used 
to satisfy some people's critical needs that would therwise go unsatisfied.  For example, 
if one policy requires fewer police officers than another, then under the former policy, the 
people who would otherwise work as police officers might work in health care to relieve 






 Given these assumptions, the state has strong reason to adopt the EEP rather than 
a more moderate enforcement policy for the moderately serious crime at issue.4  To 
achieve the crime's  optimal level of deterrence, th  state must ensure that committing it 
has the optimal expected value for potential criminals.  To ensure this, the state must 
ensure that the crime's expected punishment equals the optimal magnitude, where its 
expected punishment is the product of its probability and severity of punishment.  To set 
the crime's expected punishment at the optimal leve, th  state can set its probability of 
punishment as low as possible so long as it sufficiently raises its severity of punishment.  
Hence, assuming the crime's expected punishment equals the optimal magnitude under 
the EEP, the EEP would be the most efficient means to achieving the crime's optimal 
level of deterrence.5  For the EEP would require the least resources to set the crime's 
probability of punishment because it would be the lowest under the EEP.  And overall the 
EEP would not require any additional resources to se  the crime's severity of punishment 
because although the EEP would require the most severe punishments, it would also 
require the fewest punishments since the fewest criminals would be punished under it.  
Given the conditions of scarcity, the resources saved under the EEP could be used to 
satisfy some people's critical needs that would otherwise go unsatisfied under a more 
moderate enforcement policy.6    
                         
4.  Under a more moderate policy, the crime's severity of punishment would be lower and its probability of 
punishment would be higher than they would be under th  EEP.  
5.  As Jeremy Bentham suggests, one enforcement policy might be better than another insofar as it would be 
a more efficient means of deterring people from committing the crime at issue:  "The last object is, 
whatever the mischief be, which it is proposed to prevent, to prevent it at as cheap a rate as possible."  
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 165 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970). 
6.  For more discussion on the considerations of effici ncy that favor an extreme enforcement policy for a 
crime, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970); ROBERT 
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 427-54 (3d ed. 2000); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY 
& JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:  AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 211-





 In spite of the strong reasons in favor of the EEP, it still seems strongly 
unreasonable to punish moderately serious criminals extremely severely even though 
doing so might be the most efficient means to achieving the crime's optimal level of 
deterrence.7  The problem, though, is to explain why.8  In this paper, I explain why the 
EEP would be strongly unreasonable on the assumption that some moderately serious 
criminals would inevitably be undeterred and punished extremely severely under it.  
Initially, I consider explanations grounded in the value requirement of my general theory 
of the justification of punishment.  I argue that none succeeds.  Then I consider 
                                                             
86 (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 242-50 (5th ed. 1998). 
7.  Throughout the paper, I assume the moderately serious criminals at issue are first time criminals who 
have no exculpatory defenses.  If they were repeat criminals, it might seem reasonable to punish them 
extremely severely.  If they had a defense, it might be unreasonable to punish them at all. 
8.  At the outset, I dismiss three pragmatic objections to the EEP based on how people might behave in 
response to it.  Some might argue that the state could not adopt the EEP.  If it tried, its officials and private 
citizens would nullify the policy because punishing moderately serious criminals extremely severely would 
seem so unreasonable.  See Becker, supra note 6, at 184; Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale 
of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1264-65 (1937).  To nullify the EEP, judges and 
juries might refuse to find anyone guilty of the crime; prosecutors might refuse to charge anyone with it; 
police officers might refuse to arrest anyone for the crime; and private citizens might refuse to cooperate in 
the investigation and trial of anyone charged with the crime.  I dismiss this objection for two reasons.  First, 
the EEP might not be nullified.  Second, even if the EEP were nullified because it would seem strongly 
unreasonable, we seek to understand precisely why the EEP would be strongly unreasonable.  
 Some might argue that the EEP would not deter anyone from committing the crime because 
whatever the crime's severity of punishment, no one would be deterred by the crime's extremely low 
probability of punishment.  See Michael & Wechsler, supra, at 1264.  I dismiss this objection for two 
reasons.  First, people might be deterred by the crime's extremely low probability of punishment if its
severity of punishment were sufficiently high.  Second, the EEP would still seem strongly unreasonable 
even if it were an effective means of deterrence.  We seek to understand why it would be so unreasonable 
even under such conditions.  
 Some might argue that the EEP would result in the commission of more serious crimes because the 
state could not achieve "marginal deterrence" under it.  POSNER, supra note 6, at 245; see BENTHAM, 
supra note 5, at 165.  Because the state would punish the moderately serious crime extremely severely 
under the EEP, people would have no incentive to choose it over more serious crimes as a means to 
fulfilling their objectives.  I dismiss this objection because there are two ways the state could achieve 
marginal deterrence under the EEP.  First, there are a gradation of extremely severe punishments.  Even 
though the state would punish the moderately serious crime extremely severely under the EEP, it could sti l 
punish more serious crimes even more severely.  Second, even if the state were to impose the most severe 
punishment for the moderately serious crime under th  EEP, it could raise the probability of punishment for 
more serious crimes.  Either way the state would ensure that the expected punishment for more serious 
crimes is higher than the expected punishment for the moderately serious crime under the EEP.  In doing so, 
the state would provide people with an incentive to ch ose the latter over the former as a means to fulfilling 





explanations grounded in the desert requirement of my general theory.  I argue that my 
restorative signaling theory of punitive desert, RSbest explains why the EEP would be 
strongly unreasonable.  I conclude that RS should play an important role in constraining 
the means by which the state may enforce its laws against any crime.   
 II.  Two Requirements of Justified Punishment 
 As we discussed in Chapter 1, the state is justified in imposing a punishment on 
someone against her will only if the punishment would satisfy the desert requirement and 
the value requirement of my general theory of the justification of punishment.  According 
to the desert requirement, the person must deserve the punishment.  According to the 
value requirement, the expected value of the consequences of imposing the punishment 
on the person must be at least as high as the expect d value of the consequences of any 
other available act that would not violate anyone's rights.   
 Assuming the state would punish some against theirwill under the EEP, both 
requirements are prima facie plausible grounds on which to explain why the EEP would 
be strongly unreasonable.  The EEP might violate the desert requirement because 
moderately serious criminals might not deserve to be punished extremely severely.  The 
EEP might violate the value requirement because the xp cted value of the consequences 
of punishing moderately serious criminals extremely s verely under it might be lower 
than the expected value of the consequences of punishing them less severely under a more 
moderate enforcement policy.  We will examine each requirement in turn.   
 III. The Value Requirement    
 To determine whether the EEP would violate the value requirement, call a 
moderate enforcement policy as applied to the moderately serious crime at issue 'the 
MEP.'  Under the MEP, the crime's probability of punishment would be moderately high, 
and it would be punished only moderately severely.  Assume the crime's expected 
punishment would be the same under both the EEP and the MEP.  So assume both 





the EEP and the MEP would be better than the consequences of any other available 
enforcement policy for the crime.  On these assumptions, to show that the EEP would 
violate the value requirement, we must show that the EEP's consequences would be all 
things considered worse than the MEP's consequences.  To do so, we must identify some 
respect in which the former would be worse than the latt r.   
A.  An Egalitarian Argument   
     Egalitarians might argue that the EEP would violate the value requirement 
because the EEP would be worse than the MEP with respect to inequality.9  They assume 
inequality is intrinsically bad in the sense that it would be intrinsically bad if any two like 
criminals were punished with different severities or if one were punished but the other 
were not.10  Assuming inequality is intrinsically bad, they might argue that the EEP would 
be all things considered worse than the MEP because the EEP's inequality would be all 
things considered worse than the MEP's inequality.  To see why, note that the EEP's 
consequences would differ from the MEP's consequences in two significant ways.  First, 
relative to the MEP, fewer criminals would be punished and more criminals would go 
unpunished under the EEP because the crime's probability of punishment would be lower. 
 Second, the criminals who would be punished under the EEP would be punished much 
more severely than the criminals who would be punished under the MEP because the 
crime's severity of punishment would be much higher under the EEP.  Egalitarians might 
conclude that these differences would make the EEP's inequality all things considered 
worse than the MEP's inequality.11      
                         
9.  Isaac Ehrlich emphasizes some of the inequalities that would result from extreme enforcement policies in 
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws and the Concept of Justice:  A Positive Analysis, 2 INT'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 3, 10-11 (1982). 
10.  I refer only to "telic egalitarians" who claim we should prevent inequalities because they would be 
intrinsically bad.  Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas 3-4 (Nov. 
21, 1991).  I do not refer to "deontic egalitarians" who claim we should prevent inequalities for moral 
reasons other than the fact that they might be intrinsically bad.  Id. at 4.  





 In response, the egalitarian argument is unsound for at least three reasons.  First, 
inequality is not intrinsically bad.12  To illustrate the implausibility of assuming 
otherwise, suppose several like criminals each commit a oderately serious crime.  The 
state apprehends all of them and imposes on them moderately severe punishments in the 
form of moderately long periods of incarceration.  However, at the end of one criminal's 
period of incarceration, the state mistakes her for a much more serious criminal and 
tortures her.  At this point, the state must choose between a) torturing the others or b) 
releasing them after their moderately long periods f incarceration.    
 Given the choice, there are two reasons the state hould release the others rather 
than torture them.  First, the state's torturing them would violate their right not to be 
tortured even if torturing them would be optimific.  In short, they do not deserve to be 
tortured.  Second, even if the others deserve to bertured, we can plausibly assume that 
the consequences of torturing them would be all things considered worse than the 
consequences of releasing them.  For we can plausiby assume that the extreme suffering 
caused by torturing them would make the consequences of doing so all things considered 
worse than the consequences of releasing them.  
 However, although the state should release the others for these reasons, if 
inequality were intrinsically bad, then there would be something bad about releasing them 
rather than torturing them.  For if inequality were intrinsically bad, there would be 
something bad about punishing like criminals with different severities.  Because the state 
has already tortured the one, it would punish the ot rs with a different severity by simply 
releasing them, whereas it would punish all of them the same by torturing the others.     
 But nothing seems bad about releasing the others rather than torturing them:  
releasing them would not be in any way worse than torturing them.  To support this claim, 
we might appeal to our considered intuitions or a plausible principle.  When we reflect on 
                         
12.  My argument against the claim that inequality is intrinsically bad parallels "the Levelling Down 





the possibility of the state's releasing the others, intuitively nothing seems bad about its 
doing so:  nothing seems bad about benefiting them under conditions in which benefiting 
them would not harm anyone else.  Releasing the othrs would ensure that not all like 
criminals receive punishments of the same severity.  But nothing seems bad about the 
mere pattern of unequally severe punishments that would result.  
 According to a plausible principle, if a) two states of affairs S1 and S2 contain 
exactly the same people, and b) no one in S2 is in any way worse off than she would be in 
S1, then S2 is not in any way worse than S1.  Call this welfare principle 'WP'.  WP's 
plausibility stems from the fact that if its antecedent conditions are satisfied, and no other 
states of affairs are obtainable, then there seems nothing for anyone to regret about 
moving from S1 to S2.  If there is nothing for anyoe to regret about moving from S1 to 
S2, S2 is not in any way worse than S1.   
 Given WP, we may assume that the states of affairs that would result from either 
torturing or releasing the others would contain exactly the same people.  And we may 
assume that releasing the others would not make anyone in any way worse off than she 
would have been if they had been tortured.  Most notably, releasing the others would 
make them significantly better off than they would have been if they had been tortured.  
And, presumably, releasing the others would not in any way worsen the condition of the 
one whom the state has already tortured.  So WP entails that the state of affairs that would 
result from releasing the others would not be in any way worse than the state of affairs 
that would result from torturing them even though the former would contain an inequality 
absent from the latter.  As a consequence, inequality is not intrinsically bad.   
 In summary, the egalitarian argument is unsound because inequality is not 
intrinsically bad.  So even if the EEP would realize more inequality than the MEP, the 
additional inequality by itself would not make the EEP worse in any way than the MEP. 
 Second, even if inequality were intrinsically bad, the egalitarian argument is still 





considered worse than the MEP's overall inequality.  The argument focuses only on 
inequalities between the criminals whom the EEP and the MEP specifically target.  
However, both policies could also affect the inequalities between people outside the 
targeted class of criminals.  These inequalities would likely be all things considered 
worse under the MEP than under the EEP.  For the resou ces saved under the EEP could 
be used to improve inequalities between people outside he targeted class of criminals.  
Given conditions of scarcity, such inequalities would likely persist under the MEP.  
Because the resources saved under the EEP could improve inequalities that would persist 
under the MEP, the EEP's overall inequality might be all things considered better than the 
MEP's overall inequality even though the inequality among the targeted criminals would 
be worse under the EEP than under the MEP.   
 Third, even if the EEP's overall inequality were all things considered worse than 
the MEP's overall inequality, the egalitarian argument still does not show that the EEP 
would be all things considered worse than the MEP.  ven if inequality is intrinsically 
bad, it is not the only thing that is intrinsically bad.  Suffering is also intrinsically bad, and 
increases in suffering can offset improvements in inequality.  For two reasons, the EEP 
would likely realize less overall suffering than the MEP.  First, the EEP and the MEP 
would realize the same overall amount of suffering among the targeted class of criminals. 
 For they would realize the same overall amount of punishment among them because the 
crime's expected punishment would be the same under both.13  Second, the EEP would 
likely realize less suffering than the MEP among peopl  outside the targeted class of 
criminals.  For the resources saved under the EEP could be used to prevent the suffering 
of people outside the targeted class.  Thus, even if the EEP's overall inequality were all 
                         
13.  The policies would differ insofar as the overall amount of punishment under the EEP would consist in a 
relatively small number of criminals receiving extremely severe punishments, whereas the overall amount 
under the MEP would consist in a relatively large number of criminals receiving moderately severe 
punishments.  However, such differences would only affect the way that the overall amount of punishment 






things considered worse than the MEP's overall inequality, the EEP might be all things 
considered better than the MEP because the EEP might realize sufficiently less overall 
suffering than the MEP.    
B.  A Prioritarian Argument    
 Prioritarians might concede that inequality is noti trinsically bad, and the EEP 
would realize less overall suffering than the MEP.  But they might argue that the EEP 
would still violate the value requirement because colle tively people's suffering would be 
worse under the EEP than under the MEP.  According to prioritarians, for any particular 
amount of suffering a person experiences, her suffering that amount is worse the worse 
her life considered as a whole.14  To illustrate, suppose two people suffer the same 
amount at some time.  Suppose also that one person's life considered as a whole is worse 
than the other person's life considered as a whole.  According to prioritarians, the former's 
suffering is worse than the latter's suffering even though they suffer the same amount.  
 To show that collectively people's suffering would be worse under the EEP than 
under the MEP, prioritarians might focus on showing that the suffering of the affected 
class would be worse under the EEP than under the MEP.  The affected class consists in 
the people whose suffering would be affected by the choice between the EEP and the 
MEP.  Other things being equal, the affected class consists in the targeted criminals who 
would be punished under either policy, people closely related to them, and the people 
whose suffering would be prevented by the resources saved under the EEP.  
 Prioritarians might assume that among the affected lass, the lives of the criminals 
who would receive extremely severe punishments under the EEP would be the worst.  
Assuming their lives would be the worst, prioritarians might argue that the suffering of 
the affected class would be worse under the EEP than under the MEP.  Even though the 
affected class would suffer less under the EEP than under the MEP, the criminals who 
                         





would be punished extremely severely under the EEP would have the worst lives, and 
therefore, their suffering any particular amount under the EEP would be worse than 
anyone in the affected class suffering that amount under the MEP.     
 In response, prioritarianism is a plausible view about the badness of suffering.  
However, the argument does not show conclusively that the EEP would violate the value 
requirement because it does not show conclusively that the suffering of the affected class 
would be worse under the EEP than under the MEP.  Among the affected class, the 
people who stand to have the worst lives might not be the criminals who would be 
punished extremely severely under the EEP:  they might be the people under the MEP 
whose suffering would have been prevented by the resources saved under the EEP.  Even 
if not, the mere fact that a person has a worse life than another does not make the former's 
suffering some amount worse than any amount of suffering that the latter might 
experience.  The former's suffering some amount might be better than the latter's 
suffering a sufficiently larger amount.  Similarly, the mere fact that a person has a worse 
life than others does not make her suffering some aount worse than any amount of 
suffering that the others might experience collectively.  Her suffering some amount might 
be better than the others' suffering collectively a sufficiently larger amount.  Thus, even if 
the criminals who would be punished extremely severly under the EEP would have the 
worst lives among the affected class, the suffering of the affected class might still be 
better under the EEP than under the MEP because the affected class might suffer 
sufficiently less overall under the EEP than under th  MEP.   
C.  An Absolutist Argument  
    Absolutists concede that the mere fact that a person has a worse life than others 
does not make her suffering some amount worse than any amount of suffering that the 
others might experience individually or collectively.  But they might still argue that the 
suffering of the affected class would be worse under th  EEP than under the MEP.  





types that the former types are absolutely worse than e latter types in the following 
sense:  a person's suffering some amount of the former types would be worse than any 
number of other people's suffering any amount of the latter types.   
 To show that the suffering of the affected class would be worse under the EEP 
than under the MEP, absolutists might assume that the criminals punished extremely 
severely under the EEP would experience an extremely severe type of suffering that 
would be much more severe than the types of suffering anyone in the affected class would 
experience under the MEP.  They might infer that the extremely severe type of suffering 
would be absolutely worse than the latter types of uffering.  So they might conclude that 
the suffering of the affected class would be worse under the EEP than under the MEP no 
matter how much more the affected class would suffer as a whole under the MEP.   
 In response, the absolutist argument is also unpersuasive for at least two reasons.  
First, the people who stand to experience the worst type of suffering might not be the 
criminals who would be punished extremely severely under the EEP:  they might be the 
people under the MEP whose suffering would have been pr vented by the resources 
saved under the EEP.  Second, the argument rests on the u acceptable assumption that 
some types of suffering are absolutely worse than less severe types of suffering.  The 
assumption is unacceptable because if it were true, it would unacceptably entail that the 
relation "is all things considered worse than" is intransitive.15  To see why, consider an 
extreme type of suffering that might seem absolutely worse than a mild type of suffering. 
 For example, suppose the extreme type of suffering co sists in several years of extremely 
intense pain.  Call this type 'A.'  Suppose the mild type of suffering consists in just a few 
minutes of mildly intense pain.  Call this type 'Z.'  Suppose also that A is absolutely worse 
than Z such that one person's suffering A is all things considered worse than any number 
                         
15.  My argument for why the absolutist assumption has this implication parallels an argument that Larry 
Temkin formulates in A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175, 179-81 





of people's suffering Z.  Now consider someone's suffering A.  Presumably, for some 
number x>1, x people's suffering B, which is only slightly less severe than A, would be 
all things considered worse than one person's suffering A.  For example, suppose B 
consists in pain that is only slightly less intense than A and lasts for only slightly less time 
than A.  Presumably, for some number x2>x, x2 people's suffering C, which is only 
slightly less severe than B, would be all things considered worse than x people's suffering 
B.  For example, suppose C consists in pain that is only slightly less intense than B and 
lasts for only slightly less time than B.  And presumably, for some number x3>x2, x3 
people's suffering D, which is only slightly less severe than C, would be all things 
considered worse than x2 people's suffering C.  For example, suppose D consists in pain 
that is only slightly less intense than C and lasts for only slightly less time than C.   
 At this point, we can see that by repeating the previous line of reasoning enough 
times, we can construct a chain from one person's suffering A to some large number of 
people's suffering Z such that each group's suffering in the chain would be all things 
considered worse than the group's suffering that immediately precedes it in the chain.16  
Given the chain, if A were absolutely worse than Z, then the relation "is all things 
                         
16.  In reply, absolutists might argue that no matter how many times we repeat the previous line of 
reasoning, we could never extend the chain from one person's suffering A to some number of people's 
suffering Z.  Ken Binmore and Alex Voorhoeve suggest such an argument in Defending Transitivity against 
Zeno's Paradox, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 272 (2003).  Following their a gument, absolutists might contend 
that after repeating the previous line of reasoning in umerable times, the chain would converge to some 
limit of suffering that would be more severe than Z.  As the chain approaches the limit, the number of 
people's experiencing the types of suffering close t  the limit would increase to infinity.  And no number of 
people's experiencing the types of suffering at the limit or after it would be all things considered worse than 
the relevant number of people's experiencing the typ s of suffering before the limit.  As a consequence, the 
chain would not extend to Z no matter how many times w  repeat the previous line of reasoning.     
 In response, the claim that the chain might converge to some limit seems implausible.  If the chain 
converges to some limit of suffering of type M, then there is a type of suffering N such that N is only 
slightly less severe than M but no number of people's experiencing N would be all things considered worse 
than a particular number of people's experiencing M.  But to the contrary, it seems that for any two types of 
suffering M and N, if N is only slightly less severe than M, then for any number x of people's experiencing 
M, there is some number y>>x such that y people's experiencing N is all things considered worse than x 
people's experiencing M.  As a consequence, it seem implausible to assume that the chain converges to 
some limit.  Thus, it seems that by repeating the previous line of reasoning enough times, we could extend 





considered worse than" would be intransitive.  For if the relation were transitive, then A 
would not be absolutely worse than Z because the larg  number of people's suffering Z 
would be all things considered worse than the one person's suffering A.  Because 
presumably we could construct a similar chain betwen one person's experiencing any 
type of severe suffering and a much larger number of pe ple's experiencing any type of 
less severe suffering, the absolutist assumption entails that the relation "is all things 
considered worse than" is intransitive.    
 This relation, though, does not seem intransitive.17  Because the absolutist 
assumption unacceptably entails that it is, the assumption itself is unacceptable.  Contrary 
to the absolutist argument, the most severe type of suffering experienced in the affected 
class under the EEP would not be absolutely worse than the types of suffering 
experienced in the affected class under the MEP.  Hence, the suffering of the affected 
class might be all things considered better under th  EEP than under the MEP if the 
affected class were to suffer sufficiently less overall under the EEP.  
D.  A Retributive Argument      
 Given the objections to the prioritarian and absolutist arguments, retributivists 
might contend that the EEP would violate the value requirement on very different 
grounds.18  Both the prioritarian and absolutist arguments assume that anyone's suffering 
                         
17.  Assuming the relation "is all things considered worse than" is intransitive would conflict with a c non 
of practical reasoning.  According to the canon, given any set of acts available to an agent, at leastone act 
in the set is choiceworthy in the sense that the agent has at least as much reason to perform it as she has to 
perform any of the other acts in the set.  However, if the relation "is all things considered worse than" were 
intransitive, then given some set of acts available to an agent, none of the acts might be choiceworthy.  For 
example, consider a case in which among the acts available to an agent, an act would be choiceworthy if 
and only if its consequences would be at least as good as the consequences of any other available act.  Not 
every case is like this, but some are, especially when no one's rights are at stake.  If the relation "is all things 
considered worse than" were intransitive, then it is possible that for any available act, its consequences 
would be all things considered worse than the consequences of some other available act.  Hence, contrary to 
the canon, none of the acts available to the agent would be choiceworthy if the relation "is all things 
considered worse than" were intransitive.  






in the affected class under either policy would be intrinsically bad.  However, 
retributivists assume that a criminal's suffering could be intrinsically good.  Depending on 
the seriousness of her crime, they assume there is some optimal amount of suffering that 
it would be intrinsically good that she experience.19  To the extent she suffers any less or 
any more, it would be intrinsically bad.    
 Retributivists might assume that a moderate amount f suffering would be the 
optimal amount for moderately serious criminals.  So for three reasons, the suffering of 
the targeted class of criminals would be worse under the EEP than under the MEP.  First, 
fewer criminals would suffer the optimal amount under the EEP than under the MEP.  
Second, more criminals would suffer less than the optimal amount under the EEP than 
under the MEP.  Third, more criminals would suffer more than the optimal amount under 
the EEP than under the MEP.  All three claims hold given that a) fewer criminals would 
be punished under the EEP than under the MEP becaus the crime's probability of 
punishment would be lower under the EEP, and b) all the criminals punished under the 
EEP would suffer too much because they would be punished extremely severely, whereas 
all the criminals punished under the MEP would suffer only the optimal amount because 
they would be punished only moderately severely.  Assuming the suffering of the targeted 
class of criminals would be worse under the EEP than under the MEP, retributivists might 
infer that the EEP would be all things considered worse than the MEP.  
 In response, the retributive argument is unpersuasive for three reasons.  First, it 
rests on the repugnant assumption that it is intrinsically good that criminals suffer.  On 
reflection, no one's suffering any amount could be intrinsically good; anyone's suffering 
any amount under any conditions would be intrinsically bad.20  Suffering could be 
                         
19.  See Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISRAEL L. REV. 15, 19-20 (1993); cf. G.E. 
MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 82, 262-65 (Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993) (claiming that the organic 
whole of a criminal's suffering some punishment is better than the organic whole of her suffering no 
punishment).  





instrumentally good in the sense that it would have good effects.  For example, someone's 
suffering might prevent her from boarding an airplane destined to crash.  A criminal's 
suffering might have the good effect of deterring herself or others from committing 
crimes in the future.  But no one's suffering could be good in itself. 
 Second, at best, if a criminal's suffering some amount were intrinsically good, it 
would be so only if she were strongly responsible for her crime.21  A criminal would be 
strongly responsible for her crime only if no factors beyond her control by themselves 
causally determined her committing the crime in the sense of making her committing it 
inevitable.  But on a plausible view of the relation between any actual criminal and the 
natural world, factors beyond her control by themselves did causally determine her 
committing the crime.  According to the view, for any actual criminal, states of the world 
prior to her birth in conjunction with the laws of nature causally determined her 
committing the crime.  Because the laws of nature and the states of the world prior to 
someone's birth are beyond her control, factors beyond any actual criminal's control 
causally determined her committing the crime.  Hence, o actual criminal is strongly 
responsible for her crime.  Therefore, no actual criminal's suffering any amount is 
intrinsically good.22    
 Third, even if the retributive assumption is true, the argument still does not show 
conclusively that the EEP would violate the value requirement.  It would show only that 
the suffering of the targeted class of criminals would be worse under the EEP than under 
the MEP.  However, the resources saved under the EEP might be used to prevent enough 
suffering among innocent people outside the targeted class of criminals to make the 
suffering of the affected class considered as a whole better under the EEP than under the 
                         
21.  Parfit alludes to this point and the following problem with it in supra note 10, at 32-33.  
22.  In clarification, this objection to retributivism is not a defense of hard determinism; it is not meant to 
undermine the possibility that criminals are morally responsible for their crimes in the sense that they are 
blameworthy and deserve to be punished for them.  It only undermines the claim that it is intrinsically good 





MEP.      
 At this point, we may conclude that the value requirement does not provide a 
robust explanation of why the EEP would be strongly unreasonable.  On the one hand, the 
EEP might very well satisfy the requirement.  No considerations decisively prove 
otherwise.  On the other hand, even if the EEP would violate it, the violation would not 
explain why the EEP would be strongly unreasonable.  For the EEP to be strongly 
unreasonable on the basis of the value requirement, the EEP must not only violate it, but 
also be a particularly egregious violation of it such that its consequences would be not 
just worse, but much worse than the consequences of the MEP.  However, n if the 
EEP's consequences would be worse than the consequences of the MEP, they would not 
be much worse in light of the fact that a) the resources saved under the EEP could be used 
to prevent a substantial amount of suffering among in ocent people outside the targeted 
class of criminals and b) the targeted class of criminals would suffer substantially under 
both policies.      
 IV.  The Desert Requirement     
 On its face, the desert requirement is a more promising basis on which to explain 
why the EEP would be strongly unreasonable because moderately serious criminals seem 
to deserve no more than moderately severe punishments.  If so, then the EEP would be 
not only a violation of the desert requirement, but also a particularly egregious violation 
of it.  For under the EEP, the state would punish moderately serious criminals not just 
more severely than they deserve, but much more.  Th challenge is to explain why 
moderately serious criminals deserve to be punished no more than moderately severely.23  
A.  An Expressive Theory     
 According to expressivists, a criminal does not deserve a punishment if the 
punishment would express an unwarranted attitude of moral blame toward her.  They 
                         






might argue that moderately serious criminals do not deserve the EEP's extremely severe 
punishments because such punishments would express too much blame toward them.  
They might defend the claim in two ways. 
 According to the first argument, under the EEP the state would punish moderately 
serious criminals just as severely as it punishes criminals who commit very serious 
crimes, such as very violent crimes.  In fact, the state does tend to punish very serious 
criminals extremely severely, and under the EEP, the s ate would also punish moderately 
serious criminals extremely severely.  Because under the EEP the state would punish 
moderately and very serious criminals extremely severely, expressivists might infer that 
under the EEP the state would punish them equally severely.  By punishing them equally 
severely, the state would express toward moderately serious criminals the attitude that 
they are just as blameworthy as very serious criminals.24  However, moderately serious 
criminals are not as blameworthy as very serious criminals.  Thus, punishing moderately 
serious criminals extremely severely under the EEP would express too much blame 
toward them.      
 In response, the first expressive argument does not how that the EEP's extremely 
severe punishments would express too much blame toward moderately serious criminals. 
 The argument falsely assumes that under the EEP the state must punish moderately and 
very serious criminals equally severely.  Although under the EEP the state would punish 
both extremely severely, it need not punish them equally severely.  For there is a 
gradation of extremely severe punishments:  some extr mely severe punishments are less 
severe than other extremely severe punishments.  To avoid expressing toward moderately 
serious criminals the unwarranted attitude that they ar  just as blameworthy as very 
serious criminals, the state could impose on moderately serious criminals under the EEP 
                         
24.  H.L.A. Hart suggests this point when he assert that if a state were to punish with equal severity c imes 
that differ in seriousness, then "there is a risk of either confusing common morality or flouting it and 
bringing the law into contempt."  H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in 





extremely severe punishments that are less severe than the extremely severe punishments 
it imposes on very serious criminals.  
 Expressivists might argue that even if the state were to punish moderately serious 
criminals less severely than very serious criminals under the EEP, it would still express 
too much blame toward moderately serious criminals by punishing them extremely 
severely.  They might claim that the absolute severity of a criminal's punishment 
expresses an absolute degree of blame toward her.  Punishing a criminal extremely 
severely expresses an extremely high degree of blame toward her.  By punishing 
moderately serious criminals extremely severely under the EEP, the state would express 
too much blame toward them because they are only moderately blameworthy, not 
extremely blameworthy.  Hence, moderately serious criminals do not deserve to be 
punished extremely severely under the EEP.    
 In response, the second expressive argument is circular.  As we discussed in 
Chapter 1, an attitude of moral blame consists at least partly in certain demands.  One 
demand that is constitutive of moral blame is the demand to undertake a punishment.  
Punishing someone expresses blame toward her by expressing its constitutive demand on 
her to undertake the punishment.  Under the EEP, punishing moderately serious criminals 
extremely severely would express an extremely high degree of blame toward them by 
expressing a demand on them to undertake an extremely severe punishment.  To claim 
that the EEP's extremely severe punishments would express too much blame toward 
moderately serious criminals is to claim that the punishments would express an 
unwarranted demand on them to undertake such extremely severe punishments.  But to 
claim that a demand on the criminals to undertake an xtremely severe punishment would 
be unwarranted presupposes that they do not deserve uch a punishment.  The claim that 
moderately serious criminals do not deserve the EEP's extremely severe punishments is 





presupposes the claim it aims to explain, it is circular.25      
B.  A Restorative Signaling Theory   
 As I argued in Chapter 1, RS explains why criminals deserve to be punished by 
explaining why they must undertake a punishment to fulfill the obligation of restoration 
they incur from committing their crimes.  According to RS, when someone commits a 
crime, she undermines certain conditions of trust in the sense that she undermines the 
conditions that are necessary for others' being justified in believing that she is not 
disposed to commit crimes.  She is obligated to resto  those conditions because unless 
she restores them, she will cause others to incur the costs of insecurity.   
 To restore the conditions of trust, she must demonstrate to others that she has a 
good will in the sense of a stable disposition to be appropriately motivated by the moral 
reasons against violating the rights of others.  To demonstrate that she has a good will, 
she must demonstrate that she has a stable dispositon to care highly about the interests of 
others.  To demonstrate this, she must demonstrate th t she has acted with a sufficiently 
high degree of benevolence for a sufficiently long time after committing her crime.  To 
demonstrate that she has acted with such benevolence, she must sacrifice some of her 
sufficiently important personal interests for a sufficiently long time for the sake of 
                         
25.  To avoid this circularity objection, expressivi ts might contend that punishing moderately serious 
criminals extremely severely would be inappropriate because such punishments would express the 
unwarranted assertion that they disrespected the rig ts of others to an extremely bad degree in committing 
their crimes.  In fact, they disrespected the rights of others only to a moderately bad degree.  Cf. 
SCANLON, supra note 20, at 267 (claiming that "[i]nsofar as punishment involves an assertion that the 
agent governed him-or herself in a way that was faulty, it is appropriate only when this is true").   
 For at least three reasons, this is not a good explanation of why the criminals would not deserve to 
be punished extremely severely under the EEP.  First, the EEP's extremely severe punishments would not 
express the false assertion that the moderately seriou  criminals disrespected the rights of others to an 
extremely bad degree.  Unlike a mere utterance, an assertion is the expression of a belief.  Because the state 
does not believe that the moderately serious criminals disrespected the rights of others to an extremely bad 
degree, it does not assert this in punishing them extremely severely under the EEP.  At most, the EEP's 
punishments would express a mere utterance of the fals proposition.  Second, it is not clear people have a 
right against the mere utterance of a false proposition, especially under conditions in which no believes it.  
Assuming the state is transparent about the reasons of efficiency for which it adopts the EEP, these 
conditions could obtain under the EEP.  Third, even if people have a right against the mere utterance of a 






benefiting others.   
 According to the main principle of RS, a criminal deserves a punishment for her 
crime that is no more severe than the burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation 
of restoration she incurs from committing her crime.  In other words, a criminal deserves 
to be punished for her crime no more severely than e burdens she is obligated to 
undertake to restore the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime.26   
 Given RS, we can now explain why moderately serious criminals do not deserve 
to be punished extremely severely under the EEP.  According to RS, the absolute severity 
of the most severe punishment that a criminal deserv  for her crime corresponds to the 
absolute severity of the burdens she must undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration. 
 When someone commits a moderately serious crime, she di respects the rights of others 
to a moderately bad degree in committing it.  Her crime is strong evidence that she has a 
moderately bad disposition to commit crimes.  Thus, her crime is strong evidence that she 
has a moderately bad disposition to disrespect the rig ts of others.  So her crime is strong 
evidence that there is a moderately bad deficiency in the degree to which she cares about 
others.   
 On reflection, to annul this evidence and demonstrate that she has a stable 
disposition to care highly about others, she must demonstrate that she has acted with a 
moderately high degree of benevolence for a moderately long time after committing her 
crime.  To demonstrate this, she must sacrifice some f her moderately important 
personal interests for a moderately long time for the sake of benefiting others.  So she 
must undertake no more than a moderately severe burden to restore the conditions of trust 
she undermined by committing her crime.  Hence, she des rves no more than a 
moderately severe punishment for her crime.  As a consequence, she would not deserve to 
                         
26.  As a corollary, a criminal does not deserve a punishment for her crime that is more severe than te 
burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation of restoration she incurs from committing it.  In other 
words, a criminal does not deserve to be punished for her crime more severely than the burdens she is 





be punished extremely severely under the EEP.   
 V.  Three Objections 
A.  First Objection 
 Critics might concede that RS correctly explains why moderately serious 
criminals deserve moderately severe punishments.  But drawing on the form of RS's 
explanation, they might construct a similar argument for why moderately serious 
criminals also deserve the EEP's extremely severe punishments.  Because the EEP would 
likely realize less overall suffering than more moderate enforcement policies, critics 
might claim that the EEP would be optimific in the s nse that its consequences would be 
all things considered better than the consequences of any other available enforcement 
policy.  Assuming the EEP would be optimific, punishing moderately serious criminals 
extremely severely under the EEP would be optimific in the sense that the consequences 
of doing so would be all things considered better than the consequences of treating them 
in any other way available.  Assuming people have an obligation of extreme beneficence 
to undertake any optimific treatment, critics might infer that moderately serious criminals 
are obligated to undertake the EEP's extremely severe punishments.  So contrary to RS, 
moderately serious criminals deserve them.   
 In response, people do not have an obligation of extreme beneficence.  Such an 
obligation would demand too much from them.  If a person had such an obligation, she 
would be obligated to undertake extremely severe budens merely because the 
consequences of her doing so would be all things con idered slightly better than the 
consequences of her not doing so.  For example, suppo e a person could prevent someone 
from suffering years of intense pain only by undertaking a course of treatment that would 
cause her the same intense pain but for slightly less time.  Other things being equal, if she 
had an obligation of extreme beneficence, she would be obligated to undertake this 
painful course of treatment merely because the consequences of her doing so would be all 





though, no one seems to have such a strong obligation to sacrifice her own critical 
interests whenever doing so would be merely optimific.  In general, an individual seems 
justified in caring about her own critical interests out of proportion to their objective 
value.  So within limits, an individual can be justified in promoting her own critical 
interests even when promoting them would not be optimific.27  Thus, people do not have 
an obligation of extreme beneficence.28  Therefore, the first objection does not show that
moderately serious criminals are obligated to undertak  the EEP's extremely severe 
punishments.    
B.  Second Objection      
 Critics might point out that a criminal's obligation of restoration is ultimately 
grounded in her more basic obligation not to cause oth rs harm.29  A person seems 
specially responsible for the consequences she causes rather than merely allows to 
occur.30  So although a person is not generally obligated not to allow others harm, she is 
obligated not to cause others harm.  The critics might argue that a moderately serious 
criminal is obligated to undertake the EEP's extremely severe punishment because unless 
she undertakes it, she will cause others harm.  
                         
27.  See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 171-75 (1986); SAMUEL 
SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 20 (rev. d. 1994).  
28.  A person does have an obligation of minimal beneficence to make a trivial sacrifice to relieve a dire 
burden.  But this obligation could not explain why someone would be obligated to undertake the EEP's 
extremely severe punishment because such a punishment would not be a trivial sacrifice.  A person might 
have a more demanding obligation to undertake an extremely severe burden when the consequences of her 
doing so would be all things considered extremely better than the consequences of her not doing so.  But 
this obligation would also not explain why a moderat ly serious criminal would be obligated to undertake 
the EEP's extremely severe punishment.  For there is little reason to believe that the EEP's consequences 
would be all things considered extremely better than the consequences of a more moderate policy.  
29.  Unless a criminal restores the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime, she will 
cause others harm by causing them to incur the costs of insecurity.  
30.  See, e.g., Warren Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences:  The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 
98 PHIL. REV. 287 (1989); Samuel Scheffler, Doing and Allowing, 114 ETHICS 215 (2004); BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM:  FOR AND AGAINST 75, 93-95, 99 





 Suppose the state adopts the EEP and apprehends a moderately serious criminal.  
If she does not undertake the EEP's extremely severe punishment, she will effectively 
lower the crime's severity of punishment for other potential criminals by causing them to 
believe that they too stand to suffer a less severe punishment for committing the crime.  
By effectively lowering the crime's severity of punishment for other potential criminals, 
she will cause others either of two harms.   
 On the one hand, the state might raise the crime's probability of punishment for 
others to compensate for their belief that they now stand to suffer a less severe 
punishment for the crime.  By doing so, the state would ensure that they are deterred from 
committing the crime just as strongly as they would have been if she had not effectively 
lowered the crime's severity of punishment for them.  To raise the crime's probability of 
punishment for others, though, the state must incur additional enforcement costs.  So if 
the state were to raise the crime's probability of punishment for others, she would cause 
harm to the state by causing it to incur such costs.    
 On the other hand, to avoid incurring these additional costs, the state might not 
raise the crime's probability of punishment for others.  As a consequence, others would 
commit the crime who would have been deterred from c mitting it if she had not 
effectively lowered the crime's severity of punishment for them.  So if the state were not 
to raise the crime's probability of punishment for others, she would cause harm to the 
victims of their additional crimes.    
 In response, we might concede that if the moderately serious criminal does not 
undertake the EEP's extremely severe punishment, then either the state will incur 
additional enforcement costs or other criminals will commit crimes that they would have 
been deterred from committing it if she had not effectively lowered the crime's severity of 
punishment for them.  However, the critics falsely assume that she would cause either 
harm to occur by not undertaking the EEP's extremely s vere punishment.  On reflection, 





harm would be caused solely by other actual or potential criminals. 
 On the one hand, suppose the state does not raise he crime's probability of 
punishment for others, and some commit the crime who ould have been deterred from 
committing it if she had not effectively lowered the crime's severity of punishment for 
them.  Although more people are harmed as victims of these additional crimes, she did 
not cause them harm.  In this case, the other criminals alone caused them harm by 
committing crimes against them.  Because she is not responsible for their decisions to 
commit crimes against their victims, she did not cause the victims harm.  She merely 
allowed them to be harmed.  
 On the other hand, suppose the state raises the crim 's probability of punishment 
for others in order to deter them from committing the crime.  Although the state does 
incur additional enforcement costs to raise the crime's probability of punishment for 
them, she again did not cause the state to incur such costs.  In this case, the state's 
incurring the additional enforcement costs is caused solely by the dispositions of the other 
potential criminals.  Because she is not responsible for their dispositions to commit 
crimes, she did not cause the state to incur the additional enforcement costs.  She merely 
allowed the state to incur them.   
 Because the moderately serious criminal would not cause either harm to occur by 
not undertaking the EEP's extremely severe punishment, she is not obligated to undertake 
it on the basis of her obligation not to cause others arm.  So the second objection does 
not show that she deserves the EEP's extremely severe punishment.    
C.  Third Objection     
 Critics might concede that by not undertaking the EEP's extremely severe 
punishment, the moderately serious criminal would not cause others to commit crimes 
and would not cause the state to raise the crime's probability of punishment for others.  
But they still might argue that unless she undertaks the EEP's extremely severe 





would effectively lower the crime's severity of punishment for herself in the sense that 
she would cause herself to believe that she now stand  to suffer a less severe punishment 
for committing the crime in the future.  By effectively lowering the crime's severity of 
punishment for herself, she would cause others either of two harms.   
 On the one hand, the state might raise the crime's probability of punishment for 
her to compensate for her belief that she now stand to suffer a less severe punishment for 
committing the crime in the future.  By doing so, the state would ensure that she is 
deterred from committing the crime just as strongly as she would have been if she had not 
effectively lowered the crime's severity of punishment for her.  To raise the crime's 
probability of punishment for her, though, the state must incur additional enforcement 
costs, such as hiring an additional police officer to monitor her more frequently.  So if the 
state were to raise the crime's probability of punishment for her, she would cause harm to 
the state by causing it to incur additional enforcement costs.    
 On the other hand, to avoid incurring additional enforcement costs, the state might 
not raise the crime's probability of punishment for he .  As a consequence, she would 
commit the crime more than she would have if she had not effectively lowered the crime's 
severity of punishment for her.  So if the state were not to raise the crime's probability of 
punishment for her, she would cause harm to the victims of her additional crimes.   
 Assuming she would cause either harm to others unless she undertakes the EEP's 
extremely severe punishment, she is obligated to undertake it on the basis of her 
obligation not to cause others harm.  Thus, she desrv  the punishment.  
 In response, we might concede that the moderately serious criminal would cause 
either harm to others by not undertaking the EEP's extremely severe punishment.  But 
even so, the third objection does not plausibly explain why she would be obligated to 
undertake it.  The obligation not to cause others ha m has a limit.  Under the limit, a 
person is obligated to undertake the means necessary to p event herself from causing 





otherwise cause them.  Given the limit, the moderately serious criminal would be 
obligated to undertake the EEP's extremely severe punishment only if the punishment 
would not be extremely worse for her than the harm she would otherwise cause others.  
But presumably, the punishment would be extremely worse for her than this harm.  To 
see why, suppose she undertakes only a moderately severe punishment.   
 On the one hand, the state might not raise the crime's probability of punishment 
for her because the additional enforcement costs required to do so would be worse than 
the additional crimes she would otherwise commit.  As a consequence, she would commit 
the crime more often in the future.  But because the crime is only moderately serious, 
presumably her being punished extremely severely for it would be extremely worse for 
her than the harm she would otherwise cause the victims of her additional crimes.    
 On the other hand, the state might raise the crime's probability of punishment for 
her because the additional crimes she would otherwis  commit would be worse than the 
additional enforcement costs the state must incur to raise it for her.  As a consequence, 
she would cause the state to incur additional enforcement costs, such as hiring an 
additional police officer to monitor her more frequntly.  But such costs would likely be 
relatively low:  presumably, her being punished extr mely severely would be extremely 
worse for her than those costs.    
 Thus, the EEP's extremely severe punishment would presumably be extremely 
worse for the moderately serious criminal than the harm she would otherwise cause others 
by undertaking a less severe punishment.  So the third objection does not plausibly show 
that she is obligated to undertake it or, therefore, that she deserves it.31   
    
                         
31.  We might worry that the limit on the obligation not to cause others harm would similarly undermine 
RS's explanation of why a moderately serious criminal deserves a moderately severe punishment.  But 
presumably, the limit would not undermine it because the moderately severe burden she must undertake to 
restore the conditions of trust would not be extremely worse for her than the significant costs of insecurity 





 VI.  Concluding Remarks 
 Our analysis of the EEP illustrates the importance of the desert requirement in 
constraining the types of enforcement policies thate state may adopt for crimes, 
particularly moderately and mildly serious ones.  An enforcement policy is justified only 
if under it, the state would not punish anyone more than she deserves.  So as a 
consequence of RS, an enforcement policy is justified only if under it, the state would not 
punish anyone more severely than the burdens she must undertake to fulfill her obligation 
of restoration.  Without this constraint, there is no robust reason for the state not to adopt 
the kinds of extreme enforcement policies that would be the most efficient means to 
achieving the optimal level of deterrence for any crime.  With this constraint, the state 
must adopt more costly alternatives.  Rather than cause for complaint, the additional costs 
are simply the costs of respecting the rights of its ci izens.   
 VII.  Appendix 
 Given the main differences between the distributions f punishment under the 
EEP and the MEP, egalitarians might argue that the EEP's inequality would be all things 
considered worse than the MEP's inequality among the targeted criminals because on 
balance the different aspects of inequality would favor the latter over the former.32  
Egalitarians contend that inequality is a complex notion:  it has different aspects 
consisting in the different considerations that could make the inequality in one 
distribution worse than the inequality in another.  The inequality in one distribution might 
be worse than the inequality in another with respect to one aspect but not with respect to 
another.  To determine whether the inequality in one distribution is all things considered 
worse than the inequality in another, we must determine the degree to which each 
distribution realizes the different aspects of inequality, and we must determine the relative 
importance of each aspect if some aspects favor one distribution, while other aspects 
                         
32.  I follow Larry Temkin in my terminology and gen ral approach to comparing inequalities.  SeeLarry S. 





favor the other.   
 Egalitarians might argue that the EEP's inequality would be all things considered 
worse than the MEP's inequality because several aspects of inequality would favor the 
latter over the former, whereas no aspect of inequality would favor the former over the 
latter.  To demonstrate, consider different aspects of inequality that consist in different 
views about a) which criminals have individual complaints against an enforcement 
policy's inequality, b) the size of those individual complaints, and c) how to compare one 
policy's inequality with the inequality of another on the basis of those individual 
complaints.   
 First, egalitarians might endorse a "relative to the best off" view of individual 
complaints against an enforcement policy's inequality:  for any enforcement policy E, a 
criminal has an individual complaint against E's inequality just in case she receives a 
punishment under E that is more severe than the punishment any other criminal receives 
under E.33  According to the "relative to the best off" view of individual complaints, for 
any enforcement policy E, the size of a criminal's individual complaint against E's 
inequality is the difference between the severity of her punishment and the severity of the 
least severe punishment that any other criminal receiv s under E.  Egalitarians also might 
endorse a maximin view of comparing one policy's inequality with the inequality of 
another:  for any two enforcement policies E1 and E2, E1's inequality is worse than E2's 
inequality insofar as some criminal's individual complaint against E1's inequality is larger 
than any criminal's individual complaint against E2's inequality.  Call the "relative to the 
best off" view of individual complaints combined with a maximin view of comparison 
'View 1.'    
 According to View 1, the EEP's inequality would be worse than the MEP's 
                         
33.  In clarification, when I speak of an enforcement policy, I mean an enforcement policy for one particular 






inequality.  The difference between the most severe and least severe punishments that 
criminals would receive under the EEP would be larger than the difference under the 
MEP.  Under either policy, the least severe punishment that some criminals would receive 
would be no punishment at all.  However, under the EEP, the most severe punishment 
that other criminals would receive would be extremely s vere, whereas under the MEP, 
the most severe punishment that other criminals would receive would be only moderately 
severe.  On the "relative to the best off" view of individual complaints, some criminal's 
individual complaint against the EEP would be larger than any criminal's individual 
complaint against the MEP.  So given its maximin view of comparison, the EEP's 
inequality would be worse than the MEP's inequality according to View 1.34     
 Second, egalitarians might endorse a "relative to all those better off" view of 
individual complaints:  for any enforcement policy E, a criminal has an individual 
complaint against E's inequality just in case she rec ives a punishment under E that is 
more severe than the punishment any other criminal receives under E.  According to the 
"relative to all those better off" view of individual complaints, for any enforcement policy 
E, the size of a criminal's individual complaint against E's inequality is the sum of the 
differences between the severity of her punishment and the severity of each less severe 
punishment that other criminals receive under E.  Call the "relative to all those better off" 
view of individual complaints combined with a maximin view of comparison 'View 2.'     
                         
34.  To illustrate the application of View 1, consider the following numerical example.  Suppose a state 
would optimally deter people from committing a moderat ly serious crime by making its expected 
punishment 100 units of severity.  Assuming the crime's expected punishment were 100 units of severity, 
150 criminals would still commit it:  such criminals either cannot be deterred or the means required to deter 
them would be much worse than the crimes they would therwise commit.  Suppose the EEP and the MEP 
both make the crime's expected punishment 100 unitsof severity.  However, under the EEP, the crime's 
probability of punishment would be 0.04, and its severity of punishment would be 2500 units of severity.  
Whereas under the MEP, its probability of punishment would be 0.4, and its severity of punishment would 
be 250 units of severity.  Under the EEP, six of the 150 undeterred criminals would receive a punishment of 
2500 units of severity, and the other 144 would receive no punishment at all.  Under the MEP, 60 of the 150 
undeterred criminals would receive a punishment of 250 units of severity, and the other 90 would receive no 
punishment at all.  On the "relative to the best off" view of individual complaints, the largest individual 
complaint of a criminal against the EEP would be 2500-0, which is 2500, whereas the largest individual 





 According to View 2, the EEP's inequality would also be worse than the MEP's 
inequality.  The sum of the differences between the most severe punishment that a 
criminal would receive under the EEP and each less s vere punishment that other 
criminals would receive under the EEP would be larger than the sum of such differences 
under the MEP.  The most severe punishment that a criminal would receive under the 
EEP would be more severe than the most severe punishment that a criminal would 
receive under the MEP, and the less severe punishments that other criminals would 
receive under either policy would be no punishment at all.  Furthermore, relative to the 
MEP, more criminals would receive no punishment at all under the EEP because the 
crime's probability of punishment would be lower under the EEP.  Hence, on the "relative 
to all those better off" view of individual complaints, some criminal's individual 
complaint against the EEP would be larger than any criminal's individual complaint 
against the MEP.  So given its maximin view of comparison, the EEP's inequality would 
be worse than the MEP's inequality according to View 2.35    
 Third, egalitarians might endorse a "relative to the average" view of individual 
complaints:  for any enforcement policy E, a criminal has an individual complaint against 
E's inequality just in case she receives a punishment under E that is more severe than the 
severity of the average punishment that criminals receive under E.  According to the 
"relative to the average" view of individual complaints, for any enforcement policy E, the 
size of a criminal's individual complaint against E's inequality is the difference between 
the severity of her punishment and the severity of the average punishment that criminals 
receive under E.  To determine the average punishment that criminals receive under E, 
divide the total amount of punishment that all criminals receive under E by the total 
number of criminals under E.  The average punishment that criminals receive under E 
                         
35.  To illustrate, apply View 2 to our numerical example.  On the "relative to all those better off" view of 
individual complaints, the largest individual complaint of a criminal against the EEP would be 144*(2500-
0), which would be 360,000, whereas the largest individual complaint of a criminal against the MEP would 





will equal the crime's expected punishment under E.  Call the "relative to the average" 
view of individual complaints combined with a maximin view of comparison 'View 3.'  
 According to View 3, the EEP's inequality would also be worse than the MEP's 
inequality.  The difference between the most severe punishment that a criminal would 
receive under the EEP and the crime's expected punishment under the EEP would be 
larger than the difference under the MEP.  By hypothesis, the crime's expected 
punishment would be the same under both the MEP and the EEP.  And the most severe 
punishment that a criminal would receive under the EEP would be more severe than the 
most severe punishment that a criminal would receive under the MEP.  So on the 
"relative to the average" view of individual complaints, some criminal's individual 
complaint against the EEP would be larger than any criminal's individual complaint 
against the MEP.  Given its maximin view of comparison, the EEP's inequality would be 
worse than the MEP's inequality according to View 3.36    
 Fourth, egalitarians might endorse an additive view of comparing one 
enforcement policy's inequality with the inequality of another:  for any two enforcement 
policies E1 and E2, E1's inequality is worse than E2's inequality insofar as the sum of 
each criminal's individual complaint against E1's inequality is larger than the sum of each 
criminal's individual complaint against E2's inequality.  Call the "relative to the average" 
view of individual complaints combined with an additive view of comparison 'View 4.'  
Call the "relative to all those better off" view of individual complaints combined with an 
additive view of comparison 'View 5.'    
 According to Views 4 and 5, the EEP's inequality would be worse than the MEP's 
inequality.  On either the "relative to the average" or the "relative to all those better off" 
view of individual complaints, more criminals would have individual complaints against 
                         
36.  To illustrate, apply View 3 to our numerical example.  On the "relative to the average" view of 
individual complaints, the largest individual complaint of a criminal against the EEP would be 2500-10, 
which would be 2400, whereas the largest individual complaint of a criminal against the MEP would be 





the MEP's inequality than against the EEP's inequality; however, the size of each 
criminal's individual complaint against the EEP's inequality would be disproportionately 
larger than the size of each criminal's individual complaint against the MEP's inequality.  
As a consequence, on either the "relative to the average" or the "relative to all those better 
off" view of individual complaints, the sum of each riminal's individual complaint 
against the EEP would be larger than the sum of each criminal's individual complaint 
against the MEP.  Given their additive view of comparison, the EEP's inequality would be 
worse than the MEP's inequality according to Views 4 and 5.37     
 On the basis of Views 1-5, egalitarians would infer that the EEP's inequality 
would be all things considered worse than the MEP's inequality.  Our application of the 
views shows that several aspects of inequality would favor the MEP's inequality over the 
EEP's inequality.38  And no aspect of inequality seems to favor the EEP's inequality over 
the MEP's inequality.  The one salient aspect of inequality we have yet to consider is a 
"relative to the best off" view of individual complaints combined with an additive view of 
comparison.  Call it 'View 6.'  View 6 does not favor one over the other.  Although more 
criminals would have individual complaints against the MEP's inequality, the individual 
complaints of criminals against the EEP's inequality would be proportionately larger, such 
                         
37.  To illustrate Views 4 and 5, apply them to ourn merical example.  On the "relative to the averag" 
view of individual complaints, six criminals would have individual complaints against the EEP, and each 
complaint would be 2400.  So the sum of their complaints against the EEP would 14,400.  Whereas 60 
criminals would have individual complaints against the MEP, and each complaint would be 150.  So the 
sum of their complaints against the MEP would be 9000.     
 On the "relative to all those better off" view of individual complaints, six criminals would have 
individual complaints against the EEP, and each complaint would be 360,000.  So the sum of their 
complaints against the EEP would be 2,160,000.  Whereas 60 criminals would have individual complaints 
against the MEP, and each complaint would be 22,500.  So the sum of their complaints against the MEP 
would be 1,350,000.  
38.  In addition to Views 1-5, weighted variants of them would also favor the MEP's inequality over the 
EEP's inequality.  Such variants would weight the individual complaints of criminals who receive more 
severe punishments disproportionately higher than te individual complaints of criminals who receive less 
severe punishments.  Because the non-weighted versions of Views 1-5 favor the MEP's inequality over the
EEP's inequality, the weighted variants of them would favor the MEP's inequality even more over the EEP's 





that the sum of the individual complaints of criminals against the EEP's inequality would 
be the same as the sum of the individual complaints of criminals against the MEP's 
inequality.39   
                         
39.  To illustrate, apply View 6 to our numerical example.  On the "relative to the best off" view of 
individual complaints, six criminals would have indivi ual complaints against the EEP, and each complaint 
would be 2500.  So the sum of their complaints against the EEP's inequality would be 15,000.  Whereas 60 
criminals would have individual complaints against the MEP, and each complaint would be 250.  So the 





 Chapter 3 
 
 A New Systematic Explanation of  
 the Types and Mitigating Effects of Exculpatory Defenses 
 I.  Introduction 
 A crime is a criminal act performed with a criminal state of mind.  A crime's actus 
reus requirements define a criminal act, and its mens r a requirements define a criminal 
state of mind.  A criminal act is a type of act that standardly poses a high risk of violating 
the rights of others.  A criminal state of mind consists in disrespecting the rights of 
others.1  Such disrespect consists in flouting the moral resons against violating the rights 
of others, and flouting such reasons involves responding inappropriately to them.2  
Although a crime is defined as a criminal act performed with a criminal state of mind, the 
mere fact that someone performs a criminal act generates a rebuttable presumption that 
she is particularly blameworthy and liable to a particularly severe punishment for the act. 
 Assuming she really is so blameworthy, the state would be warranted in blaming her to 
that degree.  And if she really is liable to such a severe punishment, then the state has 
most reason to punish her so severely against her will. 3  This presumption is rebutted, 
                         
1.  See Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 40-41 (1977) (describing the concept of 
"moral recognition respect" whose denial captures th  sense of disrespect at issue); Benjamin B. Sendor, 
Mistakes of Fact:  A Study in the Structure of Criminal Conduct, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 707, 720-36 
(1990) (suggesting that disrespect for the rights of others is standardly constitutive of a crime's mens rea 
requirements).  Throughout the paper, I focus only  crimes that are mala in se.  For discussion on the 
types of defenses the state should recognize for crimes that are mala prohibita or strict liability offenses, see 
JEREMY HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME 237-76 (2004) (endorsing a due diligence defense and a 
reasonable ignorance of law excuse to such offenses).  
2.  At one extreme, such an inappropriate response might consist in someone's intending to do something 
under conditions in which she believes that doing it would have a high risk of violating the rights of others, 
and none of what she believes about the consequences of doing it provides her with any reason to do it.   
3.  My sense of liability is a demanding one.  On this sense, a criminal actor is liable to a punishment if and 







though, when the criminal actor has an exculpatory defense.4  Defenses mitigate how 
much a criminal actor is blameworthy and liable to be punished.5  If a criminal actor has a 
full defense for her act, she is not at all blameworthy and is not liable to any punishment 
for it.  If she has a partial defense for the act, she might be somewhat blameworthy and 
liable to some punishment for it, but not as much as presumed.     
 Although defenses have these mitigating effects, it i  not obvious what qualifies 
as a defense or why defenses have these effects.  In his paper, I have three objectives.  
First, I seek to spell out a taxonomy of the main types of defenses.  Second, I aim to 
explain the mitigating effects of defenses on a criminal actor's liability to punishment.  
Third, I explain their mitigating effects on a criminal actor's blameworthiness.  To explain 
their mitigating effects on how much a criminal actor is liable to be punished, I initially 
consider explanations grounded in the value requirement of my general theory of the 
justification of punishment.  I argue none succeeds.  Next I consider explanations 
grounded in the desert requirement of my general theory.  I argue that my restorative 
signaling theory of punitive desert, RS, best explains them.  I then argue that RS also 
plausibly explains the mitigating effects of defenss on how much a criminal actor is 
blameworthy.  Given its explanatory power, I argue that RS has important implications 
not only for what should qualify as a defense but also for the nature and strength of the 
state's reasons to recognize defenses as mitigating f ctors in its punitive policies.   
                                                             
demanding sense, a criminal actor is liable to a punishment if and only if the state's imposing it on her
against her will would not violate her rights.  Cf. Jeff McMahan, The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive 
Killing , 15 PHIL. ISSUES 386, 386 (2005) (describing a similarly less demanding sense of liability to 
harmful treatment). 
4.  As I use the term, a criminal actor is not necessarily a criminal.  A criminal actor is defined only as 
someone who performs a criminal act.  A criminal is someone who performs a criminal act with a criminal 
state of mind. 
5.  Throughout the paper, I use the term 'defenses' to refer only to exculpatory defenses.  To be concise, I 
leave the exculpatory qualification implicit.  I will not explain why the state should recognize non-
exculpatory defenses, like diplomatic immunity.  For discussion of non-exculpatory defenses, see Paul H. 







 II.  Presuppositions 
 In spelling out the main types of defenses and explaining their mitigating effects, I 
make several presuppositions that I assume obtain at the time a criminal actor is assessed 
for blameworthiness and liability to punishment.  First, a criminal actor is unavoidably a 
member of a large community of persons over which the state governs as their agent.  
Second, any justifiable means of reducing the degree of interaction between a criminal 
actor and others would unavoidably leave a significant degree of interaction between 
them and so would unavoidably leave others vulnerabl  to her to a significant degree.  
Third, there are no extraordinary means of obtaining epistemic access to a criminal actor's 
dispositions.  So I assume there are no extraordinary means of obtaining epistemic access 
to whether she has a particular disposition to commit crimes.   
 I make presuppositions 1-3 because I seek a practical explanation of the mitigating 
effects of defenses.  I seek to explain their mitigating effects in the actual world given the 
natural facts that generally characterize the unavoid ble conditions under which people 
actually live.  Presuppositions 1-3 are such facts.  I leave it an open question whether the 
considerations that constitute defenses in the actual world would also be defenses with 
the same mitigating effects in other worlds in which those presuppositions do not obtain.  
 Fourth, everyone knows all the external and internal facts about all the acts the 
criminal actor has performed, including the external and psychological causes of her acts 
and their consequences.  Fifth, everyone knows all the facts about her physical and 
psychological capacities.  Thus, I assume everyone knows whether she has the capacity to 
respond appropriately to the moral reasons against violating the rights of others.  Sixth, 
everyone forms justified beliefs about her dispositi ns on the basis of his knowledge 
specified in presuppositions 4-5.  So if everyone's knowledge of the relevant facts justify 
him in believing that she has a particularly bad disposition to commit crimes, I assume he 







to his justified beliefs about her dispositions.  So if others are justified in believing that 
she has a particularly bad disposition to commit crimes, and they are rationally required to 
incur certain costs in response, I assume they incur such costs.   
 I make presuppositions 4-6 because I seek to explain the mitigating effects of 
defenses on the assumption that others fulfill their ep stemic duties to each other and to 
the criminal actor before they punish her.  Before they do so, they have a duty to discover 
that no facts about her acts or capacities entail th t she does not deserve the punishment.  
They also have a duty to form justified beliefs about her dispositions to commit crimes.  
And when others discover facts that make someone des rving of punishment, they have a 
duty to promulgate such facts to those with an interest in them but are unaware of them.  
Presuppositions 4-6 entail that others fulfill such duties.  
 Also I make presuppositions 4-7 because I seek to xplain the mitigating effects of 
defenses on how much a criminal actor is blameworthy and deserves to be punished.  
Both concepts are plausibly defined conditionally on the assumption that presuppositions 
4-7 obtain at the time of assessment.  Regarding the concept of blameworthiness, 
someone is particularly blameworthy for an act if and only if she did it, and others would 
be warranted in blaming her to this degree for doing it if presuppositions 4-7 were to 
obtain.  Regarding the concept of punitive desert, omeone deserves a punishment for an 
act if and only if she did it, and the state would not violate her rights by imposing the 
punishment on her against her will for doing it if presuppositions 4-7 were to obtain.  In 
either case, how much someone is blameworthy or deserv  to be punished for doing 
something does not seem to depend essentially on the moral status of blaming or 
punishing her under less idealized conditions.  Forexample, whether someone is 
blameworthy for doing something does not seem to depend essentially on whether others 
would be warranted in blaming her for it under conditions in which a) they do not know 







dispositions; or c) they are disposed to respond irrationally to their beliefs about her 
dispositions.6  Similarly, these less idealized conditions also seem irrelevant to the issue 
of whether someone deserves to be punished for doing s mething.  So to explain the 
mitigating effects of defenses on how much a criminal actor is blameworthy and deserves 
to be punished, we should assume presuppositions 4-7 obtain at the time of assessment.   
        III.  A Taxonomy of Defenses  
 To explain the mitigating effects of defenses, we should understand the main 
types of them.  We can usefully begin by describing three general types along with 
justifications.    
A.  Type 1 Defenses   
 When someone performs a criminal act, there is a presumption that in performing 
it, she manifested a particularly bad degree of disrespect toward the rights of others.  The 
presumed degree of disrespect corresponds to how badly she presumably flouted the 
moral reasons against violating their rights.  How badly she presumably flouted such 
reasons corresponds to how inappropriately she presumably responded to them.  In 
general, how inappropriately she presumably responded to such reasons depends on the 
beliefs, intentions, and motives with which she presumably performed the act.  More 
precisely, how inappropriately she presumably responded to them depends on a) what she 
presumably intended in performing the act, b) what presumably motivated her to intend to 
perform the act, c) how strongly she was presumably motivated to intend to perform the 
act, and d) the relative strength of the reasons that s e presumably had for and against 
intending to perform the act.  What reasons she presumably had for and against intending 
to perform the act depends on what she presumably believed when she performed it.    
 Thus, a reason is meant here in a subjective sense that is relative to what the 
                         
6.  Cf. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, Sentiment and Value, 110 ETHICS 722, 745 (2000) (noting that 
whether someone is warranted in feeling a particular emotion, like blame, toward something depends on 







criminal actor believed when she performed the act. In his sense, the reasons she had for 
and against intending to perform the act were provided by what she believed when she 
performed it.7  So in this sense, the fact that someone believes that her performing a 
particular act would directly cause another to die provides her with a strong moral reason 
against intending to do it.  This fact provides herwith such a reason even if her belief is 
false, or she believes that it does not provide her with such a reason.  Hence, if she were 
to intend to perform the act without believing it would have any consequences that would 
count in favor of it, she would flout very badly the moral reasons against violating the 
putative victim's right not to be killed.  Therefore, she would disrespect very badly his 
right not to be killed.      
 Given the degree of disrespect that someone presumably anifested in performing 
a criminal act, type 1 defenses are considerations hat mitigate how badly she actually 
disrespected the rights of others in performing it.8  In other words, they mitigate how 
badly she actually flouted the moral reasons against v olating the rights of others in 
performing the act.  They mitigate how inappropriately she actually responded to such 
                         
7.  In an objective sense, someone's reasons for and against intending to perform an act are not relative to 
what she believes.  They are provided by facts that are rue independently of what she believes.  See Derek 
Parfit, Rationality and Reasons, in EXPLORING PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY:  FROM ACTION TO 
VALUES 17, 17 (Dan Egonsson, Jonas Josefsson, Bjorn Petersson, & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen eds., 2001) 
(noting the objective sense of reasons).  Although they are conceptually distinct, subjective and objectiv  
reasons are related.  A fact provides someone with an objective reason if and only if her believing that it 
obtains would provide her with a subjective reason.     
 To keep matters simple, I set aside for further analysis the issue of whether someone's beliefs must 
be justified for them to provide her with a subjective reason for or against intending to perform an act.  
Similarly, I set aside for further analysis the issue of whether the subjective reasons that someone had for 
and against intending to perform an act were provided not by what she believed when she performed the act, 
but more precisely, by the considerations that provided her with evidence to believe or not to believe certain 
propositions when she performed the act.  
8.  See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 279-80 (1998) (noting this type of 
defense); P.F. STRAWSON, Freedom and Resentment, i  FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 7-8 (1974) (same); Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil:  Variations on a 
Strawsonian Theme, in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 119, 123 (John Martin Fischer 
& Mark Ravizza eds., 1993) (same); cf. John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575 
(endorsing excuses which entail that in performing her act, the criminal actor satisfied the standards of 







reasons in performing it.  If a criminal actor has a full type 1 defense, she did not 
disrespect the rights of others at all in performing her act.9  If she has a partial type 1 
defense, she might have disrespected the rights of others to some degree, but she did not 
disrespect them as badly as presumed.  
 Many different considerations can provide a criminal actor with a type 1 defense.  
For example, she can have a type 1 defense of compulsion because she was caused to 
perform the act against her will by mere force.10  The compulsion might have been 
external or internal.  To illustrate a case of external compulsion, suppose a group seizes 
my arm and although I try to resist, they use my arm gainst my will to strike another 
person.  To illustrate a case of internal compulsion, suppose I suffer a seizure that also 
causes my arm to strike the victim against my will.  In both cases, I have a type 1 defense 
of compulsion for striking the victim.  In neither case did I intend to do anything that I 
believed had a high risk of striking him or harming him in any way.  In the former, I 
intended not to strike him or harm him in any way, nd in the latter, not only did I lack 
the capacity to form any intentions at all, I also had no beliefs about what I was doing.  So 
in striking the victim, I did not respond inappropriately to the moral reasons against 
violating his rights, specifically his right not tobe assaulted.  Thus, I did not disrespect 
his rights in striking him.    
 For another example, a criminal actor can have a type 1 defense of ignorance or 
mistake of fact because she did not believe her act would have the type of consequences 
                         
9.  More precisely, if a criminal actor has a full type 1 defense, she did not disrespect the rights of others to 
any significant degree in performing her act.  
10.  See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1110a1-5 (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed. 1999) 
(describing defenses of compulsion).  Strictly speaking, an act is intended, under some description.  See 
DONALD DAVIDSON, Agency, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 43, 46 (1980); MICHAEL E. 
BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 119-22 (1987).  However, when 
someone is caused to perform a criminal act against her will by mere force, she does not intend to do it, 







that make it a criminal act.11  In other words, she did not believe her act would have the 
type of consequences that standardly pose a high risk of violating the rights of others.  To 
illustrate, suppose I am target shooting with a friend.  I shoot at the target believing there 
is no chance the bullet will harm anyone in any way.  However, the bullet ricochets off 
the target and into my friend, causing him to die.  In this case, I have a type 1 defense of 
ignorance or mistake of fact for killing him.  Although I intended to do something that 
caused him to die, I did not believe that doing it would cause him to die or harm him in 
any way.  So in killing my friend, I did not respond inappropriately to the moral reasons 
against violating his rights, specifically his right not to be killed.  Hence, I did not 
disrespect his rights in killing him.    
 For another example, a criminal actor can have a type 1 defense of countervailing 
considerations because, although she knew the act was a criminal one, she was 
appropriately motivated to perform it by her belief that particular considerations obtained 
which a) entailed that her performing it would not violate the rights of others or b) 
provided her with most reason to perform it.12  Such an example might involve consent, 
self-defense, defense of others, duress, or necessity.  To illustrate a case of defense of 
others, suppose I know that an assailant will wrongfully kill a group of innocent people 
unless I kill him first.  As a consequence, he lacks a right against my killing him.  In 
response, I kill him for the purpose of preventing him from killing the others.  In this 
case, I have a type 1 defense of defense of others for killing him.  Although I intended to 
kill him, I was appropriately motivated to do so by m  belief that some consideration 
                         
11.  See ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 1110b19-1111a21 (describing defenses of ign rance or mistake of 
fact).  To keep matters simple, I set aside for further analysis the issue of whether the mistake or ignorance 
must be justified or reasonable to constitute a defense.  See supra note 7.  For discussion on this issue, see 
VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 237-64 (2005). 
12.  See ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 1110a5-1110a22 (describing defenses of countervailing 
considerations).  Again, to keep matters simple, I set aside for further analysis the issue of whether t  







obtained which entailed that he lacked a right against my killing him.  So in killing him, I 
did not disrespect his rights.    
 To illustrate a case of necessity, suppose I know that I will starve to death unless I 
steal some food from the surplus of another.  As a consequence, I have most reason to 
steal the food even though I know that by doing so I w uld violate the other's property 
right to the food.13  In response, I steal it for the purpose saving my life.  In this case, I 
have a type 1 defense of necessity for stealing the food.  Although I intended to steal it, I 
was appropriately motivated to do so by my belief that some consideration obtained 
which provided me with most reason to steal it.  So in stealing the food, I did not respond 
inappropriately to the moral reasons against violating the other's property right to it, even 
though I knew I violated this right by stealing it. For in this case, those reasons were 
outweighed by the reasons in favor of violating his property right to the food, namely the 
reasons for saving my life.  Therefore, I did not disrespect his property right to the food in 
stealing it.      
 To clarify, type 1 defenses of countervailing considerations have a motivation 
requirement:  countervailing considerations constitute a type 1 defense only if the 
criminal actor was appropriately motivated by them in performing her act.14  Thus, the 
mere fact that a criminal actor believed such considerations obtained when performing 
her act does not provide her with a type 1 defense for the act.  Such considerations 
provide her with a type 1 defense only if she not only believed they obtained, but also was 
appropriately motivated by this belief in performing the act, such that if she had not 
                         
13.  Although I assume stealing the food in this context would violate the other's property right to it, there is 
controversy over whether his property right to the food would extend to such a case.  I assume it would, in 
part, because by taking the food I presumably incur an obligation to compensate him for the loss. 
14.  See John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 103, 105 (A.P. 
Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996) (endorsing a motivation requirement on defenses of countervailing 
considerations); TADROS, supra note 11, at 273-80 (same); Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 







believed they obtained, then she would not have been motivated as strongly to perform 
it.15   
 To illustrate the motivation requirement, consider an apparent case of defense of 
others.  Suppose a misanthrope embarks on a killing spree merely because she enjoys 
killing others and has no regard for their rights.  On her spree, she sees someone aim a 
gun at five innocent persons.  She knows he will wrongfully kill the five unless she kills 
him first with her own gun.  She then kills him not because she believes that doing so is 
necessary to prevent him from killing the five, butmerely because she would enjoy 
killing him and has no regard for his rights.  Her b lief that killing him was necessary to 
prevent him from killing the five did not play any role in motivating her to kill him.  She 
would have been motivated to kill him just as strongly even if she did not have this belief. 
 As evidence that she was not motivated by this belief, we might suppose that she killed 
the other five immediately after killing the one.  In this case, she does not have a type 1 
defense of defense of others for killing him.  Although she believed that killing him was 
necessary to prevent him from killing the five, she was not motivated by this belief in 
killing him; she was motivated only by her desire for pleasure.  So she disrespected his 
right not to be killed merely to promote her own pleasure.    
 Although a criminal actor must have been appropriately motivated by 
countervailing considerations in order for them to pr vide her with a type 1 defense, her 
motivation need not have been perfectly virtuous.  The motivation requirement requires 
only an appropriate regard for the rights of others.  To illustrate, consider again the 
misanthrope, except suppose she is appropriately motivated by the rights of others.  She 
                         
15.  The motivation requirement on type 1 defenses of countervailing considerations is analogous to a 
requirement on justified or well-founded beliefs in epistemology:  someone's belief is justified or well-
founded only if she not only has evidence that supports her belief, but also holds the belief on the basis of 
her evidence that supports it.  See EARL CONEE & RICHARD FELDMAN, EVIDENTIALISM:  
ESSAYS IN EPISTEMOLOGY 92-93 (2004); cf. Hilary Kornblith, Beyond Foundationalism and the 
Coherence Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 597, 601-02 (1980); Alvin I. Goldman, What is Justified Belief?, in 







still enjoys killing others; however, she is motivaed to do so only under conditions in 
which doing so would not violate their rights.  So suppose again that the misanthrope 
kills the one under conditions in which she knows that he would kill the other five unless 
she kills him first.  In this case, though, she kills him not merely because she enjoys doing 
so, but also because she believes that doing so would n t violate his rights since killing 
him is necessary to prevent him from killing the others.  In this case, she has a full type 1 
defense of defense of others for killing him because she was appropriately motivated by 
her belief that killing him was necessary to prevent him from killing the others, such that 
if she had not held this belief, then she would not have been motivated to kill him.  She 
has such a defense for killing him even though her motivation was not perfectly virtuous 
given that she was motivated in part to kill him to pr mote her own pleasure.  However, 
she did not kill him merely to promote her own pleasure:  her motivation was constrained 
by an appropriate regard for his rights.  Because she appropriately regarded his rights in 
killing him, she did not disrespect his rights in doing so.   
 Critics might argue that type 1 defenses of countervailing considerations do not 
have a motivation requirement.16  They might contend that a criminal actor's having a y 
regard for the rights of others is not a necessary condition of her having such a defense.  
According to them, the mere fact that the criminal actor believed certain countervailing 
considerations obtained when she performed her act can be sufficient to provide her with 
a defense for the act no matter what her motivations f r performing it.  For in such a case, 
her act might have been optimific in both a subjectiv  and objective sense no matter what 
her motivations for performing it.  It might have ben subjectively optimific in the sense 
that its expected value might have been at least as high as the expected value of any other 
act then available to her.  It might have been objectiv ly optimific in the sense that its 
                         
16.  I refer in general to "critics" as a means of anticipating possible objections to my claims.  I do not 







actual consequences might have been at least as good as the consequences of any other 
acts then available to her.17  Assuming her act was optimific in both senses, she has a 
defense for the act no matter what her motivations f r performing it.  For if others were to 
express any blame toward her for the act, they would deter her and others from 
performing similar optimific acts in the future.  Hence, expressing any blame toward her 
for the act would not itself be optimific.  So she would not be blameworthy for the act.    
 To illustrate, consider again the first case of the misanthrope who has no regard 
for the rights of others.   Although her killing the innocent five was not optimific, her 
killing the one was optimific because she knew thatkilling him was necessary to prevent 
him from killing the others.  Because her killing him was optimific, she has a type 1 
defense of defense of others for doing so even thoug  she did so with no regard for his 
rights, as she killed him merely to promote her own pleasure.  If others were to express 
any blame toward her for killing him, they would deter her and others from performing 
similar optimific acts in the future.  For example, they would deter misanthropes 
generally from killing others under conditions in which doing so is necessary to prevent 
them from killing many others.  Hence, expressing ay blame toward the misanthrope for 
killing the one would not itself be optimific.  So she is not blameworthy for killing him.    
 In response, the critics have not proven that type1 d fenses of countervailing 
considerations do not have a motivation requirement.  Their argument is unpersuasive for 
at least three reasons.  First, the critics assume that a criminal act might be optimific even 
if it is performed with no regard for the rights of others.  But in the standard case, a 
criminal act would not be optimific if it were perfo med with no such regard.  Whether an 
act is optimific depends on the value or expected value of its consequences.  The value or 
expected value of an act's consequences depends on not ly the value of its further 
                         







causal consequences, but also the value of the act itself and the motives with which it is 
performed.18  If a criminal actor performs her act with no regard for the rights of others, 
then she performs it with a morally deficient motiva on that is worse than the motivation 
with which she would have performed it if she had performed it with the appropriate 
regard for the rights of others.  So in the standard c se, a criminal act performed with no 
regard for the rights of others would not be optimific because the value or expected value 
of its consequences would have been higher if it had been performed with the appropriate 
regard for the rights of others.   
 Second, if a criminal actor believes that certain countervailing considerations 
obtain when performing her act, the critics assume that expressing blame toward her for 
the act would not be optimific even if she performed it with no regard for the rights of 
others.  They assume that expressing such blame would deter her and others from 
performing other acts in the future that would be optimific at least considered 
independently of the motives with which they would be performed.  But even if 
expressing such blame would deter others from performing some optimific acts in the 
future, the expression might still be optimific.  For the expression might have some 
sufficiently valuable consequences that would not obtain in its absence.  For example, the 
expression might deter the performance of not only some optimific criminal acts, but also 
some non-optimific criminal acts.  For another example, the expression might encourage 
some to develop an appropriate regard for the rights of others.  As a consequence, the 
expression might result in not only fewer optimific criminal acts, but also fewer non-
optimific criminal acts.  Assuming the non-optimific acts prevented are sufficiently bad 
and numerous relative to the optimific acts deterred, the expression might be optimific.    
 Third, the critics assume that if expressing blame toward a criminal actor for her 
                         
18.  See G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 198-99 (Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993); William Shaw, 
The Consequentialist Perspective, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN MORAL THEORY 5, 6-7 (James 







act would not be optimific, then she is not blameworthy for the act.  But whether the 
expression would be optimific is not relevant to whether she is blameworthy.  She is 
blameworthy for the act if and only if others would be warranted in blaming her for the 
act under certain idealized conditions.19  And others' blaming her for the act would 
consist in their feeling an attitude of moral blame toward her for the act.  Such an attitude 
might consist in resentment or indignation.20  So she is blameworthy for the act if and 
only if others would be warranted in feeling an attitude of moral blame toward her for the 
act under certain idealized conditions.  But others' f eling an attitude of moral blame 
toward her does not necessarily involve their expressing the attitude.  They might feel 
such an attitude without expressing it.  Thus, the issue of whether they would be 
warranted in feeling such an attitude is distinct from the issue of whether they would be 
warranted in expressing it.  They might be warranted in feeling such an attitude even if 
they are not warranted in expressing it.21  As a consequence, even if others would not be 
warranted in expressing an attitude of moral blame toward a criminal actor for her act 
because the expression would not be optimific, the criminal actor might still be 
blameworthy for the act.   
 The critics might concede that someone is blameworthy if and only if others 
would be warranted in feeling an attitude of moral bl me toward her.  But they might 
contend that others are warranted in feeling an attitude of moral blame toward someone if 
and only if feeling such an attitude toward her would be optimific.  And they might 
contend that others would feel an attitude of moral bl me toward someone only if they 
would also express it toward her.  For they might contend that it is psychologically 
impossible to feel an attitude of moral blame toward someone without expressing it 
                         
19.  The idealized conditions plausibly include the satisfaction of my presuppositions 4-7.  
20.  See, e.g., STRAWSON, supra note 8, at 13-15. 







toward her.22  As a consequence, feeling an attitude of moral blame toward someone 
would be optimific only if expressing the attitude toward her would be optimific.  So 
feeling an attitude of moral blame toward someone would be warranted only if expressing 
the attitude toward her would be optimific.  Thus, a suming it would not be optimific to 
express an attitude of moral blame toward someone, oth rs would not be warranted in 
feeling such an attitude toward her, and so she would not be blameworthy.   
 The critics' response is unpersuasive for at leasttwo reasons.  First, we can 
plausibly deny that it is psychologically impossible to feel an attitude of moral blame 
without expressing it.  We can concede that others g nerally have a motivational tendency 
to express their attitudes of moral blame.  So we can concede that it might be difficult for 
others to restrain themselves from expressing such attitudes.  But this does not entail that 
it is psychologically impossible to do so:  it entails only that a concerted effort is required 
to do so.  Assuming others can feel an attitude of m ral blame without expressing the 
attitude, it might be optimific for them to feel the attitude even if it would not be 
optimific for them to express the attitude.    
 Second, suppose for the sake of argument that an at itude of moral blame is not 
optimific.  More generally, suppose for the sake of argument that it would not be 
optimific to feel an attitude of moral blame toward a criminal actor who performed her 
act with no regard for the rights of others but nevertheless believed certain countervailing 
considerations obtained when she performed it.  Contrary to the critics, the attitude might 
still be warranted, and so the criminal actor might still be blameworthy for the act.  For 
many of the considerations that bear on whether an attitude of moral blame is optimific 
are irrelevant to whether the attitude is warranted.  Whether the attitude is optimific 
depends on the value of all the consequences of feeling the attitude.  But whether the 
                         
22.  Cf. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, The Moralistic Fallacy:  On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions, 
61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 65, 77 (2000) (stating that "[i]n normal human psychology ... 







attitude is warranted depends on a distinct and narrower set of considerations.23  In 
general, whether an attitude of moral blame toward someone for performing an act is 
warranted depends only on three considerations.  Fir t, it depends on what the assessor is 
justified in believing about the external and interal facts about the act itself, including 
the external and psychological causes of the act and its consequences.  Second, it depends 
on what the assessor is justified in believing about the actor's capacities.  Third, it 
depends on the content of the attitude itself, and what the assessor is justified in believing 
about her relation to the actor.24  Thus, the consequences of having or not having the 
attitude are irrelevant to whether it is warranted.  Because the value of such consequences 
does bear on whether the attitude is optimific, the attitude might be warranted even if it is 
not optimific, and vice versa.   
 To illustrate the first possibility, suppose a criminal actor assaults me without any 
defense.  She then threatens to assault me again if I feel any resentment toward her for 
assaulting me.  We might suppose that if I were to resent her, I would evince some sign of 
the resentment such that she would know I were feeling it, and she would assault me as a 
consequence.  Given the threat, we might suppose that my resenting her for assaulting me 
would not be optimific.  Being assaulted again would make the consequences of my 
feeling the resentment all things considered worse than the consequences of my not 
                         
23.  For discussion on the problem of identifying the considerations that are relevant to whether an attitude 
of moral blame is warranted or, in other words, fitting or rational, see, e.g., D'Arms & Jacobson, supra note 
6; D'Arms & Jacobson, supra note 22; STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: 
MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 15-17 (2006); ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE 
CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 36-40 (1990); Parfit, supra note 7; Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Ronnow-
Rasmussen, The Strike of the Demon:  On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value, 114 ETHICS 397 (2004).  
24.  For example, suppose a criminal actor performs an act in which she disrespects the rights of a particular 
victim.  Other things being equal, only the criminal actor is warranted in feeling guilty toward herself for the 
act, given that guilt is a self-reactive attitude.  Only the victim is warranted in feeling resentment toward the 
criminal actor for the act, given that resentment is a personal reactive attitude.  And anyone is warranted in 
feeling indignation toward the criminal actor for the act, given that indignation is an impersonal reactive 
attitude.  See STRAWSON, supra note 8, 13-15 (discussing the types of reactive attitudes and their 







feeling it.  So assuming the resentment would not be optimific, I might be warranted in 
desiring not to feel it and in undertaking a process of getting myself not to feel it.25  But 
even if the resentment would not be optimific, it mght still be warranted.  For the 
consequences of my resenting her for assaulting me are irrelevant to whether the 
resentment would be warranted.  Because she disrespect d my rights in assaulting me, I 
am presumably warranted in resenting her for assaulting me.  So she might be 
blameworthy for assaulting me even if blaming her for it would not be optimific.   
 To illustrate the second possibility, suppose someone performs a supererogatory 
act of donating to charity.  A criminal actor then threatens to assault me and the donor if I 
do not feel an attitude of indignation toward the donor for giving to charity.  Given the 
threat, we might suppose that my indignation toward the donor would be optimific.  My 
and the donor's being assaulted would make the consequences of my not feeling the 
indignation all things considered worse than the consequences of my feeling it.  So 
assuming the indignation would be optimific, I might be warranted in desiring to feel the 
indignation or in undertaking a process of getting myself to feel it.  But even if the 
indignation would be optimific, it would not be warr nted.  For the consequences of my 
not feeling the indignation are irrelevant to whether it would be warranted.  Because the 
donor did not disrespect anyone's rights in giving to charity, I would not be warranted in 
feeling indignation toward her for giving to charity.  So the donor would not be 
blameworthy for giving to charity even if blaming her for it would be optimific.   
 In summary, the critics have not proven that type 1 defenses of countervailing 
considerations do not have a motivation requirement.  On the contrary, they do.  If a 
criminal actor merely believed that countervailing considerations obtained when she 
performed her act but was not appropriately motivated by them, then she disrespected the 
                         
25.  See GIBBARD, supra note 23, at 37 (distinguishing the issue of whether an attitude is rational from the 
issue of whether desiring the attitude is rational, and noting that a person can rationally desire not to have a 







rights of others in performing the act.  Other things being equal, someone's disrespecting 
the rights of others in performing an act makes her blameworthy for the act even if 
blaming her for it would not be optimific.     
 Although type 1 defenses of countervailing considerations have a motivation 
requirement, a caveat is in order.  In practice, it is standardly very difficult to determine 
whether the required motivation obtained.  To avoid wrongly denying a criminal actor a 
defense, the state should recognize a strong presumption that a criminal actor had the 
required motivation if she believed countervailing considerations obtained at the time of 
her act.  So the state should recognize a strong presumption that the criminal actor did not 
disrespect the rights of others if she believed countervailing considerations obtained at the 
time of her act.  The presumption should be overridden only when the state meets a high 
burden of proof in demonstrating that the presumption is not satisfied.  As a consequence, 
the motivation requirement might not have significant bite in practice.  
B.  Justifications    
 Justifications are a subset of type 1 defenses.  They are distinct from other type 1 
defenses in that they apply only to criminal acts performed intentionally.26  More 
precisely, justifications apply only to the specific ntention that a criminal actor had to 
perform her act.  To claim that a criminal actor has a justification for her act is elliptical 
for claiming that she has a justification for the intention she had to perform it.27  Like the 
presumptions generated by a criminal act itself, the intention of a criminal actor generates 
similar presumptions regarding how much she is blameworthy and liable to punishment 
for the intention.  In particular, the intention of a criminal actor generates similar 
                         
26.  Strictly speaking, all acts are performed intentionally.  Because I assume criminal acts can be 
performed unintentionally, I take criminal acts to be, strictly speaking, merely putative acts.  Seesupra note 
10.   
27.  I do not assume the intention a criminal actor had to perform her act was an intention to perform the act 
under its description as a criminal act.  I merely assume it was an intention to do something whose actual 







presumptions regarding how badly she disrespected the rights of others in having the 
intention.  As type 1 defenses, justifications are considerations that mitigate how much a 
criminal actor is blameworthy and liable to punishment for intending to perform her act 
by mitigating how badly she actually disrespected the rights of others in intending to 
perform the act.   
 Justifications can be subjective or objective.  A criminal actor has a subjective 
justification for her intention if and only if she has a type 1 defense for it.  A criminal 
actor has an objective justification for her intentio  if and only if she has an indefeasible 
type 1 defense for it.  She has an indefeasible typ 1 defense for the intention if and only 
if she actually has this type 1 defense for the intntion, and she would have had this 
defense for the intention even if she had the intention under conditions in which a) she 
knew all the facts, and b) other things were equal.  Objective justifications are a subset of 
subjective ones.  Objective justifications are distinct from other subjective ones in that 
objective justifications are partly defined in terms of what the criminal actor would have 
believed if she knew all the facts, whereas subjectiv  justifications are defined only in 
terms of what the criminal actor actually believed when intending to perform her act.   
 Both subjective and objective justifications can be full or partial.  A criminal actor 
has a full (or partial) subjective justification for her intention if and only if she has a full 
(or partial) type 1 defense for it.  A criminal actor has a full (or partial) objective 
justification for her intention if and only if she has a full (or partial) indefeasible type 1 
defense for it.  And she has a full (or partial) indefeasible type 1 defense for the intention 
if and only if she actually has a full (or partial) type 1 defense for the intention, and she 
would have had this full (or partial) type 1 defens for the intention even if she had the 
intention under conditions in which a) she knew all the facts, and b) other things were 
equal.   







consider again the cases of external and internal compulsion.  In both cases, I strike 
another person.  In the one, I do so merely because  group seizes my arm and uses it 
against my will to strike the victim.  In the other, I do so merely because I suffer a seizure 
that causes my arm to strike him.  In both cases, I have a type 1 defense of compulsion for 
striking the victim because I did not disrespect the rights of others in doing so.  However, 
in neither case do I have a justification.  For in neither case do I perform the act 
intentionally.  So in neither case do I intend to do anything for which I could have a 
justification.  Thus, justifications do not include type 1 defenses of compulsion although 
they do include type 1 defenses of ignorance or mistake of fact and countervailing 
considerations.     
 To illustrate the distinction between objective and mere subjective justifications, 
consider two cases of self-defense.  In the first, suppose I see two persons load guns and 
aim them at me as if they are going to shoot me to death.  In response, I believe they will 
kill me unless I prevent them from shooting.  I also believe I would prevent them from 
shooting me by shooting them to death first with my own gun.  There are no other ways I 
believe I could prevent their killing me.  To prevent their killing me, I intend to kill them, 
which I then do.  Assuming my beliefs were true, and there was no less harmful way that I 
could have prevented their killing me, I have both a subjective and an objective 
justification of self-defense for intending to kill them.  For given my actual beliefs and 
motive, I actually have a type 1 defense of self-defense for the intention.  And this 
defense is indefeasible because I would have had this efense for intending to kill them 
even if I had intended to kill them under conditions i  which a) I knew all the facts and b) 
all other things were equal.    
 The second case is the same as the first except, unknown to me, the two persons 
load their guns only with blanks and so are not an objective threat to me.  In this case, I 







my actual beliefs and motive, I still actually have a type 1 defense of self-defense for the 
intention.  But I no longer have an objective justification of self-defense for the intention 
because my defense of self-defense is not indefeasibl :  I would not have had this defense 
for intending to kill them if I had intended to kill them under conditions in which a) I 
knew all the facts, and b) all other things were equal.  For if I had known all the facts, I 
would have known they posed no threat to me.  So by intending to kill them, I would have 
disrespected their right not to be killed.    
 Given my conception of justifications, we can see where it stands on seven 
potentially controversial issues about how we should understand them.  First, the mere 
fact that a criminal actor has both no false beliefs and a type 1 defense for intending to 
perform her act does not provide her with an objectiv  justification for her intention.  To 
illustrate, consider a case of self-defense that is the same as the first except, unknown to 
me, I could have prevented the two from shooting me by merely uttering to them a 
religious slogan that would have identified me as a member of their religious group.  It is 
not that I had the false belief that uttering the slogan would not have prevented them from 
shooting me.  It is that I had no beliefs about this at all.  Here I do have a type 1 defense 
of self-defense for intending to kill them, and I had no false beliefs.  So I have a 
subjective justification for the intention.  But I do not have an objective justification for 
the intention because my type 1 defense of self-defense for it is not indefeasible.  If I had 
known all the facts, and other things were equal, then I would have known that I could 
have prevented their killing me merely by uttering the slogan.  So I would have known 
that killing them was not the least harmful means to preventing them from killing me.  
Hence, I would not have had a type 1 defense of self-defense for intending to kill them.   
 Second, the mere fact that a criminal actor intends to perform her act on the basis 
of some false beliefs does not entail that she lacks n objective justification for her 







unknown to me, if the two had shot, a gust of wind would have blown their bullets into a 
tree off of which the bullets would have ricocheted back into me, thereby killing me.  In 
this case, I intend to kill the two on the basis of my false belief that if they had shot, their 
bullets would have flown directly into me.  Other things being equal, if I had believed that 
a gust of wind would have blown their bullets into a tree, I would not have believed they 
were a threat to me and so would not have intended to kill them.  Nevertheless, I still 
have an objective justification for intending to kill them.  For given my actual beliefs and 
motive, I have a type 1 defense of self-defense for the intention.  And this defense is 
indefeasible.  If I had known all the facts, and other things were equal, then I would have 
known that my killing them was necessary to prevent their killing me.  So I still would 
have had the type 1 defense of self-defense for intending to kill them.  
 Third, the mere fact that a criminal actor has an objective justification for 
intending to perform her act does not entail that a) no one has an objective justification 
for intending to resist her act or b) third parties could have an objective justification for 
intending to perform the act on her behalf.28  To illustrate, suppose I and another person 
consent to box each other but only each other on the condition that each of us boxes 
without the assistance of third parties.  As a consequence, I have an objective justification 
for intending to strike him because I have an indefeasible type 1 defense of consent for 
this intention.  But he also has an objective justification for intending to resist my striking 
him because he also has an indefeasible type 1 defense of consent for this intention.  
Furthermore, no third parties could have an objectiv  justification for intending to strike 
                         
28.  Compare GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759-62 (1978) (endorsing such 
an entailment), with Mitchell N. Berman, Justifications and Excuses, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L. J. 1, 
62-64 (2003) (rejecting such an entailment), Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of 
Excuses, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 466-67, 491-93 (1992) (same), Joshua Dressler, New 
Thoughts About the Concept of Justifications in the Criminal Law:  A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and 
Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 87-98 (1984) (same), R.A. Duff, Rethinking Justifications, 39 TULSA 
L. REV. 829, 830 (2004) (same), Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1918-27 (1984) (same), and Douglas N. Husak, Conflicts of Justifications, 18 L. 







my opponent on my behalf because no third parties could have an indefeasible type 1 
defense for this intention.  In particular, no third parties could have an indefeasible type 1 
defense of consent for intending to strike him on my behalf given the restricted scope of 
his consent.    
 Fourth, the mere fact that a criminal actor has a full subjective justification for 
intending to perform her act does entail that her intention is subjectively right in a weak 
sense.  Someone's intention is subjectively right in a weak sense if and only if she does 
not disrespect the rights of others by having the int ntion given her actual beliefs and 
motives.  Similarly, the mere fact that a criminal actor has a full objective justification for 
intending to perform her act does entail that her intention is objectively right in a weak 
sense.  Someone's intention is objectively right in a weak sense if and only if she would 
not disrespect the rights of others by having the int ntion and some motive for it under 
conditions in which a) she knew all the facts, and b) other things were equal.   
 However, the mere fact that a criminal actor has a full subjective justification for 
intending to perform her act does not entail that her intention is subjectively right in a 
strong sense.  Someone's intention is subjectively right in a strong sense if and only if she 
has most reason to have the intention given her actual beliefs.29  Similarly, the mere fact 
that a criminal actor has a full objective justification for intending to perform her act does 
not entail that the intention is objectively right in a strong sense.  Someone's intention is 
objectively right in a strong sense if and only if she would have most reason to have the 
intention under conditions in which a) she knew all the facts, and b) other things were 
                         
29.  There is a stronger sense of a subjective justification under which a justified intention is necessarily 
subjectively right in the strong sense.  However, I am concerned here only with the sense of a justifica on 
that mitigates the degree to which a criminal actor dis espects the rights of others in intending to perform 
her act.  For I assume that a criminal actor is not blameworthy or liable to any punishment for her act if she 
did not disrespect the rights of others in intending to perform the act.  A criminal actor's intention need not 
be subjectively right in the strong sense for her to avoid disrespecting the rights of others in having the 







equal.30   
 To illustrate, consider the previous boxing case.  In it, I have a full subjective and 
objective justification for intending to strike my opponent.  Because I know he consented 
to box me, I do not disrespect his rights by intending to strike him, and I would not do so 
even if I knew all the facts, and other things were qual.  So my intention is both 
subjectively and objectively right in a weak sense.  But the intention might be neither 
subjectively nor objectively right in a strong sens.  For by striking him, I know I would 
cause him severe pain, and such pain might provide me with most reason not to intend to 
strike him even though I know striking him would not violate his rights.   
 Fifth, the mere fact that a criminal actor's intentio  is objectively right in a weak 
or strong sense does not entail that she has a subjective or objective justification for the 
intention.31  To illustrate, suppose I killed someone.  In doing so, I intended to kill him 
merely because I did not like him.  However, unknow to me, if I had not killed him, he 
would have wrongfully killed several others.  Other things being equal, this makes my 
intending to kill him objectively right in both a weak and strong sense.  But I do not have 
a subjective or objective justification for the inte ion because I do not actually have a 
type 1 defense for it.  By intending to kill him under the conditions of my ignorance, I 
disrespected his right not to be killed merely because he was unliked, and I disrespected it 
just as badly as I would have if my killing him were not in fact necessary to prevent him 
from wrongfully killing the others.   
 Sixth, the fact that a criminal act is necessary to obtain some information could 
standardly provide someone with only a subjective but not an objective justification for 
intending to perform it.  Although she could have a type 1 defense for intending to 
                         
30.  There is a stronger sense of an objective justification under which a justified intention is necessarily 
objectively right in the strong sense.  It is not my concern here.  See id. 
31.  See George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason:  A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. 







perform the act as a means to obtaining the information, the type 1 defense would 
standardly not be indefeasible.  For if she knew all the facts, and other things were equal, 
she would know the information sought independently of her performing the act.  To 
illustrate, suppose I intend to torture someone as a necessary means to extracting 
information from him that I need to prevent a disaster he would otherwise cause.  But if I 
knew the information sought independently of torturing him, I would know how to 
prevent the disaster without torturing him.  Given my actual beliefs and motive, I have a 
subjective justification for the intention because I have a type 1 defense of defense of 
others for it.  But I do not have an objective justification for the intention because my type 
1 defense for it is not indefeasible.  If I knew all the facts, and other things were equal, 
then I would know the information sought independently of torturing him, and so I would 
know how to prevent the disaster without torturing him.  So by intending to torture him, I 
would disrespect his right not to be tortured.   
 Seventh, the concept of a type 1 defense is conceptually prior to the concepts of 
both a subjective and an objective justification.  Both concepts of a justification are 
defined in terms of a type 1 defense, whereas the latt r cannot be defined in terms of the 
former.  So the fact that a criminal actor has a subjective or objective justification entails 
that she has a type 1 defense, but the fact that she has a type 1 defense does not entail that 
she has a subjective or objective justification.32  Similarly, the concept of a subjective 
justification is conceptually prior to the concept of an objective justification.  Subjective 
justifications cannot be defined in terms of objective justifications, whereas the latter can 
be defined in terms of the former.  On such a definitio , a criminal actor has an objective 
justification for intending to perform her act if and only if a) she has a subjective 
justification for the intention, and b) the type 1 defense that constitutes her subjective 
                         







justification for it is indefeasible.  Thus, the fact a criminal actor has an objective 
justification entails that she has a subjective one, but the fact that she has a subjective 
justification does not entail that she has an objectiv  one.33   
C.  Type 2 Defenses   
 When someone performs a criminal act, there is not o ly a presumption that in 
performing it, she disrespected the rights of others to a particularly bad degree.  Given 
this presumption, there is also a presumption that s e has a particularly bad disposition to 
commit crimes at the time of assessment.  More precisely, there is a presumption that her 
act is particularly strong evidence that she has the presumed disposition to commit crimes 
at the time of assessment.  In other words, there is a presumption that her act justifies 
others in believing with a particularly high credenc  that she has the presumed disposition 
to commit crimes at the time of assessment.  The badness of someone's disposition to 
commit crimes is a function of at least four factors.  First, it is primarily a function of the 
seriousness of the crimes she is willing to commit, where the seriousness of a crime 
corresponds to how badly someone disrespects the rig ts of others in committing the 
crime.  Second, it is a function of the range of peopl  against whom she is willing to 
commit crimes.  Third, it is a function of the range of situations in which she is willing to 
commit crimes.  Fourth, it is a function of the frequ ncy with which she is willing to 
commit crimes.    
 A type 2 defense is a consideration that blocks the ot erwise justified inference 
from the fact that someone performed a criminal act to her having the presumed 
disposition to commit crimes at the time of assessment.34  A type 2 defense blocks this 
                         
33.  To illustrate, consider again cases involving ignorance or mistake of fact.  
34.  Proponents of type 2 defenses generally endorse a "character theory of excuses."  According to a 
character theory, a consideration constitutes an excuse if it blocks the otherwise justified inference from the 
fact that someone performed a criminal act to her having a motivational defect in her character.  See, e.g., 
Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 L. & PHIL. 5 (1982); Michael D. 
Bayles, Hume on Blame and Excuse, 2 HUME STUD. 17 (1976); R.B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of 







inference primarily by blocking the otherwise justified inference from the fact that 
someone performed a criminal act to her being willing to commit crimes of the presumed 
degree of seriousness.  If a criminal actor has a full type 2 defense, her act is not strong 
evidence that she has any disposition to commit crimes.  In other words, her act does not 
justify others in believing with any credence that she has any disposition to commit 
crimes.35  So it does not justify others in believing with any credence that she is willing to 
commit any crimes.  If a criminal actor has a partial type 2 defense, her act might be 
strong evidence that she has some disposition to commit crimes.  But her act is not as 
strong of evidence that she has as bad a disposition to commit crimes as was presumed.  
In other words, her act might justify others in believing with some credence that she has 
some disposition to commit crimes.  But it does not jus ify them in believing with a 
credence as high as the presumed one that she has a disposition to commit crimes as bad 
as the presumed one.  So her act might justify others in believing with some credence that 
she is willing to commit some crimes.  But it does not justify them in believing with a 
credence as high as the presumed one that she is willing to commit crimes as serious as 
the presumed ones.          
 Many different considerations can provide a criminal actor with a type 2 defense.  
                                                             
W. Chapman eds., 1985); Richard B. Brandt, A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, 78 PHIL. REV. 337, 353-58 
(1969); Richard B. Brandt, Blameworthiness and Obligation, i  ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3 
(A.I. Melden ed., 1958); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 412, 477, 575 (L.A. 
Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978); Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency, 7 
SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 59 (1990); TADROS, supra note 11, at 293-321; George Vuoso, Background, 
Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661 (1987); cf. SCANLON, supra note 8, at 277-79 (suggesting 
that some considerations constitute excuses because they "sever the connection between the action or 
attitude and the agent's judgments and character"); STRAWSON, supra note 8, at 8 (stating that "[w]e shall 
not feel resentment against the man he is for the action done by the man he is not; or at least we shall feel 
less"); Watson, supra note 8, at 123 (describing excuses that, according to Strawson, "present the other ... as 
acting uncharacteristically due to extraordinary cicumstances").  
35.  More precisely, if a criminal actor has a fulltype 2 defense for her act, the act does not justify others in 
believing with any significant additional credence that she has any disposition to commit crimes.  Even if a 
person has not committed any crimes, others are still ju ified in believing with some positive baseline 








For example, all type 1 defenses are a subset of type 2 defenses because if a criminal 
actor did not disrespect the rights of others in performing her act, the act is not strong 
evidence that she disposed to commit crimes.36  In addition, though, several 
considerations are type 2 defenses that are not type 1 defenses.  So a criminal actor can 
have a type 2 defense even though in performing her act, she manifested the presumed 
degree of disrespect toward the rights of others.  For example, a criminal actor can have a 
type 2 defense because she performed her act as a result of an enduring mental illness that 
undermined her capacity to respond appropriately to the moral reasons against violating 
the rights of others, and by the time of assessment, h r illness or its symptoms have been 
eliminated by therapy or medication.   
 For another example, a criminal actor can have a type 2 defense because she 
performed her act under conditions that would standardly cause a temporary radical 
distortion in an agent's system of normative self-governance,37 which consists in all the 
norms she accepts regarding what to intend in particular situations.38  Such a distortion is 
radical if the norms the agent accepted before the distortion are radically different from 
and inconsistent with the ones she accepted under the distortion.  Such a distortion is 
temporary if its cause is temporary, and after its cause subsides, she returns to accepting 
her ex ante system of normative self-governance.   
 If someone committed a crime under such distorting conditions, her crime does 
justify others in believing that under such conditions, she was disposed to commit crimes. 
                         
36.  Although type 1 defenses are a subset of type 2 ones, their salience warrants a separate exposition. 
37.  See FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 802 (stating that an "excuse represent[s] a limited, temporal 
distortion of the actor's character"). 
38.  I assume that if a person accepts a norm regarding what to intend, the norm plays a distinctive role in 
her practical reasoning.  Most generally, I assume that if she accepts a norm regarding what to intend in 
particular situations, then she adopts the norm as her policy for determining what to intend in those 
situations.  More specifically, I assume that if she accepts a norm against intending to do something in 
particular situations, and she believes those situations obtain, then she will not intend to do it in those 







 However, she has a type 2 defense for her crime becaus  her committing it does not 
justify others in believing that after those conditions subside, she is still disposed to 
commit crimes.  For the fact that under distorting conditions, she was disposed to commit 
crimes is not strong evidence that she is so disposed ex post.  In general, what she was 
disposed to do under the distorting conditions is not strong evidence that she is similarly 
disposed ex post.  Although under the distorting conditions, she accepted a norm 
permitting her committing crimes, ex ante she might very well have accepted norms 
forbidding her committing crimes, and ex post she might very well return to accepting 
such norms again.      
 Examples of distorting conditions include intoxicat on, hypnosis, somnambulism, 
provocation, and other conditions that would temporarily impair someone's capacity to 
respond appropriately to the moral reasons against violating the rights of others.39  To 
illustrate, consider a case of provocation.  Suppose s meone returns home and without 
any warning of an affair finds her husband intimately involved with his paramour.  Given 
the extreme emotional disturbance she immediately experiences, she develops a strong 
motivational tendency to assault both and loses her capacity to respond appropriately to 
the moral reasons against violating their right not to be assaulted.  As a consequence, she 
immediately strikes both without the benefit of a cooling down period.  In this case, the 
woman does not have a type 1 defense for striking her husband and his paramour.  She 
manifested the presumed degree of disrespect toward their right not to be assaulted.  
However, she does have a type 2 defense of provocation for striking them.  The extreme 
emotional disturbance she naturally experienced in this situation would standardly cause a 
temporary radical change in an agent's system of normative self-governance.  So her 
striking the victims does justify others in believing that in her emotionally disturbed state, 
                         







she was disposed to commit crimes.  But it does not justify others in believing that she is 
still disposed to commit crimes after cooling off.  Although while in her emotional state, 
she accepted a norm permitting her committing crimes of assault, ex ante she might very 
well have accepted norms forbidding her committing a y crimes, and ex post she might 
very well accept such norms again. 
   To illustrate another distorting condition, suppose unknown to me, my doctor 
injects in me a drug that makes me intoxicated.  While intoxicated, she then hypnotizes 
me, specifically implanting in me a hypnotic suggestion to kill someone wrongfully.  In 
my intoxicated hypnotic state, I intentionally kill him.  In this case, I do not have a type 1 
defense for killing the victim.  In killing him, I manifested the presumed degree of 
disrespect toward his right not to be killed.  However, I do have a type 2 defense of 
intoxication and hypnosis for killing him.  Being intoxicated and hypnotized are 
distorting conditions that would standardly cause a t mporary radical change in an agent's 
system of normative self-governance.  So my killing the victim does justify others in 
believing that in my intoxicated hypnotic state, I was disposed to commit crimes.  But it 
does not justify others in believing that I am still d sposed to commit crimes when I am 
no longer intoxicated or hypnotized.  Although while intoxicated and hypnotized, I 
accepted a norm permitting my committing crimes of murder, ex ante I might very well 
have accepted norms forbidding my committing any crimes, and ex post I might very well 
accept such norms again.    
 Given my description of type 2 defenses, critics might argue that someone's 
having a full type 2 defense for a crime is generally inconsistent with her having no type 1 
defense for it.  In a standard case of blameworthiness and liability to punishment, a 
person's present self is blameworthy and liable to be punished for the crime of a person's 
past self.  Similarly, in a standard case of a defense, a person's present self has a defense 







full type 2 defense but no type 1 defense for the past self's crime.  And in the cases at 
issue, the present self's system of normative self-governance is radically different from 
the system of the past self.  According to the critics, their accepting radically different 
systems of normative self-governance generates the following dilemma for my claim that 
the present self has a full type 2 defense but no type 1 defense for the past self's crime.  
   On the first horn of the dilemma, suppose the present self and the past self are not 
the same person in the sense that they are not parts of the same person's life.  Although 
they have the same body, they are not the same person because they have radically 
different psychological traits in virtue of their accepting radically different systems of 
normative self-governance.  In this case, the present self does have a full type 2 defense 
for the past self's crime.  Although the past self' crime does justify others in believing 
that she was disposed to commit crimes, it does not justify others in believing that the 
present self is similarly disposed.  For the present lf would not persist as the same 
person under the conditions in which the past self would have committed crimes.  In 
addition, though, to the full type 2 defense, the present self also has a type 1 defense for 
the past self's crime.  Because they are different p rsons, neither the present self nor any 
of her own past selves actually disrespected the rights of others in virtue of the past self's 
doing so in committing the crime.  So if they are different persons, the present self has not 
only a full type 2 defense but also a type 1 defense for the past self's crime.   
 On the second horn of the dilemma, suppose the present self and the past self are 
the same person in the sense that they are parts of the same person's life.  Although they 
have radically different psychological traits, they are the same person because they have 
the same body and are psychologically connected or continuous in other relevant ways.  
In this case, the present self does lack a type 1 dfense for the past self's crime.  For the 
past self did disrespect the rights of others in committing the crime, and the past self is a 







self also lacks a full type 2 defense for the past self's crime.  For the past self's crime 
justifies others in believing that she was disposed to commit crimes under certain 
conditions.  And because the present self and the past self are the same person, her crime 
also justifies others in believing that the present self is disposed to commit crimes under 
those same conditions.  So if they are the same person, the present self has neither a full 
type 2 defense nor a type 1 defense for the past self'  crime.  As a consequence, whether 
or not the present self and the past self are the same person, the former could not have a 
full type 2 defense but no type 1 defense for the latt r's crime.  So in the cases at issue, 
someone could not have a full type 2 defense but no type 1 defense for committing a 
crime.   
 To illustrate the first horn of the dilemma, reconsider the case in which I, my 
present self, apparently have a full type 2 defense but no type 1 defense for my apparent 
past self's killing someone while intoxicated and hypnotized.  Suppose, though, that my 
apparent past self is not in fact my past self:  we are not the same person in the sense that 
we are not both parts of the same person's life.  Although we have the same body, we are 
not the same person because we have radically different psychological traits.  In 
particular, I accept norms forbidding my committing any crimes, whereas he accepted 
norms permitting his committing crimes of murder.  In this case, I have a full type 2 
defense for his killing.  Although his killing justifies others in believing that he was 
disposed to commit crimes, it does not justify others in believing that I am similarly 
disposed.  For I would not persist as the same person under the conditions of intoxication 
and hypnotism in which he would have committed crimes.  In addition, though, to having 
a full type 2 defense, I also have a type 1 defense for his killing.  Because we are different 
persons, neither I nor any of my past selves disrespected the rights of others in virtue of 
his doing so in killing the victim.  So if we are different persons, I have not only a full 







 To illustrate the second horn, reconsider the same cas .  Suppose, though, that my 
apparent past self is in fact my past self:  we are the same person in the sense that we are 
both parts of the same person's life.  Although we have radically different psychological 
traits, we are the same person because we have the same body and are psychologically 
connected or continuous in other relevant ways.  In this case, I do lack a type 1 defense 
for my past self's killing because he is my past self, and he did disrespect the rights of 
others in killing the victim.  In addition, though, to lacking a type 1 defense, I also lack a 
type 2 defense for his killing.  For his killing justifies others in believing that I am now 
disposed to commit crimes when in a similarly intoxicated hypnotic state.  So if I and my 
apparent past self are the same person, I have neither a full type 2 defense nor a type 1 
defense for his killing.  As a consequence, whether or not we are the same person, I could 
not have a full type 2 defense but no type 1 defens for his killing.    
 In response, there is no dilemma for the cases at is ue.  Someone's having a full 
type 2 defense for a crime is not generally inconsistent with her having no type 1 defense 
for it.  The first horn of the purported dilemma is implausible because it rests on an 
implausible theory of personal identity.  In the cases at issue, the present self and the past 
self do have radically different psychological traits in virtue of their accepting radically 
different systems of normative self-governance.  So they do have radically different 
personalities or characters.  But this fact by itself does not entail that they are different 
persons in the sense that they are not parts of the sam  person's life.  For example, almost 
every old adult has many past selves who were very young children with radically 
different psychological traits from her present self.  In spite of their radical psychological 
differences, they are the same person.40   
 In the cases at issue, the selves might also be the same person even though they 
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have radically different psychological traits.  Three facts could support such a possibility. 
 First, the selves have not only the same brain, but also the same body.41  Second, they 
might be psychologically connected to each other in the sense that they might have some 
significant psychological traits in common, and the traits of the past self might have 
caused the traits of the present self in the normal way that preserves the relation of 
personal identity between selves.  For example, the present self might remember some 
experiences of the past self.  Third, even if they are not psychologically connected to each 
other, they might be psychologically continuous with each other in the sense that the 
present self might be connected to the past self by a chain of selves such that each self in 
the chain is psychologically connected to its immediately preceding self in the chain.42  
Assuming they have the same brain and body, and are psychologically connected to or 
continuous with each other, and there is no branching between them, then they are the 
same person on any plausible theory of personal identity even though they have radically 
different psychological traits.    
 The second horn of the purported dilemma is implausible because its sense of a 
disposition is too broad.  According to the broad sense, someone is presently disposed to 
do something if she would do it under any possible conditions.  But the sense of a 
disposition at issue in type 2 defenses is much narrower.  It is the sense of a disposition 
that is constitutive of a character trait.43  According to the character sense, someone is 
presently disposed to do something only if she would do it under a relevant range of 
conditions.  And the relevant range consists only i those conditions in which her present 
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system of normative self-governance is held fixed.  In other words, the relevant range 
consists only in those conditions in which she would accept the same system of normative 
self-governance that she actually accepts at present.  So the relevant range does not 
include conditions in which she would accept a system of normative self-governance that 
is radically different from the one she actually accepts at present.  What she would do 
under such conditions is not relevant to what she i presently disposed to do in the 
character sense of a disposition at issue in type 2 d fenses.     
 To illustrate the distinction between these senses of a disposition, consider 
someone who accepts a norm of extreme honesty that forbids her from lying under any 
conditions.  In the character sense of a disposition, she is disposed to be honest and not 
disposed to be dishonest.  In the relevant range of conditions, she would never lie because 
she would accept a norm of extreme honesty in those c nditions.  Nevertheless, she might 
still have a broad disposition to be dishonest.  For example, it might be the case that if she 
were to suffer certain types of brain damage, she would lie because, under those 
conditions, she would accept a norm permitting her to lie.  Such a broad disposition, 
though, does not bear on what she is presently disposed to do in the character sense of a 
disposition.     
 Now in the cases at issue, a person has a full type 2 defense but no type 1 defense 
for committing a crime.  Given that she has no type 1 defense for the crime, it justifies 
others in believing that she has a broad disposition to commit crimes because it justifies 
others in believing that she would commit crimes under the type of conditions that 
actually elicited her crime.  So the crime justifies others in believing that under the 
eliciting conditions, she would accept norms permitting her to commit crimes.  But given 
that she has a full type 2 defense for the crime, it does not justify others in believing that 
she is presently disposed to commit crimes in the character sense of a disposition.  Her 







permitting her to commit crimes.  For given that she has a full type 2 defense for the 
crime, the fact that she accepted such norms under the eliciting conditions is not strong 
evidence that she accepts such norms at present aftr hose conditions have subsided.   
 To illustrate, reconsider the case in which I have  full type 2 defense but no type 
1 defense for killing someone while intoxicated and hypnotized.  Given that I have no 
type 1 defense for the crime, it justifies others in believing that I have a broad disposition 
to commit crimes because it justifies others in believing that I would commit crimes 
under conditions in which I were similarly intoxicated and hypnotized.  So my crime 
justifies others in believing that under such distorting conditions, I would accept norms 
permitting my committing crimes.  But given that I have a full type 2 defense for the 
crime, it does not justify others in believing that I m presently disposed to commit 
crimes in the character sense of a disposition.  The crime does not justify others in 
believing that at present, I actually accept norms permitting my committing crimes.  For 
given that I have a full type 2 defense for the crime, the fact that I accepted such norms 
while intoxicated and hypnotized is not strong evidnce that I accept such norms at 
present after those distorting conditions have subsided.   
D.  Type 3 Defenses     
 When someone performs a criminal act, there is a presumption that in performing 
it, she flouted certain moral reasons against violating the rights of others.  As a 
consequence, there is a presumption that at the time of assessment, she is disposed to 
flout a relevant class of moral reasons against violating the rights of others, where the 
relevant class is a function of the moral reasons she i  presumed to have flouted in 
performing the act.  Type 3 defenses are consideratons hat undermine a criminal actor's 
capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant class of moral reasons at the time of 
assessment.44  If a criminal actor has a full type 3 defense, she lacks the capacity to 
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respond appropriately to any of the relevant moral re sons.  If she has a partial type 3 
defense, she might have the capacity to respond appropriately to some of the relevant 
moral reasons, but not to all of them and particularly not to the strongest of them.   
 A criminal actor might lack the capacity in two resp cts.  First, she might lack the 
epistemic capacity to recognize the relevant reasons or to appreciate them in the sense of 
recognizing them as reasons.  The scope of her epistemic incapacity might vary.  At one 
extreme, she might have a broad incapacity to recognize or appreciate any reasons 
whether moral or non-moral.  At another extreme, sh might have only a narrow 
incapacity to recognize or appreciate the relevant moral reasons.  Second, even if she has 
the epistemic capacity, she might lack the volitional capacity to control what she intends 
to do in response to her judgments about what the relevant moral reasons count for or 
against her intending.45  So she might lack the capacity to control what norms she accepts 
governing intentions in response to her judgments about what norms the relevant moral 
reasons count for or against her accepting.46  The scope of her volitional capacity might 
also vary.  At one extreme, she might have a broad incapacity to control what she intends 
to do in response to her judgments about what any reasons count for or against her 
intending.  At another extreme, she might have onlya narrow incapacity to control what 
she intends to do in response to her judgments about what the relevant moral reasons 
count for or against her intending.  Examples of such epistemic or volitional incapacities 
include insanity, more specific forms of mental illness such as kleptomania, and possibly 
other limiting conditions more prevalent among the normal population.   
 Some considerations that provide type 3 defenses al o provide type 1 and type 2 
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ones.  To illustrate, suppose I suffer from an incurable mental illness that makes me 
permanently incapable of understanding the concept of a person.  So I am permanently 
incapable of recognizing others as thinking, feeling, and demanding subjects.  Now 
suppose I kill someone to acquire a resource, such as food, that he would otherwise 
consume or take away.  In this case, my mental illness provides me with a type 1, type 2, 
and type 3 defense for killing him.  It provides mewith a type 1 defense because I could 
not have disrespected the victim's rights without recognizing him as a person.  It provides 
me with a type 2 defense because it blocks the otherwis  justified inference from the fact 
that I killed him to my being disposed to commit crmes.  For it blocks the otherwise 
justified inference from the fact that I killed him to my being disposed to disrespect the 
rights of others.47  And in virtue of being permanent, my mental illness provides me with 
a type 3 defense because my incapacity to understand the concept of a person makes me 
incapable, at the time of assessment, of responding appropriately to any of the moral 
reasons against violating the rights of others.  The illness makes me incapable of 
recognizing or appreciating such reasons.    
 Although there is some overlap, not all considerations that provide type 3 defenses 
also provide type 1 or type 2 ones.  Unlike type 1 defenses, type 3 ones are consistent 
with a criminal actor's disrespecting the rights of others to the presumed degree in 
performing her act.  Type 3 defenses focus only on considerations that obtain at the time 
of assessing the criminal actor for blameworthiness and liability to punishment.  
Specifically, type 3 defenses focus only on her capa ities at the time of assessment rather 
than at the time she performed her act.48  So if the criminal actor lacks the relevant 
                         
47.  In this case, I am disposed to perform criminal acts.  That is, I am disposed to perform acts that satisfy 
the actus reus requirements of a crime.  However, I am not disposed to commit crimes because I am 
incapable of satisfying their mens rea requirements.  For I am incapable of disrespecting the rights of others 
in performing criminal acts in virtue of the fact tha  I am incapable of recognizing others as persons.  For 
example, we might suppose that if I were ever to strangle someone to death, I would believe I were merely 
squeezing a lemon.  







capacity at the time of assessment, she has a type 3 defense for her act even if she had the 
capacity when she performed it.49  Type 1 defenses, though, focus only on considerations 
that obtained at the time the criminal actor performed her act.  Specifically, type 1 
defenses focus only on how badly she disrespected the rights of others in performing the 
act.  So if she did so to the presumed degree, she lacks a type 1 defense for the act even if 
she has a type 3 defense for it because she lacks the relevant capacity at the time of 
assessment.   
 To illustrate, suppose I intentionally kill someon for no sound reason under 
conditions in which I have the capacity to respond appropriately to the moral reasons 
against doing so.  After killing him, though, I develop the mental illness that makes me 
incapable of understanding the concept of a person.  In this case, I lack a type 1 defense 
for killing the victim because in doing so, I disrep cted his rights to the presumed 
degree.  But I have a type 3 defense for killing him because at the time of assessment, I 
lack the capacity to respond appropriately to any of the moral reasons against violating 
the rights of others.  
 Unlike type 2 defenses, type 3 ones are consistent with a criminal act's providing 
others with knowledge that the actor has the presumd disposition to commit crimes.  
Type 3 defenses are concerned with whether the criminal actor has the capacity to 
respond appropriately to the relevant moral reasons.  But they are not concerned with 
whether she actually responds appropriately to suchreasons.  She might not actually 
respond appropriately to them even if she has the capacity to.50  Similarly, type 3 defenses 
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are concerned with whether the criminal actor has te capacity to be disposed to respond 
appropriately to such reasons.  But they are not concerned with whether she is actually so 
disposed.  She might not be so disposed even if shehas the capacity to be.51  Thus, type 3 
defenses are concerned with whether the criminal actor has the capacity to be disposed to 
choose not to commit crimes on the basis of the moral reasons against committing them.  
But type 3 defenses are not concerned with whether s  is actually so disposed.  Again, 
she might not be so disposed even if she has the capacity to be.  Type 2 defenses, though, 
are concerned with whether the criminal actor is actu lly disposed to commit crimes 
insofar as they are concerned with whether her act justifies others in believing that she is 
actually so disposed.  Thus, if her act provides others with knowledge that she has the 
presumed disposition to commit crimes, then she lacks  type 2 defense for the act even if 
she has a type 3 defense for it because she lacks the capacity to respond appropriately to 
the relevant moral reasons at the time of assessment.     
 To illustrate, suppose again that I intentionally ki l someone for no sound reason.  
Given that I disrespected his rights in killing him, I lack a type 1 defense for the act.  
Suppose also that I lack a type 2 defense for the act because it provides others with 
knowledge that I am disposed to commit crimes at the time of assessment.  Nevertheless, 
I might still have a type 3 defense for the act because at the time of assessment, I might 
lack the capacity to respond appropriately to the rel vant moral reasons against violating 
the rights of others.  In this case, I do have the epistemic capacity to recognize the 
relevant moral reasons, but I might suffer from an extreme form of psychopathy that 
makes me incapable of recognizing them as reasons.  For example, in killing the victim, I 
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did recognize that I was killing a person, but as a result of the psychopathy, I might have 
lacked then and now the capacity to recognize this fact as a moral reason against killing 
him.52  Alternatively, even if I have all the epistemic capacities, I might suffer from a 
mental illness that makes me incapable of controlling what I intend to do in response to 
my judgments about what the relevant moral reasons c unt for or against intending.  For 
example, I might have judged that I had most reason not to intend to kill the victim, but as 
a result of the mental illness, I might have intendd to do so anyway.  Assuming I 
continue to suffer from such capacities at the time of assessment, they provide me with a 
type 3 defense but not a type 2 defense for killing the victim.      
E.  Additional Types of Defenses   
 At this point, I have spelled out three general types of defenses that account for a 
very wide range of more particular defenses.  In two ways, though, these three types do 
not exhaust every type of defense.  First, there might be other general types that pick out 
particular defenses left out from the three covered so far.  Later in the paper, I will argue 
that the theory of punitive desert which best explains the mitigating effects of these three 
types does entail a more general fourth type of defense.  Expounding the fourth type must 
await our exposition of my restorative signaling theory of punitive desert.  Second, there 
are many finer grained distinctions to be drawn among the more particular defenses 
picked out by the more general types.  In other words, within the general types of 
defenses, we could demarcate many sub-types.   
 We have already seen that justifications are a subset of type 1 defenses whose 
salience warrants a separate exposition.  Other sali nt sub-types include exemptions, 
failure of proof defenses, and excuses.  An exemption is an enduring incapacity to 
respond appropriately to any moral reasons.53  Under an exemption, a person would not 
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be blameworthy or liable to punishment for any acts she might perform, including 
criminal acts.  Exemptions are a subset of type 3 dfenses.   
 Consider now failure of proof defenses.54  In general, the state is justified in 
punishing someone for committing a crime only if a st tute explicitly prohibits the 
crime.55  The statute spells out the crime's essential elements.  Some of the elements 
consist in actus reus requirements.  They describe the type of act that someone must 
perform to commit the crime.  Other elements consist in mens rea requirements.  They 
describe the state of mind with which someone must perform the act to commit the crime. 
 If someone does not satisfy all the elements of the crime, then she has a failure of proof 
defense to the charge that she committed it.  This defense consists in her not satisfying 
one of the crime's elements.  Failure of proof defenses are a subset of type 1 defenses.   
 Failure of proof defenses are especially significant because they have distinctive 
implications for the state's burden of proving at trial that a defendant not only committed 
a crime, but also is liable to punishment for committing the crime.56  At trial, the state has 
the initial burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant satisfied all the 
elements of the crime charged.57  So the state has the initial burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant lacks a failure of proof defense to the charge that she 
committed the crime.  However, the state might not have the initial burden of proving that 
the defendant lacks other types of defenses, like typ  3 ones.58  The defendant herself 
might have the initial burden of proving that she has these other defenses before the state 
incurs a burden of proving otherwise.   
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 The concept of an excuse is open to broader and narrower conceptions.59  On a 
broader conception, the concept of an excuse picks out any defense that a criminal actor 
might have for her act.  On a narrower conception, the concept of an excuse refers only to 
a class of defenses not picked out by some range of other salient types of defenses, like 
justifications, exemptions, and failure of proof deenses.    
 Whether a defense falls under the extension of one of these more particular sub-
types might have significant implications.  But forthe purposes of explaining the 
mitigating effects of defenses in general, we can abstr ct away from these more fine 
grained distinctions between defenses and focus only on the general types.  For in virtue 
of explaining the mitigating effects of the more general types, we would thereby explain 
the mitigating effects of all the more particular sub-types of defenses, like justifications, 
exemptions, failure of proof defenses, and excuses.   
 IV.  Two Requirements of Justified Punishment 
 My general theory of the justification of punishment specifies the general 
conditions under which the state is justified in punishing someone against her will.  On 
the strong sense of justification at issue here, it specifies the general conditions under 
which the state has most reason to punish someone against her will.  So the theory 
specifies the general conditions under which the state would not be open to any warranted 
attitude of moral disapproval for punishing someone against her will.  As we discussed in 
Chapter 1, my general theory contains a desert requirement and a value requirement.  The 
state is justified in imposing a punishment on somene against her will only if the 
punishment would satisfy both requirements.  According to the desert requirement, the 
person must deserve the punishment.  According to the value requirement, the expected 
value of the consequences of imposing the punishment on the person must be at least as 
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high as the expected value of the consequences of any other available act that would not 
violate anyone's rights.   
 Assuming the state would punish criminal actors against their will, both the desert 
and the value requirements are prima facie plausible grounds on which to explain the 
mitigating effects of defenses on a criminal actor's liability to punishment.  Regarding the 
desert requirement, criminal actors with full defens s might not deserve any punishment.  
Those with partial defenses might deserve to be punished only to a mitigated degree.  
Regarding the value requirement, the expected value of punishing criminal actors with 
full defenses might be lower than the expected value of not punishing them at all.  The 
expected value of punishing those with partial defenses to an unmitigated degree might be 
lower than the expected value of punishing them to a mitigated degree.  We will consider 
each requirement in turn.  
 V. The Value Requirement 
 Suppose the benefits of a punishment consist in its good consequences, and its 
costs consist in its bad consequences.  Suppose the n t b nefit of a punishment consists in 
the difference between its benefits and costs.  To explain on the basis of the value 
requirement the mitigating effects of defenses on acriminal actor's liability to 
punishment, we must prove two claims.  First, we must show that the expected costs 
would outweigh the expected benefits of punishing criminal actors with full defenses.  
Second, we must show that the expected net benefit of punishing criminal actors with 
partial defenses to an unmitigated degree would be low r than the expected net benefit of 
punishing them to a mitigated degree.  We will focus primarily on trying to prove the first 
claim regarding full defenses.  If we find such a proof, we can consider whether it 
generalizes to prove the second claim regarding partial defenses.  But if the first is 
unprovable, the second is too.  In the following analysis, whenever I refer to a defense, I 







qualification to costs and benefits implicit.   
A.  First Argument    
 According to one argument, the consequences of a punishment include the 
punishment itself, and the punishment itself is intrinsically bad.60  So a punishment is 
itself a cost, which I call its 'punitive cost.'  To satisfy the value requirement, a 
punishment must have some benefit that outweighs its punitive cost.  One benefit of a 
punishment is its deterrence benefit.  The state det rs people from performing criminal 
acts by following a policy of threatening to punish anyone who performs criminal acts 
and punishing those whom it discovers have performed th m.  Such a policy achieves 
deterrence by providing people with a strong prudential incentive not to perform criminal 
acts for fear of being punished for performing them.  The deterrence benefit of a 
punishment is the benefit of preventing all the criminal acts that it deters people from 
performing.  Assuming the main benefit of a punishment is its deterrence benefit, some 
might contend that the punitive cost would outweigh the benefits of any punishment that 
has no deterrence benefit.  They might argue that punishing criminal actors with defenses 
would have no deterrence benefit.  They might contend hat criminal actors with defenses 
are undeterrable.  In other words, when someone performs a criminal act with a defense, 
she performs the act under conditions in which she could not be deterred from performing 
it by any threat to punish her for performing the act under its description as a criminal act. 
 Because criminal actors with defenses are undeterrabl , punishing them would deter no 
one from performing any criminal acts.61  So punishing them would have no deterrence 
benefit.  Therefore, the punitive costs would outweigh the benefits of punishing them.   
                         
60.  To keep matters simple, I assume every punishment is intrinsically bad.  I also assume that the degree 
to which a punishment is intrinsically bad is proportional to its severity.  The more severe a punishment, the 
worse it is. 
61.  Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 158-62 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (arguing that punishing criminal actors with 







 To illustrate, consider a defense of ignorance or mistake of fact.  If a criminal 
actor has such a defense, she did not believe her act had the properties that made it a 
criminal act.  So she could not have been deterred f om performing her act by any threat 
to punish her for performing such an act under its de cription as a criminal act.  Because 
criminal actors with a defense of ignorance or mistake of fact are undeterrable, punishing 
them would deter no one from performing any criminal acts, and so punishing them 
would have no deterrence benefits.  
 In response, the first argument is unpersuasive for tw  reasons among others.  
According to the first objection, suppose criminal actors with some defenses are 
undeterrable.  So punishing them would not deter others from performing criminal acts 
under those same defense eliciting conditions.  Nevertheless, punishing them might deter 
people from performing criminal acts under other conditions, and so punishing them 
might have deterrence benefits that would outweigh the punitive costs of punishing 
them.62  For punishing people for performing a particular type of criminal act under a 
particular type of condition can generally deter others from performing different types of 
criminal acts under different types of conditions.  
 Punishing criminal actors with defenses can have such a general deterrence effect 
in two ways.  First, punishing them can make others more vividly aware of how bad it 
would be to suffer a punishment in general.  By seeing, hearing about, or talking to 
someone punished, others might better appreciate the severity of the suffering involved in 
being punished.  Second, punishing them can make others discount to a lesser degree 
their probability of being punished for performing criminal acts in general.  For punishing 
criminal actors with defenses indicates that the state is actively trying to detect and punish 
criminal actors in general.  And the state's punishi g them reduces the range of defenses 
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available to people charged with committing crimes.  If the state were not to punish them, 
some might commit crimes without those defenses because they believe they can avoid 
being punished for their crimes by deceiving the state into believing that they performed 
their acts with those defenses.63  But if the state were to punish criminal actors with 
defenses, others would not discount their probability of punishment in response to the 
possibility of such deception.   
 According to the second objection, not all criminal actors with defenses are 
undeterrable.  For example, consider type 3 defenses i  which a criminal actor lacks the 
epistemic capacity to recognize and appreciate as such the moral reasons against violating 
the rights of others.  Such an actor might still retain the capacity to recognize and 
appreciate merely prudential reasons against performing criminal acts.  Assuming she 
retains the capacity to respond appropriately to prudential reasons, she might be 
deterrable.  For another example, consider duress.  In a standard case of duress, someone 
performs a criminal act in response to a threat to harm her unless she performs it.  
Assuming the threatened harm was very severe and imminent, it would have been very 
difficult for the criminal actor to resist performing the act.  So she was not easily 
deterrable.  But she still might have been deterrable by the state's threat of an 
extraordinarily severe punishment for not resisting u der duress.64  Such a punishment 
                         
63.  See id.  Some might worry there is tension between my presuppositions 4 and 5 and the possibility of 
someone's committing a crime because she believes she will deceive the state into believing falsely that she 
performed her criminal act with a defense.  For to deceive the state in this way, she must deceive the stat  
about her capacities or the beliefs, intentions, and motives with which she performed her act.  In fact, 
though, there is no tension.  According to presuppositions 4 and 5, when a criminal actor is assessed for 
blameworthiness and liability to punishment, everyone knows all the facts about her capacities and the 
beliefs, intentions, and motives with which she performed her act.  However, there is no presupposition that 
everyone believes that presuppositions 4 and 5 will be satisfied at the time of assessment.  In particular, 
there is no presupposition that a criminal actor will believe at the time of her act that everyone will know all 
the relevant facts at the time she is assessed for blameworthiness or liability to punishment.  Presuppositions 
4 and 5 are consistent with a criminal actor's believing at the time of her act that the state will not know all 
the relevant facts at the time of assessment.  
64.  For this reason, considerations of deterrence arguably favor punishing criminal actors with a duress 
defense extraordinarily severely.  See Anthony Kenny, Duress Per Minas as a Defence to Crime:  II, in 







would harm her much more severely than the harm she faced for resisting under duress.   
B.  Second Argument      
 A second argument might concede that criminal actors with some defenses are 
deterrable, and punishing criminal actors with any defense can have some deterrence 
benefits.  But with respect to particular defenses, there are other reasons to believe that 
the punitive costs would outweigh the benefits of punishing criminal actors with them.  
Consider again duress.  Assuming it is extraordinarily difficult to deter people from 
complying with a threat under duress, people under duress are deterrable only by 
punishing them extraordinarily severely for not resisting the threat.  An extraordinarily 
severe punishment, though, would be very bad in itself.  Moreover, such a punishment 
would be worse than the harm someone would cause by p rforming the criminal act 
demanded under duress.  Hence, the punitive cost of punishing a criminal actor with a 
duress defense extraordinarily severely not only would be very high, but also would 
outweigh its deterrence benefit.65  So the punitive costs would outweigh the benefits of 
punishing criminal actors with a duress defense.   
 In response, we might concede that an extraordinarily severe punishment would 
be worse than the harm someone would cause by performing a single criminal act under 
duress.  But the second argument is still unpersuasive because, among other reasons, 
punishing a criminal actor with a duress defense extraordinarily severely might deter 
multiple people from performing multiple criminal acts under duress.  The extraordinarily 
severe punishment might be better than the aggregate harm that others would cause by 
performing multiple criminal acts under duress.  So the deterrence benefit of punishing a 
                                                             
as Defences to Crime:  A Postscript, in LAW, MORALITY AND RIGHTS 365, 367 (M.A. Stewart ed., 
1983); 2 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 
107 (London, MacMillan 1883).  
65.  Cf. BENTHAM, supra note 61, at 159, 163-64 (arguing that punishing criminal actors with some 
defenses would be unprofitable or too expensive because "the mischief it would produce would be greater 







criminal actor with a duress defense extraordinarily severely not only might be very high, 
but also might outweigh its punitive cost.  
C.  Third Argument     
 A third argument might concede that punishing a criminal actor with a duress 
defense would deter multiple people from performing multiple criminal acts under duress. 
 But in addition to having a deterrence benefit, the punishment would also have a 
deterrence cost, which is the cost of preventing all the acts it would deter people from 
performing.  Some might contend that the deterrence cost of the punishment would 
outweigh its deterrence benefit because criminal acts performed under duress are 
optimific.  They are optimific because in a case of duress, the threatened harm would be 
worse for the person under duress than the alternative harm she would directly cause by 
performing the criminal act demanded.66  Hence, assuming that punishing criminal actors 
with a duress defense would deter only optimific acts, the deterrence costs would 
outweigh the deterrence benefits of punishing them.  So the overall costs would outweigh 
the overall benefits of punishing them.       
 To illustrate, suppose someone threatens to assault me unless I commit a theft.  
My committing the theft would be optimific because th  harm of my being assaulted 
would be worse than the alternative harm I would directly cause by committing the theft.  
Thus, assuming that punishing me for committing the theft would deter only optimific 
acts, the deterrence cost would outweigh the deterrence benefit of the punishment.  So its 
overall costs would outweigh its overall benefits.    
 In response, the third argument is unpersuasive for three reasons among others.  
First, suppose for the sake of argument that in a case of duress, the threatened harm 
would be worse for the person under duress than the al ernative harm she would directly 
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cause by performing the criminal act demanded.  Nevertheless, performing the criminal 
act might not be optimific.  For performing it is not to resist the threat.  And not resisting 
the threat might result in the indirect harm of increasing the incidence of duress and hence 
the number of victims of duress.  Conversely, resisting the threat might result in the 
indirect benefit of decreasing the incidence of duress and the number of victims of duress.  
 On the one hand, by resisting the threat and hence not performing the criminal act 
demanded, the person under duress would signal that she is threat resistant in the sense 
that she is disposed to resist unauthoritative threa s under duress.  In so doing, she would 
also set a precedent of threat resistance for others o follow when they are under duress.  
As a result, others might also resist threats under duress, and thereby signal that they too 
are threat resistant.  As a consequence, potentially threatening agents might infer that she 
and others too are threat resistant.  Thus, they might refrain from putting others under 
duress as a means of fulfilling their criminal objectives.  For if someone wants others to 
perform a criminal act, and he knows they are likely to be threat resistant, then it is not 
rational for him to place them under duress as a mens of getting them to perform the act. 
 So by increasing the perceived incidence of threat resistance, resisting threats under 
duress might reduce the incidence of duress and the number victims of duress.67 
 On the other hand, by not resisting the threat and hence performing the criminal 
act demanded, the person under duress would signal that she is not threat resistant.  In so 
doing, she would also set a precedent of threat non-resistance for others to follow when 
they are under duress.  As a result, others might also not resist threats under duress, and 
thereby signal that they too are not threat resistant.  As a consequence, potentially 
threatening agents might infer that she and others too are not threat resistant.  Thus, they 
might engage in putting others under duress as a means of fulfilling their criminal 
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objectives.  For if someone wants others to perform a criminal act, and he knows they are 
likely to be not threat resistant, then it might be prudentially rational for him to place 
them under duress as a means of getting them to perf rm the act.  So by decreasing the 
perceived incidence of threat resistance, not resisting threats under duress might increase 
the incidence of duress and the number of victims of duress.  Assuming the indirect 
benefits of resistance and the indirect harms of non-resistance would be sufficiently large, 
performing the criminal act demanded under duress would not be optimific.   
 Second, suppose for the sake of argument that the criminal acts of those with a 
duress defense are optimific.  Nevertheless, the deterrence benefits might still outweigh 
the deterrence costs of punishing criminal actors with a duress defense.  In addition to 
deterring optimific criminal acts performed under du ess, punishing them might also deter 
non-optimific criminal acts performed under other conditions.  In response to punishing 
them, potential criminal actors in general might become more vividly aware of how bad 
being punished would be for them, and they might discount to a lesser degree their 
probability of punishment.  For example, punishing criminal actors with a full defense of 
duress might deter others from performing non-optimific criminal acts under conditions 
in which they would really have only a partial defens  of duress but mistakenly believe 
they have a full defense of duress.  The deterrence ben fits might outweigh the deterrence 
costs of punishing even optimific criminal acts performed under duress if the non-
optimific acts deterred are sufficiently numerous and harmful relative to the optimific 
ones deterred.   
 Third, suppose for the sake of argument that punishi g criminal actors with a 
duress defense would deter only optimific criminal acts.  So the direct deterrence costs 
would outweigh the direct deterrence benefits of punishing them.   Nevertheless, the 
overall deterrence benefits might still outweigh the overall deterrence costs of punishing 







incidence of duress and hence the number of victims of duress.  For punishing them 
might increase the number of people who are threat resistant by increasing the number of 
people who are deterred from performing criminal acts demanded under duress.  Hence, 
the deterrence effect of punishing criminal actors with a duress defense might increase the 
incidence of threat resistance.  Assuming potentially threatening agents would be aware 
of this higher incidence, they might refrain from putting others under duress as a means of 
fulfilling their criminal objectives.  Thus, by increasing the perceived incidence of threat 
resistance, the deterrence effect of punishing criminal actors with a duress defense might 
decrease the incidence of duress and the number of victims of duress.68  Assuming this 
indirect deterrence benefit would be sufficiently large, the overall deterrence benefits 
might outweigh the overall deterrence costs of punishi g them.  So the overall benefits 
might outweigh the overall costs of punishing them.69   
D.  Fourth Argument    
 A fourth argument might concede that punishing criminal actors with a duress 
defense would have indirect deterrence benefits.  But according to the argument, the 
overall costs would still outweigh the overall benefits of punishing criminal actors with a 
duress defense or a range of other defenses.  The relevant range consists in those defenses 
that preclude a criminal actor from having a fair opp rtunity to avoid performing her act.  
If the state were to punish criminal actors with these defenses, it would deny people a fair 
opportunity to avoid being punished for performing criminal acts with these defenses.70  
                         
68.   By parity of reasoning, not punishing criminal actors with a duress defense might make people less 
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Kenny, supra note 64, at 348, 352-53; Abbott v. The Queen, 1977 A.C. 755, (Lord Salmon); cf. PARFIT, 
supra note 42, at 20-23, 457-61.  
69.  As an apparently paradoxical implication of this analysis, a punishment might be optimific even if it 
deters the performance of only optimific criminal acts.  The appearance of paradox, though, dissipates in 
light of the fact that deterring the performance of even optimific criminal acts can have indirect benefits that 
would outweigh the costs of deterring such acts.  
70.  H.L.A. Hart emphasizes this point in supra note 62, at 22-24 and in Legal Responsibility and Excuses, 







Hence, by punishing them, the state would restrict people's ability to plan on making 
choices that would safeguard them from being punished.71  As a consequence of 
punishing them, people would incur at least three additional costs of insecurity in 
response to the possibility of being punished for performing criminal acts with these 
defenses.  First, they would invest in services to help them avoid performing criminal acts 
with these defenses.  Second, they would avoid engagi  in valuable activities that would 
place them at an unduly high risk of performing criminal acts with these defenses.  Third, 
they would fear the possibility of performing criminal acts with these defenses.  Because 
punishing criminal actors with these defenses would result in additional costs of 
insecurity, the overall costs would outweigh the ovrall benefits of punishing them.    
 To illustrate, consider again duress.  Criminal actors with a duress defense did not 
have a fair opportunity to avoid performing their acts because they knew they would have 
suffered serious harm if they had avoided performing them.  If the state were to punish 
them, it would deny people a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for performing 
criminal acts under duress.  Hence, by punishing them, the state would restrict people's 
ability to plan on making choices that would safeguard them from being punished.  As a 
consequence of punishing them, people would incur at least three additional costs of 
insecurity in response to the possibility of being punished for performing criminal acts 
under duress.  First, they would invest more in servic s to reduce their risk of being put 
under duress.  For example, they might invest more in protective services to help them 
defend against potential threats, and they might invest more in surveillance schemes to 
help them avoid interacting with those who are likely to put them under duress.  Second, 
they would avoid more valuable activities that would leave them too vulnerable to duress. 
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 Third, they would fear more the possibility of being put under duress.  Because 
punishing criminal actors with a duress defense would result in additional costs of 
insecurity, the overall costs would outweigh the ovrall benefits of punishing them.       
 In response, the fourth argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons.  First, 
we might concede that punishing criminal actors with the relevant defenses would result 
in some additional costs of insecurity.  However, punishing them might also result in the 
reduction of other costs of insecurity.  As we have noted, punishing criminal actors with 
defenses might have general deterrence effects.  Thus, punishing them might result in the 
performance of fewer criminal acts and in fewer peopl  being victims of criminal acts.  
So if the state were to punish criminal actors with the relevant defenses, it might provide 
more people with a fair opportunity to avoid being victims of criminal acts.72  Hence, by 
punishing them, the state might increase the confide ce with which people can plan on 
not being victims of criminal acts.  As a consequence of punishing them, people might 
reduce the costs of insecurity they incur in respone to their lower probability of being 
victims of criminal acts.  First, they might invest less in services aimed at protecting them 
from being victims of criminal acts.  Second, they might engage in valuable activities that 
would otherwise place them at an unduly high risk of being victims of criminal acts.  
Third, they might fear less the possibility of being victims of criminal acts.  Assuming 
punishing criminal actors with the relevant defenses would result in a sufficiently large 
reduction in some costs of insecurity, punishing them might have the benefit of reducing 
costs of insecurity overall.  So the overall benefits might outweigh the overall costs of 
punishing them.   
 To illustrate, consider again duress.  As we have not d, punishing criminal actors 
with a duress defense might deter people from performing criminal acts in general and 
                         







might reduce the incidence of duress as a result of making others more threat resistant.  
So punishing them might result in fewer people performing criminal acts and fewer 
people being victims of criminal acts.  More specifically, punishing them might result in 
fewer victims of duress.  Thus, if the state were to punish them, it might provide more 
people with a fair opportunity to avoid being victims of criminal acts in general and 
duress in particular.  Hence, by punishing them, the state might increase the confidence 
with which people can plan on not being victims of criminal acts.  As a consequence of 
punishing them, people might reduce the costs of insecurity they incur in response to their 
lower probability of being victims of criminal acts.  First, for example, they might invest 
less in services aimed at reducing their risk of being put under duress or being victims of 
criminal acts performed under duress.  Second, for example, they might engage in more 
valuable activities that would otherwise leave them too vulnerable to such criminal acts.  
Third, for example, they might fear less the possibility of being victims of such criminal 
acts.  Assuming that punishing criminal actors with a duress defense would result in a 
sufficiently large reduction in some costs of insecurity, punishing them might have the 
benefit of reducing costs of insecurity overall.  So the overall benefits might outweigh the 
overall costs of punishing them.  
 Second, suppose for the sake of argument that punishing criminal actors with the 
relevant defenses would increase costs of insecurity overall.  Nevertheless, punishing 
them might still have significant deterrence effects and so significant deterrence benefits. 
 Assuming the deterrence benefits would be sufficiently large, they might outweigh the 
additional costs of insecurity of punishing them.  So the overall benefits might still 
outweigh the overall costs of punishing them.   
E.  Fifth Argument   
 A more general fifth argument might concede that punishing criminal actors with 







benefits.  But according to the argument, the overall costs would still outweigh the overall 
benefits of punishing them because the punitive costs f punishing them would be 
extremely high.  They would be extremely high because punishing them would be 
extremely bad.  Punishing them would be extremely bad not so much because each would 
suffer extremely severely in being punished.  After all, the punishments need not be 
extremely severe.  Rather punishing them would be extr mely bad because they do not 
deserve to be punished.  So punishing them would violate their rights, and violating their 
rights would be extremely bad considered individually nd especially in the aggregate.    
 In response, the fifth argument is problematic for at least four reasons.  First, it 
merely assumes that criminal actors with defenses deserve no punishment.  However, this 
assumption stands in need of justification.  Given that criminal actors without defenses 
deserve some punishment, it is not clear why those with defenses deserve no punishment. 
 Because the argument provides no justification for its central assumption, it is 
unpersuasive.  
 Second, suppose the argument were to justify its central assumption.  Then the 
argument would be superfluous.  If criminal actors with defenses deserve no punishment, 
then this fact by itself explains why they are not liable to any punishment independently 
of whether the costs would outweigh the benefits of punishing them.  For if they do not 
deserve any punishment, then punishing them would vio ate their rights.  And the state 
has a decisive reason not to violate someone's rights regardless of whether the costs 
would outweigh the benefits of violating her rights.  So the state would not be justified in 
imposing an undeserved punishment on someone regardl ss of whether the costs would 
outweigh the benefits of doing so.   
 Third, suppose again that criminal actors with defenses deserve no punishment.  
The argument is still problematic because it is not clear that punishing a criminal actor 







the punitive costs of punishing her would be extremely high as the argument assumes.  
The state's punishing her would violate her rights.  Hence, given the state's decisive 
reason not to violate anyone's rights, it has a decisive reason not to punish her.  But this 
fact does not obviously entail that the state's punishi g her would be extremely bad.   
 A person's rights provide others with a decisive ag nt-relative reason not to 
violate them.  An agent-relative reason is a reason whose description contains an 
essentially indexical reference to the subject of the reason, whereas an agent-neutral 
reason is one whose description does not contain such a reference.73  Specifically, 
people's rights provide someone with a decisive agent-relative reason not to violate them 
herself.  But people's rights do not provide someone with a decisive agent-neutral reason 
to minimize the violations of their rights in general.  For example, a person does not have 
most reason to violate the rights of one in order to prevent another from violating the 
rights of several others.74   
 So the state's decisive reason not to punish a criminal actor with a defense is an 
agent-relative one.  As a consequence, the state is warranted for agent-relative reasons in 
desiring to an extremely strong degree that it not punish her.  But again this fact does not 
obviously entail that the state's punishing her would be extremely bad.  For the narrow 
sense of value at issue is an impartial one.75  On this sense, something is good only if 
everyone is warranted for agent-neutral reasons in desiring that it obtain.76  Conversely, 
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something is bad only if everyone is warranted for agent-neutral reasons in desiring that it 
not obtain.  More specifically, something is extremely bad only if everyone is warranted 
for agent-neutral reasons in desiring to an extremely strong degree that it not obtain.  The 
fact, though, that the state is warranted for agent-r la ive reasons in desiring to an 
extremely strong degree that it not punish a criminal actor with a defense does not 
obviously entail that everyone is warranted for agent-neutral reasons in desiring to an 
extremely strong degree that the state not punish her.  Whether there is such an entailment 
stands in need of justification.  Without providing one, the argument is problematic.    
 Fourth, suppose for the sake of argument that punishing a criminal actor with a 
defense would be extremely bad because punishing her would violate her rights.  So 
suppose the punitive costs of punishing criminal actors with defenses would be extremely 
high considered individually and especially considere  in the aggregate.  Nevertheless, 
the deterrence benefits might still outweigh the punitive costs of punishing them.  For 
punishing them might deter people generally from performing criminal acts that would 
violate the rights of others.  As a consequence, punishing them might prevent the 
violation of the rights of others.  If violating someone's rights would be extremely bad, 
then preventing the violation of someone's rights would be extremely good.  Hence, 
punishing criminal actors with defenses might have the extremely good deterrence effect 
of preventing people from violating the rights of others.  So the deterrence benefits of 
punishing them might be extremely high.  Thus, the deterrence benefits might outweigh 
the punitive costs of punishing them even if the latter would be extremely high.  
 In the final analysis, punishing criminal actors with full defenses would have 
significant costs, which might even be extremely high.  In particular, punishing them 
would result in significant punitive costs and costs of insecurity.  However, punishing 
them might also have significant benefits, which also might be extremely high.  In 







epistemically indeterminate whether the overall costs would outweigh the overall benefits 
of punishing them.  There is no robust reason to believe one way or the other.  So the 
value requirement does not explain the mitigating effects of full defenses on a criminal 
actor's liability to punishment.   
 Parallel claims hold with respect to partial defens s.  Punishing criminal actors 
with partial defenses to an unmitigated degree would also have significant additional 
costs, such as punitive costs and costs of insecurity.  However, punishing them to an 
unmitigated degree might also have significant additional benefits, such as deterrence 
benefits.  Thus, it is epistemically indeterminate whether the net benefit of punishing 
them to an unmitigated degree would be lower than te net benefit of punishing them to a 
mitigated degree.  There is no robust reason to believe one way or the other.  So the value 
requirement also does not explain the mitigating effects of partial defenses on a criminal 
actor's liability to punishment.      
 VI.  The Desert Requirement 
 Compared to the value requirement, the desert requirement seems a much more 
promising basis on which to explain the mitigating effects of defenses on a criminal 
actor's liability to punishment.  Intuitively, a criminal actor with a full defense deserves 
no punishment, and more generally, a criminal actor with a partial defense deserves to be 
punished only to a mitigated degree.  This intuition, though, stands in need of 
justification.  As we have noted, it is not clear why criminal actors with full defenses 
deserve no punishment given that criminal actors without them deserve some.  More 
generally, it is not clear why criminal actors with partial defenses deserve to be punished 
only to a mitigated degree given that criminal actors without them deserve to be punished 
to an unmitigated degree.  To explain these mitigatn  effects, I will consider theories of 
punitive desert that might provide a prima facie plausible basis on which to explain them. 







defenses.  If a theory does not explain them, then it does not explain the mitigating effects 
of partial defenses either.  If a theory does explain them, we will consider whether it also 
provides a more general explanation of the mitigating effects of partial defenses.  
Ultimately, I argue that my restorative signaling theory of punitive desert best explains 
the mitigating effects of both full and partial defenses.    
A.  A Fairness Theory     
 A fairness theory might state the following necessary condition of punitive desert: 
 a criminal actor deserves to be punished for her act only if she had a fair opportunity to 
avoid performing it.  If a criminal actor has a defense for her act, then she lacked a fair 
opportunity to avoid performing it.  So criminal actors with defenses do not deserve to be 
punished.   
 To illustrate, consider a defense of ignorance or mistake of fact.  If a criminal 
actor has such a defense, she did not believe her act had the properties that made it a 
criminal act.  So she could not have been motivated to avoid performing the act by those 
properties.  And she could not have been deterred fom performing the act by any threat 
to punish her for performing such an act under its de cription as a criminal act.  As a 
consequence, she lacked a fair opportunity to avoid performing it.  Thus, she does not 
deserve to be punished for it. 
 For another illustration, consider duress.  In a standard case, a criminal actor with 
a duress defense knew she would have suffered seriou  harm unless she performed her 
act.  Given the serious harm she would have suffered if she had avoided performing her 
act, she lacked a fair opportunity to avoid performing it.  So she does not deserve to be 
punished for it.   
 In response, the fairness theory is open to at leas two objections.  First, the theory 
does not identify a necessary condition of defenses.  A criminal actor might have a 







consider a criminal actor with a defense of consent or defense of others and who knew the 
state did not recognize such considerations as defens s.  She could have known that her 
act was a criminal one punishable by the state, and she might have known that she could 
have avoided the act without suffering serious harm s a result.  So she could have had a 
fair opportunity to avoid performing the act even though she performed it with a defense 
of consent or defense of others.  Thus, the theory is limited in its explanatory power.  At 
best, it could only explain the mitigating effects of a subset of defenses.  
 Second, the theory does not identify a necessary condition of punitive desert.  A 
criminal actor might deserve to be punished for her act even if she lacked a fair 
opportunity to avoid performing it.  To illustrate, consider a case involving a 
"counterfactual intervener."77  Suppose I perform a criminal act with no defenses.  
Suppose also that throughout the process of my performing it, a bystander secretly 
observed me ready to intervene whenever I might have expressed any reluctance to 
perform the act.  If I had expressed such reluctance, the bystander would have threatened 
to harm me seriously unless I performed the act.  In this case, I lacked a fair opportunity 
to avoid performing it.  For if I had avoided performing it, I would have suffered serious 
harm.  Nevertheless, I still deserve to be punished for the act.    
    
                         
77.  I borrow this term from JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CONTROL:  A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 29-30 (1998) and Copp, supra note 50, at 268. 
 As they use the term, a counterfactual intervenor is the potentially intervening mechanism in any Frankfurt-
style counterexample to the principle of alternate possibilities.  According to the principle, someone is 
blameworthy for performing an act only if she could have done otherwise.  In other words, someone is not 
blameworthy for performing an act if she literally could not have done otherwise.  Although I am not 
directly engaging this principle here, my counterexamples to the fairness theories of punitive desert ar  
similar in form to a Frankfurt-style counterexample to this principle.  I set aside for further analysis, though, 
the issue of whether this principle is sound and the issue of whether Frankfurt-style counterexamples 
undermine it.  For more discussion on these issues, see, e.g., Harry Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and 
Moral Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829 (1969); Peter van Inwagen, Ability and Responsibility, 87 PHIL. 
REV. 201 (1978); and MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES:  ESSAYS 
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES (David Widerker & Michael McKenna 







B.  A Second Fairness Theory     
 A second fairness theory might concede the objections to the first.  But it might 
state a revised necessary condition of punitive desrt, and try to explain the mitigating 
effects of only a subset of defenses.  According to the revised condition, a criminal actor 
deserves to be punished for her act only if a) she disr spected the rights of others in 
performing it, and b) she had a fair opportunity to av id disrespecting the rights of others 
in performing it.  If a criminal actor has some range of defenses, then she does not satisfy 
at least one part of the revised condition.  Thus, criminal actors with the relevant defenses 
do not deserve to be punished.  The revised conditi of the second theory reflects the 
idea that ultimately criminal actors deserve to be punished not for performing their acts 
per se, but rather for the way they governed themselve  in performing them.78  In 
particular, they deserve to be punished for disrespecting the rights of others in performing 
their acts.    
 The revised condition is not open to the counterexample to the first theory.  In that 
case, I lacked a fair opportunity to avoid performing the criminal act.  But I also 
disrespected the rights of others in performing it, and I had a fair opportunity not to do so 
because I was free to perform the act with only appro riate motives.  For suppose I had 
expressed reluctance to perform the act, and the bystander had intervened, threatening to 
harm me seriously unless I performed it.  Then I would have been free to perform the act 
solely in order to avoid the threatened harm; this motivation would have been consistent 
with my performing the act with an appropriate regard for the rights of others and so with 
no disrespect for the rights of others.  So the revised condition does not unacceptably 
entail that I do not deserve to be punished for performing the act.    
 In response, the second theory does not identify a necessary condition of punitive 
                         







desert.  A criminal actor might deserve to be punished for her act even if she lacked a fair 
opportunity to avoid disrespecting the rights of others in performing it.  To illustrate, 
consider another case involving a counterfactual intervener.  Suppose again that I perform 
a criminal act with no defenses.  So I disrespected th  rights of others in performing it.  
Suppose also that throughout the process of my performing the act, a bystander secretly 
observed me ready to intervene whenever I might have expressed any reluctance to 
perform it.  If I had expressed such reluctance, th bystander would have injected in me a 
mind altering drug that would have diminished my capacity to respond appropriately to 
the moral reasons against violating the rights of others.  As a consequence of the drug, I 
would have performed the act, and I would have disrespected the rights of others in 
performing it.  In this case, I lacked a fair opportunity to avoid not only performing the 
act, but also disrespecting the rights of others in performing it.  For if I had tried to avoid 
performing the act, I would have been injected with a drug that would have caused me not 
only to perform it, but also to disrespect the rights of others in performing it.  
Nevertheless, I still deserve to be punished for the act.  
C.  A Third Fairness Theory       
 A third fairness theory might concede the objections to the first two.  But it might 
state another necessary condition of punitive desert and again try to explain the mitigating 
effects of only a subset of defenses.  According to the condition, a criminal actor deserves 
to be punished for her act only if she had a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for it. 
 If a criminal actor has some range of defenses, and the state were to punish her for the 
act, then she would not have had a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for it.  Thus, 
criminal actors with the relevant defenses do not deserve to be punished.   
 The revised condition might not be open to the two previous counterexamples in 
which I perform a criminal act with no defenses.  In the first case, suppose the state 







recognizes a defense of duress as a mitigating factor.  Then I had a fair opportunity to 
avoid being punished for the act.  For if I had tried not to perform the act, the bystander 
would have put me under duress.  And if I had performed the act under duress, I would 
have had a duress defense for it, and the state would n t have punished me for it.  In the 
second case, suppose the state punishes me for perfming the criminal act under 
conditions in which the state recognizes a defense of intoxication as a mitigating factor.  
Then I had a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for the act.  For if I had tried not to 
perform the act, the bystander would have caused me to b come intoxicated by injecting 
in me the drug.  And if I had performed the act while intoxicated, I would have had an 
intoxication defense for it, and the state would not have punished me for it.  So in neither 
case would the revised condition unacceptably entail th t I do not deserve to be punished 
for the act.   
 In response, there might be significant costs to the state's adopting or not adopting 
the revised condition as a constraint on the conditions under which it punishes criminal 
actors.  On the one hand, if the state were not to adopt the constraint, it would restrict 
people's ability to plan on making choices that would safeguard them from being 
punished.  So as we have discussed, people might incur additional costs of insecurity in 
response to the possibility of being punished for performing criminal acts with the 
relevant defenses.  On the other hand, if the statewer  to adopt the constraint, it would 
restrict people's ability to plan on making choices that would safeguard them from being 
victims of criminal acts.  Punishing criminal actors with the relevant defenses would have 
a general deterrence effect that would be absent under the constraint.  If the state were not 
to punish criminal actors with the relevant defenses, it would provide fewer people with a 
fair opportunity to avoid being victims of criminal cts.  So as we have discussed, people 
might incur additional costs of insecurity in response to their higher probability of being 







 But whether or not the benefits would outweigh the costs of adopting the revised 
condition as a constraint, it is not a necessary conditi n of punitive desert.  A criminal 
actor might deserve to be punished for her act evenif she lacked a fair opportunity to 
avoid being punished for it.  To illustrate, consider variants of the previous cases.  In the 
first, suppose the state punishes me for performing the criminal act under conditions in 
which the state does not recognize a defense of duress as a mitigating factor.  Then I 
lacked a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for it.  For if I had tried not to perform 
the act, the bystander would have put me under duress.  And if I had performed the act 
under duress, the state would have punished me for it anyway.  In the second case, 
suppose the state punishes me for performing the criminal act under conditions in which 
the state does not recognize a defense of intoxication s a mitigating factor.  Then I also 
lacked a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for the act.  For if I had tried not to 
perform it, the bystander would have caused me to bec me intoxicated by injecting in me 
the drug.  And if I had performed the act while intoxicated, the state would have punished 
me for it anyway.  So in both cases, the revised condition unacceptably entails that I do 
not deserve to be punished for the act.  
 In clarification, there is something objectionable about the state in each case.  But 
what is objectionable is not the state's punishing me for my criminal acts or imposing on 
me an undeserved punishment.  Given that I performed th  acts with no defenses, I 
deserved to be punished for them even though I lacked a fair opportunity to avoid being 
punished for them because the state does not recognize the relevant defenses.  Rather 
what is objectionable is precisely the state's policy of not recognizing these defenses as 
mitigating factors.  The policy is objectionable because criminal actors with these 
defenses do not deserve to be punished.  The claim, though, that criminal actors with 
defenses do not deserve to be punished is precisely the claim that stands in need of 







 In the final analysis, the fairness theories and their  potential variants are 
problematic for at least two reasons.  First, it isdoubtful that any fair opportunity of 
avoidance principle is a necessary condition of punitive desert.  Such principles seem 
open to counterexamples involving counterfactual interveners or non-standard punitive 
policies involving strict liability.  So it is doubtful that such principles could explain why 
criminal actors with any full defenses deserve no punishment.  Second, even if such a 
principle is a necessary condition of punitive desert, its explanatory power would likely 
be limited.  As we have seen, it is doubtful that such principles could explain why 
criminal actors with some full defenses do not deserve to be punished.  For criminal 
actors with some full defenses, like consent and defens  of others, seem capable of 
having a fair opportunity to avoid any relevant consequence.  It is also doubtful that such 
principles could explain why criminal actors with mere partial defenses deserve to be 
punished only to a mitigated degree.  Criminal actors with some partial defenses might 
have only a partially unfair opportunity to avoid some relevant consequence.  But it is not 
clear how such degrees of unfairness could explain why they deserve to be punished only 
to a mitigated degree.   
D.  An Expressive Theory        
 An expressive theory might point out that punishing someone expresses an 
attitude of moral blame toward her.79  Such an attitude might be resentment or 
indignation.  Given the expressive aspect of punishment, an expressive theory might state 
the following necessary condition of punitive desert:  a criminal actor deserves a 
punishment only if the punishment would not express an unwarranted attitude of moral 
blame toward her.  So a criminal actor deserves a punishment only if the punishment 
would not express too much blame toward her.  Punishing criminal actors with full 
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defenses would express too much blame toward them because punishing them would 
express some blame toward them, and they are not at all blameworthy.  Thus, they do not 
deserve to be punished.  More generally, punishing criminal actors with partial defenses 
to an unmitigated degree would express too much blame toward them because punishing 
them to an unmitigated degree would express an unmitigated degree of blame toward 
them, and they are blameworthy only to a mitigated d gree.  Hence, they do not deserve 
to be punished to an unmitigated degree.     
 In response, the theory is open to at least two objections.  First, it merely assumes 
that criminal actors with full defenses are not at all blameworthy, and those with partial 
defenses are blameworthy only to a mitigated degree.  But these claims stand in need of 
justification.  Given that criminal actors without f ll defenses are blameworthy to some 
degree, it is not clear why those with full defenses are not also blameworthy to some 
degree.  And given that criminal actors without partial defenses are blameworthy to an 
unmitigated degree, it is not clear why those withou  partial defenses are not also 
blameworthy to an unmitigated degree.  Because the theory provides no justification for 
these assumptions, it is unpersuasive.   
 Second, the theory is circular.  On a standard view, attitudes of moral blame 
consist at least partly in certain demands.80  To feel an attitude of moral blame toward 
someone is to make or feel certain demands on her.  So to express an attitude of moral 
blame toward someone is to express certain demands on her.  One demand that is 
constitutive of an attitude of moral blame is the demand to undertake a punishment or, 
more precisely, the burdens constitutive of a punishment.81  Punishing someone expresses 
                         
80.  See DARWALL, supra note 23, at 17; STRAWSON, supra note 8, at 14-15, 21-22; Watson, supra 
note 8, at 121, 126-28.  
81.  Attitudes of moral blame are sentiments of justice.  See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, 87-107 
(Oxford, 1998).  As such, they are a subset of all attitudes of moral disapproval.  I do not claim that a 
demand to undertake a punishment is constitutive of all the latter.  I only claim that such a demand is 
constitutive of moral blame.  See id. at 93, 95 (claiming that attitudes of moral blame as sentiments of 







an attitude of moral blame toward her by expressing its constitutive demand on her to 
undertake the punishment.  So to claim that a punishment expresses an unwarranted 
attitude of moral blame toward someone is to claim that the punishment expresses an 
unwarranted demand on her to undertake the punishment.  And to claim that a demand on 
someone to undertake a punishment is unwarranted presu poses that she does not deserve 
the punishment.82  As a consequence, the expressive theory is circular in virtue of the fact 
that it presupposes what it aims to explain.83    
 To clarify, consider criminal actors with full defenses.  The theory tries to explain 
why they do not deserve any punishment on the assumption that any punishment would 
express too much blame toward them.  But to claim that any punishment would express 
too much blame toward them is to claim that any punishment would express an 
unwarranted demand on them to undertake the punishment.  And to claim that a demand 
on them to undertake any punishment would be unwarranted presupposes that they do not 
deserve any punishment.  The claim, though, that they do not deserve any punishment is 
precisely the claim to be explained.  Consider now criminal actors with partial defenses.  
The theory tries to explain why they do not deserve an unmitigated punishment on the 
assumption that such a punishment would express too much blame toward them.  But to 
                                                             
punished); cf. Thomas Baldwin, Punishment, Communication, and Resentment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 124, 128, 130, 132 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999) (claiming that resenting someone 
involves the judgment that she should be punished); JOSEPH BUTLER, Sermon VIII:  Upon Resentment, 
in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH BUTLER 141 (W.E. Gladstone ed., 1896) (suggesting that attitudes of 
resentment and indignation toward someone involve a d sire that she be punished). 
82.  The considerations that determine whether others are warranted in demanding someone to undertake a 
punishment are narrower than the considerations that determine whether others have most reason to desire 
to demand her to undertake the punishment.  The relevant considerations are the ones that determine 
whether she is obligated to others to undertake the punishment.  Cf. Copp, supra note 50, at 271-75; 
DARWALL, supra note 23, at 96-99.  For related discussion on the distinction between the considerations 
that make an attitude warranted, fitting, or rational and the considerations that make an attitude desirable, 
see the works cited in supra note 23.  
83.  Cf. Baldwin, supra note 81, at 130, 132 (expounding a similar circularity objection to attempts to 
justify punishing someone on the grounds that punishi g her would express a warranted attitude of 







claim that an unmitigated punishment would express too much blame toward them is to 
claim that such a punishment would express an unwarranted demand on them to 
undertake the punishment.  And to claim that a demand on them to undertake an 
unmitigated punishment would be unwarranted presupposes that they do not deserve such 
a  punishment.  The claim, though, that they do not deserve an unmitigated punishment is 
precisely the claim to be explained.  Because the theory presupposes the claims it aims to 
explain, it is circular.     
E.  A Restorative Signaling Theory   
 As I argued in Chapter 1, RS explains why and how much criminals with no 
defenses deserve to be punished by explaining why they must undertake a punishment to 
fulfill the obligation of restoration they incur from committing their crimes.  According to 
RS, when someone commits a crime without a defense, she undermines certain 
conditions of trust in the sense that she undermines th  conditions that are necessary for 
others' being justified in believing that she is not disposed to commit crimes.  She is 
obligated to restore those conditions because unless she restores them, she will cause 
others to incur the costs of insecurity.   
 To restore the conditions of trust, she must demonstrate to others that she has a 
good will in the sense of a stable disposition to be appropriately motivated by the moral 
reasons against violating the rights of others.  To demonstrate that she has a good will, 
she must demonstrate that she has a stable dispositon to care highly about the interests of 
others.  To demonstrate this, she must demonstrate th t she has acted with a sufficiently 
high degree of benevolence for a sufficiently long time after committing her crime.  To 
demonstrate that she has acted with such benevolence, she must sacrifice some of her 
sufficiently important personal interests for a sufficiently long time for the sake of 
benefiting others.   







crime that is no more severe than the burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation 
of restoration she incurs from committing her crime.  In other words, a criminal deserves 
to be punished for her crime no more severely than e burdens she is obligated to 
undertake to restore the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime.84  
 Given RS's explanation of why and how much criminals with no defenses deserve 
to be punished, we can see its explanation of how much criminal actors presumably 
deserve to be punished for their acts.  According to RS, a criminal actor deserves to be 
punished for her act no more severely than the burdens she must undertake to fulfill the 
obligation of restoration she incurs from performing her act.  When someone performs a 
criminal act, there is a presumption that she committed a particularly serious crime in 
performing it.  Thus, she presumably disrespected th  rights of others to a particularly bad 
degree in performing it.  As a consequence, she presumably has a particularly bad 
disposition to commit crimes.  So she is presumably disposed to flout a relevant class of 
the moral reasons against violating the rights of others.  And so presumably there is a 
particularly bad deficiency in the degree to which she cares about the interests of others.  
Thus, there is a presumption that by performing her act, she undermined conditions of 
trust to a particularly bad degree.  On the assumption that she has the capacity to restore 
those conditions of trust, she is presumably obligated to do so.  Assuming she has an 
obligation of restoration, there is a presumption that she must undertake certain burdens 
to fulfill it.  Hence, she presumably deserves to be punished for her act as severely as 
those burdens, but no more severely.  Given RS's explanation of how much criminal 
actors presumably deserve to be punished for their acts, we can now see how it explains 
the mitigating effects of the main types of defenses.   
                         
84.  As a corollary, a criminal does not deserve a punishment for her crime that is more severe than te 
burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation of restoration she incurs from committing it.  In other 
words, a criminal does not deserve to be punished for her crime more severely than the burdens she is 







1.  Type 1 Defenses    
 Consider type 1 defenses, which mitigate how badly  criminal actor disrespected 
the rights of others in performing her act.  Suppose a criminal actor has a full type 1 
defense.  Then she did not commit a crime in performing her act.  Although she might 
have violated the rights of others, she did not disrespect their rights in performing the act. 
 For example, she might have been caused to perform the act against her will by mere 
force; she might not have believed her act would have the type of consequences that make 
it a criminal act; or she might have been appropriately motivated to perform the act by her 
belief that particular considerations obtained which a) entailed that her performing it 
would not violate the rights of others or b) provided her with most reason to perform it.  
As a consequence, the act is not strong evidence that she is disposed to commit crimes.  
Thus, she did not undermine any conditions of trust by performing the act.  So she does 
not incur an obligation of restoration from performing it.  Therefore, she does not deserve 
to be punished for the act.       
 To illustrate, consider a criminal actor with a full type 1 defense of duress.  
Suppose she commits a theft in response to another's reat to kill her unless she commits 
it.  In this case, her theft is not a crime.  Although she might have violated the rights of 
the theft victim, she did not disrespect his rights because her reasons in favor of 
committing the theft outweighed her reasons against.85  As a consequence, her theft is not 
strong evidence that she is disposed to commit crimes.  So she did not undermine any 
conditions of trust by committing the theft, and so she does not incur an obligation of 
restoration from committing it.  Therefore, she does not deserve to be punished for 
committing the theft.     
                         
85.  I assume a person can have agent-relative reasons to care about her own interests out of proportion to 
the interests of others.  See, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 73, at 171-75; SCHEFFLER, supra note 75, at 20; 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM:  FOR AND AGAINST 75, 
108-18 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973).  So I assume someone might have most reason not to
resist a threat under duress even though the indirect effects of not resisting the threat would make doing so 







 Suppose a criminal actor has a mere partial type 1 d fense.  Then although she 
committed a crime in performing her act, the crime was not as serious as presumed.  
Thus, the defense mitigates the seriousness of the crim  she committed in performing the 
act.  It mitigates how badly she disrespected the rights of others in performing the act.  So 
the defense mitigates the badness of the disposition to commit crimes that others are 
justified in believing she has on the basis of her act.  And so the defense mitigates the 
deficiency in the degree to which she cares about others that they are justified in believing 
she has on the basis of her act.  In sum, the defens  mitigates how badly she undermined 
conditions of trust by performing the act.  As a consequence, the defense mitigates the 
severity of burdens she must undertake to restore the conditions of trust she undermined 
by performing the act.  So it mitigates the severity of burdens she must undertake to fulfill 
her obligation of restoration.  Therefore, the defense mitigates how much she deserves to 
be punished for the act.   
2.  Type 2 Defenses      
 Consider type 2 defenses, which block the otherwis ju tified inference from the 
fact that someone performed a criminal act to her having the presumed disposition to 
commit crimes at the time of assessment.  Suppose a criminal actor has a full type 2 
defense.  Then she might have committed a crime in p rforming her act.  But given the 
defense, the act is not strong evidence that she is disposed to commit crimes at the time of 
assessment.  For example, she might have performed the act under conditions that would 
standardly cause a temporary radical distortion in an agent's system of normative self-
governance.  Thus, she did not undermine any conditi s of trust at the time of 
assessment by performing her act.  So at the time of assessment, she does not incur an 
obligation of restoration from performing the act.  Therefore, she does not deserve to be 
punished for the act.   







Suppose she intentionally killed others while she was sleepwalking.86  In this case, she 
did commit a very serious crime in killing them.  She disrespected their rights very badly 
in doing so.  Nevertheless, her killing them is notstrong evidence that she is disposed to 
commit crimes at the time of assessment, when she is awake.  For she killed the others 
under conditions, namely a particular state of sleep, that would standardly cause a 
temporary radical distortion in an agent's system of normative self-governance.87  Thus, 
she did not undermine any conditions of trust at the time of assessment by killing the 
others.  So at the time of assessment, she does not incur an obligation of restoration from 
killing them.  Hence, she does not deserve to be punished for the crime.      
 Suppose a criminal actor has a mere partial type 2 d fense.  Then she might have 
committed a crime in performing the act, and the crime might have been as serious as 
presumed.  She might have disrespected the rights of others to the presumed degree in 
performing the act.  Nevertheless, the defense still mi igates the badness of the 
disposition to commit crimes that others are justified in believing she has at the time of 
assessment on the basis of her act.  Thus, the defense mitigates how badly she 
undermined conditions of trust at the time of assesment by performing her act.  So it 
mitigates the severity of burdens she must undertak to restore the conditions of trust she 
undermined by performing the act.  And so it mitigates the severity of burdens she must 
undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration at the time of assessment.  Therefore, the 
defense mitigates how much she deserves to be punished for the act.   
3.  Type 3 Defenses    
 Consider type 3 defenses, which are considerations hat undermine a criminal 
                         
86.  For an actual case involving homicidal somnambulism, see The Queen v. Parks [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871 
(Canada).  
87.  Cf. Rosalind Cartwright, Sleepwalking Violence:  A Sleep Disorder, a Legal Dilemma, and a 
Psychological Challenge, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1149, 1150 (2004) (describing the state of sleep in 







actor's capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant class of moral reasons at the time 
of assessment.  Suppose a criminal actor has a fulltype 3 defense.  Then she might have 
committed a crime in performing her act, and the act might be strong evidence that she is 
disposed to commit crimes at the time of assessment.  So the act might be strong evidence 
that she is disposed to flout a class of moral reasons against violating the rights of others. 
 Thus, she might have undermined conditions of trust by performing her act.   
 Nevertheless, even if the criminal actor did undermine conditions of trust, she is 
not obligated to restore them.  For a person is obligated to do something only if others can 
fairly demand her to do it.88  And others cannot fairly demand someone to do something 
that she lacks the capacity to do.89  So a person is obligated to do something only if she
has the capacity to do it.90  If a criminal actor has a full type 3 defense for he  act, she 
lacks the capacity to respond appropriately to any of the relevant moral reasons that she is 
presumably disposed to flout.  Hence, she lacks the capacity to restore any of the 
conditions of trust she undermined by performing her act.  Assuming others know she 
lacks the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant moral reasons, there is nothing 
she could do to justify others in believing that she is disposed to respond appropriately to 
them.  Because she lacks the capacity to restore any of the conditions of trust she 
undermined by performing her act, she is not obligated to restore any of them.  As a 
consequence, she does not incur an obligation of restoration from performing her act.  
Therefore, she does not deserve to be punished for the act.     
 To illustrate, suppose someone commits a theft with a full type 3 defense of 
kleptomania, where kleptomania is an incapacity to respond appropriately to the moral 
                         
88.  Cf. Copp, supra note 50, at 271-75; DARWALL, supra note 23, at 96-99.   
89.  See Copp, supra note 50, at 271-75.  
90.  This is similar to the more general principle that someone ought to do something only if she can do it.  
See id.; IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:380 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996) (stating 







reasons against committing theft.  In this case, her theft is a crime.  She disrespected the 
rights of others in committing it.  Given that she committed the theft as a kleptomaniac, 
her theft is strong evidence only that she is disposed to commit crimes of theft.91  So her 
theft is strong evidence only that she is disposed to flout the moral reasons against 
committing theft.  Thus, she did undermine some conditions of trust by committing her 
crime.   
 Nevertheless, she is not obligated to restore those c nditions of trust to any degree 
because she does not have the capacity to do so.  To restore them to any degree, she must 
have the capacity to demonstrate to others that she is disposed to respond appropriately to 
the moral reasons against committing theft.  To have this capacity, she must have the 
capacity to respond appropriately to such reasons.  But as a kleptomaniac, she lacks this 
capacity.  Assuming others know she lacks the capacity to respond appropriately to the 
moral reasons against committing theft, there is nothi g she could do to justify their 
believing that she is disposed to respond appropriately to them.  As a consequence, she 
does not incur an obligation of restoration from committing her theft.  Therefore, she does 
not deserve to be punished for the theft.92   
 Suppose a criminal actor has a mere partial type 3 d fense.  Then she might have 
committed a crime in performing her act, and the crime might have been as serious as 
presumed.  The act might justify others in believing that she has the presumed disposition 
to commit crimes.  So the act might justify others in believing that she is disposed to flout 
                         
91.  For this reason, kleptomania is also a partial type 2 defense to a crime of theft.  In the standard c se, a 
theft is strong evidence of a broader disposition to commit a broader range of crimes.  As we discussed in 
Chapter 1, criminals tend to exhibit a high degree of versatility.  
92.  Although the kleptomaniac does not incur an obligation of restoration from committing her theft, she 
might still incur an obligation to compensate her victims for their losses, and if her disposition to commit 
theft is sufficiently bad, she might incur an obligation to incapacitate herself by undertaking a civil 
commitment.  But neither requiring her to compensate her victims nor incapacitating her would constitute a 
punishment per se.  For neither would express an attitude of moral blame toward her and neither would be 







the presumed class of moral reasons against violating the rights of others.  Thus, she 
might have undermined conditions of trust to the prsumed degree by performing her act.  
 However, even if she did undermine conditions of trust to the presumed degree, 
she is not obligated to restore these conditions fully because she lacks the capacity to do 
so.  To restore them fully, she must demonstrate that s e is disposed to respond 
appropriately to all the relevant moral reasons she i  presumably disposed to flout.  But 
she lacks the capacity to demonstrate this because she lacks the capacity to respond 
appropriately to all the relevant moral reasons in virtue of having a partial type 3 defense. 
 Assuming others know she lacks this capacity, there is nothing she could do to justify 
their believing that she is disposed to respond appropriately to all the relevant moral 
reasons.    
 Because she has the capacity to respond appropriately only to a subset of the 
relevant moral reasons, she has the capacity to demnstrate that she is disposed to 
respond appropriately only to a subset of them.  So she is obligated to demonstrate that 
she is disposed to respond appropriately only to a subset of the relevant moral reasons.  
Hence, the defense mitigates the degree to which she is obligated to restore the conditions 
of trust she undermined by performing her act.  Under her obligation of restoration, she is 
obligated to restore only to a partial degree the conditions of trust she undermined by 
performing her act.  As a consequence, the defense mitigates the severity of burdens she 
must undertake to fulfill the obligation of restoration she incurs from performing her act.  
Thus, the defense mitigates how much she deserves to be punished for the act.   
4.  Type 4 Defenses    
 Given its account of the three main types of defenses, RS generates a more 
general fourth type of defense.  Type 4 defenses are considerations that mitigate the 
severity of burdens a criminal actor must undertake o fulfill the obligation of restoration 







not undertake any burdens to fulfill the obligation.  So she does not deserve any 
punishment for her act.  If a criminal actor has a partial type 4 defense, she might need to 
undertake some burdens to fulfill the obligation, but the necessary burdens are not as 
severe as presumed.  So the defense mitigates how much she deserves to be punished for 
her act.  Although all type 1, type 2, and type 3 defenses are a subset of type 4 ones, some 
considerations can be type 4 defenses without falling under the extension of the other 
types.  Consider three plausible candidates:  childhoo , brainwashing, and a rotten social 
background.   
 Consider childhood.  In some cases, childhood provides a type 1 defense.  
Children are sometimes incapable of understanding the effects of their acts on others.  
When they perform criminal acts, they sometimes do not believe their acts have the 
properties that make them criminal ones.93  In other cases, childhood provides a type 2 
but not a type 1 defense.  Unlike adults, children often do not have settled dispositions.  
As they grow, their dispositions constantly change oft n in radical ways.  So the mere fact 
that a child was disposed to disrespect the rights of others when she performed a criminal 
act is sometimes not strong evidence that she is similarly disposed later at the time of 
assessment.94  In other cases, childhood provides a type 3 but not a type 2 or type 1 
defense.  Children sometimes lack the capacity to respond appropriately to the moral 
reasons against violating the rights of others.95  In other cases, though, childhood arguably 
provides a type 4 defense but not one of the other typ s.  Relative to adults, the 
dispositions of children are standardly much more malleable in the sense that they are 
much more responsive to the demands of authority figures.  So even if children do 
undermine conditions of trust to the presumed degree, and even if they have the capacity 
                         
93.  See SCANLON, supra note 8, at 280.  
94.  See id. at 280-81.   







to respond appropriately to the moral reasons against v olating the rights of others, they 
can standardly go a long way toward restoring those c nditions merely by undertaking a 
demanding but non-punitive course in moral education.  The same cannot be said for 
adults in the standard case.  Hence, the fact that a criminal is a child mitigates the severity 
of burdens she must undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration.  
 Consider brainwashing, which is a means of changing a person's beliefs or the 
norms she accepts.  Brainwashing is coercive persuasion standardly carried out through 
means of manipulation and domination.96  When brainwashing is successful, it causes a 
radical change in the victim's system of normative self-governance.  In particular, 
brainwashing can cause someone who accepts norms against committing crimes to accept 
norms requiring her to commit them.  Now suppose such a person commits a crime 
because she has been brainwashed into accepting a norm requiring her to commit it.97  In 
such a case, she might not have a type 1 defense because she might have disrespected the 
rights of others to the presumed degree in committing the crime.  She might not have a 
type 2 defense because her crime might be strong evidence that she has the presumed 
disposition to commit crimes at the time of assessment.  More strongly, she might 
actually have such a disposition at the time of asses ment.  She might not have a type 3 
defense because she might still have the capacity to respond appropriately to the moral 
                         
96.  Brainwashing a victim often involves several elements, such as 1) isolating her; 2) exercising total
control over her environment, especially the information she receives and what is communicated to her; 3) 
physically debilitating her by, for example, providing her with an inadequate diet, insufficient sleep, and 
poor sanitation; 4) requiring her to perform repetitive tasks, like copying written material; 5) manipulating 
her feelings of guilt and anxiety; 6) threatening to annihilate her unless she accepts the beliefs or norms of 
her apparently all-powerful captors; 7) degrading her for not accepting them; 8) subjecting her to peer 
pressure; and 9) requiring her to act contrary to the beliefs or norms that her captors want her to reject.  See 
Richard Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind:  Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively 
Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1978).  
97.  For cases that arguably involve such brainwashing, see the cases of American prisoners of war during 
the Korean conflict at U.S. v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452 (1954); U.S. v. Fleming, 19 C.M.R. 438 (1954); 
U.S. v. Olson, 20 C.M.R. 46 (1955).  See also the case of Patricia Hearst at U.S. v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 







reasons against violating the rights of others.  Thus, she might have undermined 
conditions of trust by committing her crime, and she might incur an obligation to restore 
those conditions at the time of assessment.  Neverthel ss, she still might have a type 4 
defense for her crime.  When brainwashed people are freed from their captors and 
undergo a rigorous but non-punitive psychiatric process of deprogramming or 
deconditioning, they are highly likely to reject the changes that were induced in them 
from the brainwashing.98  So when a criminal commits a crime as a result of 
brainwashing, she can go a long way toward restoring conditions of trust by merely 
separating from her captors and undergoing non-punitive treatment.99  Hence, the fact that 
a criminal was brainwashed can mitigate the severity of burdens she must undertake to 
fulfill her obligation of restoration.100   
 Consider a rotten social background.101  Someone with such a background is 
standardly born into an environment involving, among ther things, extreme poverty, an 
abundance of corrupting influences, a scarcity of positive influences, and a perceived lack 
of viable opportunities for escaping the environment.  Such a background can place a 
high degree of pressure on someone to commit crimes, especially property crimes.102  
                         
98.  See Delgado, supra note 96, at 9, 9 n.40, 30-32; ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM:  A STUDY OF "BRAINWASHING" IN CHINA 86-151 (1961). 
99.  To obtain such separation and treatment, the brainwashed criminal will likely require the assistance of 
the state. 
100.  In addition to providing a type 4 defense, brainwashing might also provide a type 2 or type 3 defense. 
 A criminal actor could have a type 2 defense of brainwashing if she performed her act as result of 
brainwashing, and she obtained treatment before the time of assessment.  She could have a type 3 defense of 
brainwashing if her brainwashing undermined her capa ity to respond appropriately to the moral reasons 
against violating the rights of others at the time of assessment.  Although brainwashing can be a partial 
defense, I leave it an open question whether it can be a full defense.   
101.  U.S. v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 961 (D.C. Cir 1973) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (using the phrase 
'rotten social background').  
102.  See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976); 
Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe 
Environmental Deprivation?, 3 L. & INEQUALITY 9 (1985).  Although a rotten social background can 







Suppose someone commits a crime, such as theft, in response to pressures from her rotten 
social background.  Although she might lack a type 1, type 2, or type 3 defense for the 
crime, she still might have a type 4 defense for it.  Even if she undermined conditions of 
trust by committing the crime, and has the capacity to respond appropriately to the moral 
reasons against violating the rights of others, she can restore the conditions to a 
significant degree by merely pursuing non-criminal opportunities to live under better 
social conditions.  Such opportunities include, among thers, opportunities for 
meaningful employment, opportunities for severing personal ties with corrupting 
influences, and opportunities to establish personal ties with positive influences.103  By 
pursuing such opportunities, the criminal would free herself from many of the factors in 
her rotten social background that pressured her to commit crimes.  Thus, the fact that a 
criminal has a rotten social background can mitigate the severity of burdens she must 
undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration.104   
 In the final analysis, RS explains why defenses mitigate how much criminal actors 
deserve to be punished for their acts by explaining why defenses mitigate the severity of 
burdens they must undertake to fulfill the obligation of restoration they incur from 
performing their acts.  In some cases, criminal actors with defenses do not incur an 
obligation of restoration from performing their acts.  They might not have undermined 
any conditions of trust by performing their acts, and even if they did undermine 
                                                             
background actually succumb to such pressure and commit crimes.  See Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of 
Welfare Criminology:  A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1259 (1976).  
103.  Obtaining such opportunities would likely require the assistance of the state.  Although their provision 
might be costly for the state, such costs are acceptable given that their deprivation arguably constitutes an 
injustice.  
104.  In addition to providing a type 4 defense, a rotten social background might also provide a type 2 or
type 3 defense.  A criminal actor could have a type 2 defense of a rotten social background if she performed 
her act against such a background, and she pursues non-criminal opportunities to live under better social 
conditions before the time of assessment.  She could have a type 3 defense of a rotten social background if 
her background undermined her relevant capacities a the time of assessment.  Although a rotten social 







conditions of trust, they might lack the capacity to restore them.  In other cases, criminal 
actors with defenses do incur an obligation of restoration, but their defenses nevertheless 
mitigate the severity of burdens they must undertak o fulfill the obligation.   
 VII.  Blameworthiness 
 So far we have focused on how RS explains the mitigat ng effects of defenses on 
punitive desert.  In light of this explanation, we can see how RS explains their mitigating 
effects on blameworthiness.  As we have noted, attitudes of moral blame contain certain 
demands, like the demand to undertake a punishment, that are constitutive of the attitudes 
themselves.  According to RS, an attitude of moral bl me contains a demand to restore 
conditions of trust and a demand to undertake certain burdens to restore those conditions. 
 When others blame a criminal actor for her act, they presuppose that she undermined 
certain conditions of trust by performing the act, nd they demand her to restore those 
conditions by undertaking certain burdens.  The higher the severity of burdens they 
demand her to undertake, the more they blame her for the act.  The lower the severity of 
burdens, the less they blame her for the act.   
 According to RS, the degree to which a criminal actor is blameworthy for her act 
corresponds to the severity of burdens that others are warranted in demanding her to 
undertake to restore the conditions of trust she undermined by performing the act.  The 
higher the severity of burdens they are warranted in demanding her to undertake, the more 
she is blameworthy for the act.  The lower the severity of burdens, the less she is 
blameworthy for the act.  According to RS, others are warranted in demanding a criminal 
actor to undertake certain burdens to restore the conditions of trust she undermined by 
performing her act if and only if she must undertake those burdens to fulfill the obligation 
of restoration she incurs from performing the act.  Thus, by explaining the mitigating 
effects of defenses on the severity of burdens that criminal actors must undertake to fulfill 







criminal actors are blameworthy. 
 VIII.  Conclusion  
 RS has important implications for the nature and strength of the state's reasons to 
recognize defenses as mitigating factors in its punitive policies.  There are two possible 
reasons why the state might recognize them.  On the one hand, the state might do so on 
the basis of considerations of value or efficiency.  In particular, it might do so because the 
costs would outweigh the benefits of punishing criminal actors with defenses to an 
unmitigated degree.  On the other hand, the state might do so on the basis of 
considerations of justice.  By showing that defenses mitigate how much criminal actors 
deserve to be punished, RS shows that their mitigatin  effects are indeed ultimately 
grounded in considerations of justice.  So even if it would be costly or inefficient to 
punish criminal actors with defenses only to a mitigated degree, the state is still obligated 





 Chapter 4 
   
 Forgiving Criminals:  What It Means and When It is Warranted 
 
 I.  Introduction 
 
 Suppose someone commits a crime by disrespecting the rights of others in 
performing a criminal act.  She has no exculpatory defenses.  As a consequence, she is 
blameworthy and deserves to be punished for the crime.  We also standardly presume she 
could undertake some course of action that would warrant forgiving her for the crime.  
Our presumption generates two issues.  One concerns what it means to forgive her.  
Another concerns the conditions under which forgiveness would be warranted.  To 
appreciate these issues, we should distinguish forgiveness from other positive responses 
we might have to a criminal.    
 Forgiveness is distinct from mercy, which consists in not forcing someone to 
undertake the burdens she is obligated to undertake.1  When someone commits a crime 
with no exculpatory defenses, she incurs an obligation to undertake a punishment for the 
crime.2  If she caused harm to others, she also might incur an obligation to compensate 
them for the harm, and fulfilling this obligation might be burdensome for her.  Having 
mercy on the criminal could consist in not forcing her to fulfill either obligation or to 
undertake the burdens necessary to fulfill them.  As such, having mercy on her is 
consistent with continuing to blame her for the crime by continuing to feel an attitude of 
                         
1.  See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Forgiveness and resentment, i  FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 
20-21 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (distinguishing mercy from forgiveness); Lucy 
Allias, Wiping the Slate Clean:  The Heart of Forgiveness, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 36, 47-49 (2008) 
(same).  
2.  Throughout the paper, I refer only to criminals who commit their crimes with no full exculpatory 
defenses.  
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moral blame toward her.3  Forgiveness, though, involves the suspension of blame.4  
 Forgiveness is not the mere suspension of blame.5  P ople can suspend blame for 
no reason at all.  For example, they can suspend blaming a criminal merely because they 
forgot about her crime.  Or they can suspend blame merely because they lose the capacity 
to feel blame.  Neither is forgiveness because forgiveness involves suspending blame for 
a reason.6  It involves the suspension of blame in response to a judgment.  In this sense, 
forgiveness not only is a judgment-sensitive attitude or state of mind, but consists at least 
partly in a judgment.7 
 Forgiveness, however, is not the mere suspension of blame for a reason.8  People 
might suspend blame merely for reasons that bear only on whether they would be 
warranted in desiring to blame or in undertaking a process of getting themselves to 
blame.9  Call these 'state-based reasons'.10  For example, people might suspend blame for 
                         
3.  Throughout the paper, I refer only to blame of a moral kind.  An attitude of moral blame might consist in 
resentment, indignation, or guilt.  See, e.g., P.F. STRAWSON, Freedom and Resentment, i  FREEDOM 
AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 13-15 (1974).  
4.  See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 1, at 22 (claiming that forgiveness involves for wearing resentment); 
Allias, supra note 1, at 41 (contending that forgiveness involves overcoming retributive emotions).  
5.  See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 1, at 22-23.  
6.  See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 1, at 23-24 (claiming that forgiveness involves forswearing resentment 
for moral reasons). 
7.  See Pamela Hieronymi, Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness, 62 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 529, 530 (2001) (taking forgiveness to involve a judgment or change in 
view).  For the idea of a judgment-sensitive attitude, see T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH 
OTHER 20-24 (1998).  
8.  See, e.g., JEAN HAMPTON, Forgiveness, resentment and hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 
35, 36-37 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988).  
9.  See ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 37 (1990) (distinguishing the issue of 
whether an attitude is rational from the issue of whether desiring the attitude is rational, and noting hat a 
person can rationally desire not to have a rational attitude); Derek Parfit, Rationality and Reasons, in 
EXPLORING PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY:  FROM ACTION TO VALUES 17, 27 (Dan Egonsson, Jonas 
Josefsson, Bjorn Petersson, & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen eds., 2001) (same).  
10.  I borrow this term from Derek Parfit.  See John Broome, Reason and Motivation, 71 SUPPLEMENT 
TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 137-8 (2003) (discussing Parfit's use the 
term).  
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mere prudential or altruistic reasons concerning its effects.  Blaming can have harmful 
effects on the well-being of both those who blame and those who are blamed.  When 
someone feels blame toward another, the feeling itself can impair her capacity to engage 
in valuable activities or relationships with others generally.  When someone learns that 
others blame her, she can suffer a loss in self-esteem.  So people might suspend blame 
merely to avoid the harmful effects of blaming itself.  In this case, they would suspend 
blame for a reason, namely a state-based reason.  But their suspension would not 
constitute forgiveness, which involves the suspension of blame for the right kind of 
reasons.  The right kind concern only considerations that bear on whether others would be 
warranted in blaming.11  Call these considerations 'object-based reasons'.12  Others 
forgive someone only if they suspend blaming her in response to their judgment that 
certain considerations obtain which would make their continuing to blame her 
unwarranted.  
 Forgiveness, though, is not the mere suspension of blame for object-based 
reasons.  Suppose someone commits a crime, and others blame her for it.  However, they 
blame her too much; they feel too much resentment or i dignation.13  So their attitude of 
blame was never warranted.  Now assume they reflect on the nature of her crime in a 
"cool hour" and realize their mistake.  In response, th y mitigate how much they blame 
her for the crime and subsequently blame her only to a warranted degree.  In other words, 
                         
11.  For discussion on the problem of identifying the considerations that are relevant to whether an attitude 
of blame is warranted or, in other words, fitting or rational, see, e.g., Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, The 
Moralistic Fallacy:  On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 
65, 77 (2000); Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, Sentiment and Value, 110 ETHICS 722, 745 (2000); 
STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT:  MORALITY, RESPECT, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 15-17 (2006); GIBBARD, supra note 9, at 36-40; Parfit, supra note 9, at 17-39; 
Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, The Strike of the Demon:  On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and 
Value, 114 ETHICS 397, 397-423 (2004). 
12.  I borrow this term from Derek Parfit.  See Broome, supra note 10, at 137-38 (discussing Parfit's use of 
it).  
13.  See JOSEPH BUTLER, Sermon IX:  Upon Forgiveness of Injuries, in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH 
BUTLER 150, 151-52 (W.E. Gladstone ed., vol. 2, 1896) (noting this possibility).  
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they rectify their previously unwarranted attitude of blame toward her.  In rectifying the 
attitude, they suspend for object-based reasons at least a degree of blame toward the 
criminal.  However, the rectification does not involve forgiveness, not even of a partial 
kind.  From the perspective of those who forgive a criminal, the criminal must earn their 
forgiveness by making their continued blame toward her unwarranted.  But if their blame 
toward her was never warranted in the first place, th re is nothing she must do to make its 
continuation unwarranted.  So forgiveness involves th  suspension of only a previously 
warranted attitude of blame.  In other words, it involves suspending blame that was 
warranted prior to the considerations that make forgiveness warranted.14   
 But lastly, forgiveness is not the mere suspension of a previously warranted 
attitude of blame for object-based reasons.  After committing her crime, suppose the 
criminal subsequently suffers from a mental illness that causes her to lose the capacity to 
respond appropriately to moral reasons or reasons of any kind.  As a consequence, the 
mental illness provides her with a full exculpatory defense for the crime.15  In response, 
others might suspend for this object-based reason their previously warranted attitudes of 
blame toward her.  Their suspension, though, would still not involve forgiving her.  
Forgiveness involves suspending a previously warranted attitude of blame not just for any 
object-based reasons, but only for a relevant class of them.  The challenge of demarcating 
the relevant class is the challenge of understanding forgiveness.  
                         
14.  Relatedly, forgiving a criminal for her crime presupposes that she was blameworthy for it.  See Allias, 
supra note 1, at 43.  But see JOSEPH BUTLER, Sermon VIII:  Upon Resentment & Sermon IX:  Upon 
Forgiveness of Injuries, in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH BUTLER 136-67 (W.E. Gladstone ed., vol. 2, 
1896) (contending that forgiveness could consist in forswearing revenge and moderating a previously 
unwarranted attitude of resentment).  For this interpretation of Butler, see CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, 
FORGIVENESS:  A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 19-37 (2007).  
15.  In Chapter 3, I explain why such an incapacity provides an exculpatory defense.  Cf. SCANLON, supra 
note 7, at 280 (describing defenses that consist in an i capacity to respond appropriately to reasons); 
STRAWSON, supra note 3, at 8-10 (same); Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil:  Variations 
on a Strawsonian Theme, in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 123 (John Martin Fischer 
& Mark Ravizza eds., 1993) (same); R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, 14-38 (2005) (same); 
VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 124-29 (2005) (same); MODEL PENAL CODE art. 
4 (same). 
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 In this paper, I defend a theory of what it means d when it is warranted to 
forgive criminals.16  In doing so, I demarcate the relevant class of reasons for which 
suspending blame toward them would constitute forgiveness.  Ultimately, I defend the 
theory by deriving it from a restorative signaling theory of punitive desert, which I call 
'RS'.  I argue that RS illuminates the content of blame in a way that identifies the relevant 
class of reasons.  Thus, my argument uncovers an important connection between the 
concepts of punitive desert, blame, and forgiveness.  After defending the theory, I apply it 
to several potentially controversial issues concerning the forgiveness of criminals.  The 
applications shed further light on the nature of forgiveness itself and the conditions under 
which it would be warranted.   
 II.  A Restorative Signaling Theory of Punitive Desert 
 As I argued in Chapter 1, RS explains why criminals deserve to be punished by 
explaining why they must undertake a punishment to fulfill the obligation of restoration 
they incur from committing their crimes.17  According to RS, when someone commits a 
crime, she undermines certain conditions of trust in the sense that she undermines the 
conditions that are necessary for others' being justified in believing that she is not 
disposed to commit crimes.  She is obligated to resto  those conditions because unless 
she restores them, she will cause others to incur the costs of insecurity.   
 To restore the conditions of trust, she must demonstrate to others that she has a 
good will in the sense of a stable disposition to be appropriately motivated by the moral 
reasons against violating the rights of others.  To demonstrate that she has a good will, 
she must demonstrate that she has a stable dispositon to care highly about the interests of 
others.  To demonstrate this, she must demonstrate th t she has acted with a sufficiently 
                         
16.  I leave it an open question how my theory might apply to those who perform acts that are wrongful in 
some sense but not serious enough to be crimes.  I focus only on forgiving criminals for two reasons.  First, 
their forgiveness is especially difficult to warrant.  Second, the practical consequences of their warranting 
forgiveness are especially important. 
17.  In summarizing RS here, I make the same presuppositions I defended in Chapter 1. 
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high degree of benevolence for a sufficiently long time after committing her crime.  To 
demonstrate that she has acted with such benevolence, she must sacrifice some of her 
sufficiently important personal interests for a sufficiently long time for the sake of 
benefiting others.   
 According to the main principle of RS, a criminal deserves a punishment for her 
crime that is no more severe than the burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation 
of restoration she incurs from committing her crime.  In other words, a criminal deserves 
to be punished for her crime no more severely than e burdens she is obligated to 
undertake to restore the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime.18      
 III.  Blaming Criminals   
 RS illuminates the content of blame.  A criminal not only deserves to be punished 
for her crime.  She also is blameworthy for it in the sense that others would be warranted 
in blaming her for the crime if presuppositions 4-7were to obtain.19  On a standard view, 
blame consists partly in certain demands.20  For example, it contains a demand to 
undertake a punishment or, more precisely, the burdens constitutive of a punishment.21  
                         
18.  As a corollary, a criminal does not deserve a punishment for her crime that is more severe than te 
burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation of restoration she incurs from committing it.  In other 
words, a criminal does not deserve to be punished for her crime more severely than the burdens she is 
obligated to undertake to restore the conditions of trust she undermined by committing it.  
19.  See Chapter 1 for my exposition of these presuppositions.  Cf. D'Arms & Jacobson, Sentiment, supra 
note 11, at 745 (noting that whether someone is warranted in feeling a particular emotion, like blame, 
toward something depends on what she has evidence for b lieving about it). 
20.  See DARWALL, supra note 11, at 17; STRAWSON, supra note 3, at 14-15, 21-22; Watson, supra 
note 15, at 121, 126-28. 
21.  Attitudes of moral blame are sentiments of justice.  See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 87-107 
(Oxford, 1998).  As such, they are a subset of all attitudes of moral disapproval.  I do not claim that a 
demand to undertake a punishment is constitutive of all the latter.  I only claim that such a demand is 
constitutive of moral blame.  See id. at 93, 95 (claiming that attitudes of moral blame as sentiments of 
justice involve both a desire to punish their objects and the judgment that their objects can be properly 
punished); cf. Thomas Baldwin, Punishment, Communication, and Resentment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 124, 128, 130, 132 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999) (claiming that resenting someone 
involves the judgment that she should be punished); BUTLER, Sermon VIII, supra note 14, at 141 
(suggesting that attitudes of resentment and indignatio  toward someone involve a desire that she be 
punished). 
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RS illuminates the content of blame by identifying some of the presuppositions and 
demands constitutive of it.  According to RS, blame contains a demand to restore certain 
conditions of trust by undertaking certain burdens in order to demonstrate a good will.  
When others blame someone for a crime, they presuppose that she undermined certain 
conditions of trust by committing it, and they demand her to restore those conditions by 
undertaking certain burdens in order to demonstrate hat she has a good will.22  The 
higher the severity of burdens they demand her to undertake, the more they blame for the 
act.  The lower the severity of burdens, the less they blame her for the act.   
 By illuminating its content, RS illuminates the conditions under which blame 
would be warranted.  Suppose people blame a criminal for her crime.  In doing so, they 
presuppose that she undermined certain conditions of trust by committing it, and they 
demand her to restore those conditions by undertaking certain burdens.  Thus, their 
attitude is warranted only if a) they are justified n believing that the criminal really did 
undermine the relevant conditions of trust by committing her crime, and b) they are 
warranted in demanding her to undertake the relevant burdens to restore those conditions. 
 Their demand is warranted only if they are justified n believing that the criminal really 
must undertake those burdens to restore the relevant conditions.23   
 IV.  Forgiving Criminals 
A.  The Meaning of Forgiveness  
 Given the content of blame and the conditions under which it is warranted, we can 
identify what it means to forgive a criminal.  Suppose others feel a warranted attitude of 
blame toward her for the crime.  They are justified in believing that she undermined 
                         
22.  When I speak of a demand to restore conditions of trust, I mean a demand to restore them by 
demonstrating a good will.  When I speak of a criminal's restoring conditions of trust, I mean her restoring 
them in this way.  
23.  More generally, RS explains why the demand to restore conditions of trust is warranted insofar as the 
criminal will cause others to incur the costs of insecurity unless she restores them, and people are generally 
warranted in demanding someone not to cause others harm, like the costs of insecurity.  
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certain conditions of trust by committing it, and they are warranted in demanding her to 
restore those conditions by undertaking certain burdens.  To forgive the criminal for her 
crime, they must suspend blaming her for it, and they must do so for the right reason.  
The right reason consists in their judging that the criminal has restored the conditions of 
trust she undermined by committing the crime.24  In response to the judgment, they would 
cease demanding the criminal to restore those conditi s, and so would cease demanding 
her to undertake any burdens as a means to restoring hem.  Thus, forgiving a criminal 
involves suspending a previously warranted attitude of blame toward her by suspending 
its constitutive demands in response to the right judgment.   
B.  Degrees of Forgiveness  
 Forgiveness comes in degrees.  It can be full or partial.  Before a criminal 
commits her crime, others are justified in believing with a particular baseline credence 
that she is not disposed to commit crimes.25  Because her crime is strong evidence that 
she is so disposed, it undermines conditions of trust by lowering the credence with which 
others are justified in believing that she is not so disposed.  Thus, conditions of trust are 
undermined to a degree, and they can be restored to a egree. 
                         
24.  Cf. Aurel Kolnai, Forgiveness, 74 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, 91, 101 
(1973-74) (taking forgiveness to involve the judgement that the forgiven has undergone a change in heart); 
MURPHY, supra note 1, at 24 (stating that one reason people forgive a wrongdoer is because she has 
repented or had a change of heart); HAMPTON, supra note 8, at 86 (stating that forgiving someone for a 
wrongful act is "a way of removing it as evidence of the state of his soul, so that one is able to judge him 
favorably without it," and forgiving her for the act involves the judgment that it "does not provide good 
evidence of the condition of the wrongdoer's soul"); GRISWOLD, supra note 14, at 50 (suggesting that 
forgiving a wrongdoer involves the judgement that she has shown through deeds and words a commitment 
"to becoming the sort of person who does not inflict injury"); Allias, supra note 1, at 56-57 (stating that 
"when you forgive the perpetrator your attitude towards her as a person is no longer the negative one that 
her wrongdoing supports; in other words, the act is disregarded in your ways of regarding and esteeming 
her, and in this sense, the slate is wiped clean, and the act is not held against her"); David Sussman, K tian 
Forgiveness, 96 KANT-STUDIEN 85, 86 (2005) (pointing out that forgiveness involves a response to 
wrongdoing that "can repair significant violations of trust).  
25.  A person's credence in a belief is her subjectiv  probability or degree of confidence that the belief is 
true.  For discussion on the concept of subjective probabilities and their relation to objective probabilities, 
see DAVID LEWIS, A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS:  
VOLUME II 83 (1986). 
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 Fully forgiving the criminal for her crime involves judging that she has fully 
restored the conditions of trust she undermined by committing it.  Given her crime's 
evidentiary significance, full forgiveness involves judging that she has provided others 
with equally strong countervailing evidence that she is no longer disposed to commit 
crimes.  Other things being equal, it involves judging that she has justified others in 
believing that she is not so disposed with the credence with which they would have been 
justified in believing this if she had not committed the crime.  Thus, fully forgiving the 
criminal for her crime involves ceasing to demand her to restore any of the conditions of 
trust she undermined by committing the crime, and so it involves ceasing to demand her 
to undertake any burdens to restore them.  So full forgiveness involves fully suspending 
all blame toward the criminal for her crime.      
 Unlike full forgiveness, forgiving a criminal only partially for her crime involves 
judging that she has restored some but not all the conditions of trust she undermined by 
committing it.  Given the crime's evidentiary significance, mere partial forgiveness 
involves judging that she has provided others with strong but not equally strong 
countervailing evidence that she is no longer disposed to commit crimes.  Other things 
being equal, it involves judging that she has justified others in believing that she is not so 
disposed with a higher credence, but not a credence as high as the one with which they 
would have been justified in believing this if she had not committed the crime.  Hence, 
partial forgiveness can involve ceasing to demand her to restore some but not all the 
conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime, and so it can involve ceasing 
to demand her to undertake some but not all the burdens necessary to restore those 
conditions.  Partial forgiveness can involve continuing to demand the criminal to restore 
the conditions of trust left undermined by her crime, and it can involve continuing to 
demand her to undertake the burdens necessary to restore them.  So partial forgiveness 
can involve suspending some but not all blame toward the criminal for her crime.  
 
 190
C.  Forgiving from Three Perspectives  
 Forgiveness can be given from three perspectives corresponding to three attitudes 
of blame.26  Assume someone commits a crime against another.  As a personal reactive 
attitude, the victim is warranted in resenting the criminal for her crime.  As an impersonal 
reactive attitude, anyone is warranted in feeling indignation toward her for the crime.  To 
forgive the criminal from the perspective of the victim or a third party, they must suspend 
their warranted resentment or indignation by making the required judgment and ceasing 
the relevant demands in response.27  Because the criminal specifically disrespected th 
rights of the victim, he likely finds the prospect of forgiving her most challenging.  For 
this reason, the criminal seeking forgiveness should be concerned primarily with the 
victim's perspective.   
 Forgiveness can also be given from the perspective of the criminal herself.  As a 
self-reactive attitude, the criminal is warranted in feeling guilty for her crime.  Mutatis 
mutandis the same presuppositions and demands that are constitutive of resentment and 
indignation are also constitutive of guilt.  In feeling guilty for her crime, the criminal 
presupposes that she undermined certain conditions of trust by committing it, and she 
demands herself to restore those conditions by undertaking certain burdens in order to 
demonstrate to others that she has a good will.28  To forgive herself for the crime, she 
must suspend her guilt by suspending its constitutive demands in response to her 
                         
26.  See STRAWSON, supra note 3, at 13-15.  
27.  Although some writers assume that only the victim of a crime can forgive the criminal, there is no 
principled reason to hold such an exclusive view.  SeeEve Garrard & David McNaughton, In Defence of 
Unconditional Forgiveness, 104 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 39, 45 n. 6 (2003) 
(leaving room for forgiveness from third parties).  
28.  A person can be warranted in feeling guilty for c mmitting a crime that has not been detected by others. 
 In this case, she still presupposes that she undermin d conditions of trust by committing her crime in the 
sense that if others knew she committed it, they would not be justified in believing that she is not disposed 
to commit crimes.  In demanding herself to restore hese conditions, she demands herself to undertake a 
course of action that would justify others in believing that she is not so disposed even if they were to l arn 
that she committed the crime.  Her demand is warranted given the inevitable risk that her crime will be
detected and others will incur the costs of insecurity if she does not restore the conditions of trust. 
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judgment that she has restored the conditions of trust.   
D.  Warranted Forgiveness   
 The conditions under which forgiveness is warranted follow from its meaning.  
Suppose others fully forgive a criminal for her crime.  Their full forgiveness is warranted 
if and only if they are warranted in judging that she has fully restored the conditions of 
trust she undermined by committing the crime.  Assume they only partially forgive her.  
They judge that she has only partially restored the conditions of trust she undermined by 
committing the crime, and in response, they reduce the severity of the burdens they 
demand her to undertake to restore the other conditi s of trust left undermined by her 
crime.  Their partial forgiveness is warranted if and only if they are warranted in judging 
that she has restored the conditions of trust to the relevant degree, and they are warranted 
in judging that she need not undertake the more sevre burdens to restore the other 
conditions of trust that they continue demanding her to restore.  If others are not 
warranted in making these judgments, they might make them nonetheless.  So they might 
forgive her nonetheless.  But in this case, their forgiveness would not be warranted.  
E.  The Value of Warranted Forgiveness    
 When others are warranted in forgiving a criminal, their forgiveness would 
promote at least four values.  First, they would rationally reduce the costs of insecurity 
they incur in response to her crime.  They would fear the criminal less.  They would 
engage in activities that would otherwise leave them too vulnerable to her.  And they 
would not invest as heavily in costly precautionary measures to protect themselves from 
her.  Second, the criminal's self-esteem would improve upon learning that others forgive 
her.  People are ashamed to be regarded as untrustwo thy.  Third, forgiveness would 
promote reconciliation between the criminal and others.  They would enter into 
relationships with each other, like friendships, that would not be rationally possible in the 
absence of warranted forgiveness.  Fourth, forgiveness would benefit the relationships, 
projects, and commitments of others generally.  Forthe feeling of blame itself can be an 
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all consuming experience that impairs one's capacity to sustain these important parts of 
one's life.     
 V.  Implications 
 Given my theory of forgiving criminals, we can see where it stands on some 
potentially controversial issues concerning the subject.  One issue concerns the relation 
between forgiveness, punishment, apology, and compensation.  Others concern forgiving 
the untrustworthy, the unforgivable, forgiving the d ad, and the elective nature of 
forgiveness.   
A.  Punishment, Apology, and Compensation 
 Being warranted in forgiving a criminal not only is consistent with, but also 
standardly requires her having undertaken a punishment.  To be warranted in forgiving 
her, others must be justified in believing that shehas restored the conditions of trust she 
undermined by committing her crime.  As we discussed, to restore these conditions, she 
must demonstrate that she has a good will.  To do so, she must undertake certain burdens 
for the sake of benefiting others.  Such burdens would standardly constitute a punishment 
taking the form of labor intensive community service.    
 Providing an apology and compensation is also a necessary condition of warranted 
forgiveness.29  To warrant others in judging that she has restored th  conditions of trust, 
the criminal must apologize for her crime, and she must compensate her victims for the 
harm she caused them.30  Neglecting to do either would indicate that she has not rectified 
the deficiency in the degree to which she cares about others that she manifested in 
committing her crime.  More specifically, it would indicate a persisting insufficient 
                         
29.  Cf. GRISWOLD, supra note 14, at 49-50 (suggesting that warranted forgiveness requires the 
wrongdoer to communicate contrition and her regret that she performed the act).  
30.  In addition, other steps might also be necessary to restore the conditions of trust and, hence, warrant 
forgiveness.  For example, the criminal might need to undergo some form of therapy and take steps to 
eliminate aspects of her situation that pressure he to commit crimes, such as unemployment and corrupting 
social influences.  Much will depend on the specifics of the case.  
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concern for the interests of her victims.  While necessary, providing an apology and 
compensation might or might not be sufficient to warrant forgiveness.  This depends on 
the form they take.     
 On the one hand, neither might be burdensome for the criminal to provide.  For 
example, she might apologize through mere cheap talk; she might compensate her victims 
by effortlessly providing them with resources that she no longer needs or wants; or she 
might compensate them by directing a third party insurance company to compensate them 
on her behalf.  Assuming an apology and compensation re not burdensome for her to 
provide, their provision would not demonstrate that she has rectified the deficiency in her 
concern for others.   
 On the other hand, providing an apology and compensation might be burdensome. 
 For example, the criminal might express her apology and compensate her victims 
through engaging in labor intensive community service aimed at benefiting them.  In this 
case, their provision would be part of her punishment for the crime.31  Ultimately, the 
extent to which an apology and compensation warrant forgiveness depends on the extent 
to which their provision constitutes the punishment that the criminal undertakes to restore 
the conditions of trust.  
 Although warranted forgiveness standardly requires a past punishment, the issue 
of whether it is consistent with a warranted demand for further punishment depends on 
whether it is full or only partial.  Warranted parti l forgiveness is consistent with such a 
demand.  When others are warranted in only partially forgiving a criminal, they are 
justified in believing that she has restored some but not all the conditions of trust she 
undermined by committing her crime.  So they can be warranted in demanding her to 
undertake a further punishment to restore the conditi s of trust left undermined.  
Warranted full forgiveness, however, is not consistent with a warranted demand for 
                         
31.  See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 106 (2001) (noting that 
a criminal's undertaking a punishment for her crime can constitute a forceful expression of her apology).  
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further punishment.  When others are warranted in fully orgiving a criminal, they are 
justified in believing that she has restored all the conditions of trust she undermined by 
committing it.  So they are not warranted in demanding her to undertake any further 
punishment to restore such conditions.  As a consequence of RS, they would not be 
warranted in demanding her to undertake any further punishment for her crime.  
Moreover, it seems conceptually impossible for others fully to forgive a criminal for her 
crime and at the same time punish her for the crime themselves.  For full forgiveness 
would involve suspending all blame toward her for the crime, and punishing her for it 
would express some blame.32   
B.  Forgiving the Untrustworthy  
 If a criminal restores some but not all the conditions of trust she undermined by 
committing her crime, then she remains untrustworthy at least to a degree.  So others can 
be warranted in partially forgiving an untrustworthy criminal for her crime.  There are 
also at least two situations in which others could be warranted in fully forgiving an 
untrustworthy criminal.   
 One involves a repeat criminal.  Her initial crime undermines conditions of trust 
to a particular degree.  It justifies others in believing with an unduly high credence that 
she is disposed to commit crimes, and there is a serious deficiency in the degree to which 
she cares about the interests of others.  Assume she refuses to restore these conditions of 
trust.  She refuses to apologize for the crime or to compensate any of her victims or to 
sacrifice any of her personal interests for the sake of benefiting anyone relevantly related 
to her victims.  So she is untrustworthy, and others are not warranted in forgiving her 
even partially for the crime.   
 Assume she commits a second crime against different victims.  Her second crime 
                         
32.  See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, i  DOING AND DESERVING:  
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970) (discussing the conceptual connection 
between punishment and the expression of moral blame).  
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undermines additional conditions of trust.  It justifies others in believing with an even 
higher credence that she has an even worse disposition to commit crimes and an even 
worse deficiency in the degree to which she cares about others.33  Suppose, though, that 
she fully restores the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her second crime. 
 She apologizes for it, compensates its victims, and sacrifices some of her sufficiently 
important personal interests for a sufficiently long time for the sake of benefiting people 
relevantly related to its victims.  Because she fully restored the conditions of trust she 
undermined by committing her second crime, others are warranted in fully forgiving her 
for it even though her first crime still makes her untrustworthy.  In general, others can be 
warranted in fully forgiving a repeat criminal for some but not all of her crimes, and the 
remaining crimes might make her untrustworthy at lest to a degree.     
 A second situation concerns the self-fulfilling nature of trust.34  People 
intrinsically desire to be trusted because they intrinsically desire others to hold them in 
esteem, and trusting them is one way of doing so.  They instrumentally desire trust 
because it is necessary for the formation and flourishing of close relationships.  They also 
desire trust because it reduces others' costs of insecurity.  So trusting someone provides 
her with a good that she desires to maintain by not doing anything to undermine it.  
Hence, trusting someone not to commit crimes can provide her with additional prudential 
and altruistic incentives not to commit them.  Thus, trusting someone can itself make her 
more trustworthy.     
 The self-fulfilling nature of trust entails that forgiving a criminal can itself make 
her more trustworthy.35  Because forgiving her involves judging that she has become 
                         
33.  Her disposition to commit crimes might be worse in the sense that she is willing to commit more 
serious crimes, and she is willing to commit crimes with a higher frequency, in a broader range of situat ons, 
and against a broader range of people. 
34.  See, e.g., Kolnai, supra note 24, at 105; Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
202, 212-17 (1995). 
35.  See Kolnai, supra note 24, at 102-03.  
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more trustworthy, it standardly involves placing a higher degree of trust in her by 
believing with a higher credence that she is not disposed to commit crimes.  Assuming 
the additional trust provides her with a good that she desires to maintain, forgiving her 
can itself make her more trustworthy.  The trust warranting effect of forgiveness entails 
that others can be warranted in fully forgiving an untrustworthy criminal for her crime 
when forgiving her would make her trustworthy or at least completely restore the 
conditions of trust she undermined by committing it.  
 To illustrate, suppose a criminal proceeds to resto  the conditions of trust she 
undermined by committing her crime.  She proceeds to undertake the required 
punishment and provide the required apology and compensation.  In doing so, she evinces 
a significant desire for others' trust.  Now suppose she succeeds in restoring the 
conditions of trust up to the point at which forgiving her would itself completely restore 
them.  At this point, she has not fully restored the conditions of trust and so is still 
untrustworthy.  However, others would be warranted in fully forgiving her because their 
doing so would itself complete the restoration and make her trustworthy.    
 For at least three reasons, though, the trust warranting effect of forgiveness cannot 
warrant full or even partial forgiveness unless the criminal undertakes a punishment and 
provides an apology and compensation to demonstrate th  she has a good will.36  First, 
the trust warranting effect of forgiveness is marginal at best.  Although its evidentiary 
significance can be non-trivial, it can restore the conditions of trust only to a partial 
degree and make the criminal only marginally more trustworthy.  
 Second, forgiveness has a non-trivial trust warranting effect only if others are 
justified in believing that the criminal strongly desires their trust.  Others would be 
justified in believing this only if they were justified in believing that the criminal is 
willing to restore the conditions of trust by undertaking a punishment.  Unless the 
                         
36.  See Kolnai, supra note 24, at 103 (stating that if a wrongdoer has provided no sign of a change of heart, 
then the reconciling or reforming effect of forgiveness would be "utterly dubious"). 
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criminal makes such a sacrifice, others would not be justified in believing that her desire 
for their trust is sufficiently strong.   
 Third, forgiveness has a trust warranting effect in large part by providing the 
criminal with a prudential incentive not to commit crimes.  But to restore the conditions 
of trust fully or to a significant degree, the criminal must demonstrate to others that she is 
appropriately motivated by the moral reasons not to commit crimes.  She must 
demonstrate that she is disposed not to commit themeven under conditions in which 
doing so would be in her best personal interests.  To demonstrate this, she must 
demonstrate that she cares highly about the interests of others.  To do so, she must 
undertake the relevant punishment and provide an apology and compensation.  By 
demonstrating that she cares highly about others, she would thereby strengthen the trust 
warranting effect of forgiving her by indicating to others that she is appropriately 
motivated by the altruistic reasons not to undermine the trust inherent in their forgiveness.  
C.  The Unforgivable  
 A criminal might be unforgivable for her crime in two senses.  On a weak sense, 
she is unforgivable for the crime if and only if she is blameworthy for it, and others would 
not be warranted in forgiving her for it if they knew all the facts about her capacities and 
what she has actually done.  On the weak sense, the criminal might be fully or partially 
unforgivable.  She is partially unforgivable for her crime only if others would not be 
warranted in fully forgiving her for it under the idealized conditions.  She is fully 
unforgivable for the crime only if others would not be warranted in even partially 
forgiving her for it under those conditions.  A defiant criminal is unforgivable in the weak 
sense because she refuses to restore the conditions of tru t she undermined by committing 
her crime.  At one extreme, she might refuse to undertake any punishment or to provide 
any apology or compensation in response to the crime. 
 Although unforgivable in the weak sense, defiant criminals need not be 
unforgivable in a stronger sense.  On a strong sense, a criminal is unforgivable for her 
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crime if and only if she is blameworthy for it, and there is nothing she could do to warrant 
others in forgiving her for the crime if they were to know all the facts about her capacities 
and actions.  On the strong sense, a criminal might also be fully or partially unforgivable 
depending on whether she could warrant others in fully or partially forgiving her for the 
crime under the idealized conditions.  A defiant criminal need not be unforgivable in the 
strong sense because she might be able to restore the conditions of trust even though she 
chooses not to.  Although no criminal is fully unforgivable in the strong sense, two 
considerations could make her partially unforgivable in this sense.  
 A criminal might lose her capacity to respond appro riately to some of the moral 
reasons against violating the rights of others.  The seriousness of a crime justifies others 
in believing that the criminal is disposed to flout a particular class of such reasons.  To 
restore the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime, the criminal must 
demonstrate that she is appropriately motivated by the relevant moral reasons.  Assuming 
she has the capacity to respond appropriately to such reasons, she can demonstrate that 
she is appropriately motivated by them.  But assume she later loses the capacity to 
respond appropriately to some of the relevant moral reasons.37  If others know this, then 
she cannot justify their believing that she is appro riately motivated by all the relevant 
moral reasons.  She can justify their believing that s e is appropriately motivated by only 
some of them.  So she can warrant their judging that s e has restored some but not all the 
conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime.  Because she can warrant 
others in only partially forgiving her for the crime, she is partially unforgivable for it in 
the strong sense.38   
                         
37.  She might lose the capacity in two ways.  She might lose the epistemic capacity to recognize the 
reasons or to appreciate them as reasons.  Or she mig t lose the volitional capacity to control what she 
intends in response to her judgments about what the reasons count for or against her intending.  
38.  After the criminal restores the conditions of trust as much as she can, she would no longer be 
blameworthy for her crime to any degree, as I later explain.  At that point, others might suspend all blame 
toward her in response to their judgment that she lacks the capacity to restore the conditions any further.  
But their full suspension of blame would not constitute full forgiveness because it would not be in response 
to their judgment that she has fully restored the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime. 
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 A worse incapacity, though, would not make the criminal fully unforgivable.  
Suppose she later loses her capacity to respond appropriately to any of the relevant moral 
reasons.  If others know this, then she cannot justify their believing that she is 
appropriately motivated by any of these reasons.  So she cannot warrant their judging that 
she has restored any of the conditions of trust she und rmined by committing her crime.  
Hence, she cannot warrant their even partially forgivin  her for the crime.  But this does 
not entail that she is unforgivable for it because nforgivability presupposes 
blameworthiness.  When the criminal loses her capacity to respond appropriately to any 
of the relevant moral reasons, she is no longer blameworthy for the crime because the 
incapacity would provide her with a full exculpatory defense for it.  Others would no 
longer be warranted in blaming her for the crime because doing so would involve 
demanding her to restore conditions of trust that se lacks the capacity to restore.  And in 
general, others are not warranted in demanding someone to do something that she lacks 
the capacity to do.39   
 If a criminal retains the capacity to respond appro riately to the relevant moral 
reasons, then she cannot be fully unforgivable for her crime in the strong sense.  She can 
at least partially restore the conditions of trust by undertaking a punishment and providing 
an apology and compensation to her victims.40  However, the seriousness of her crime 
combined with her age might still make her partially unforgivable for it in the strong 
sense.  Consider two cases. 
                                                             
 Mere partial forgiveness is consistent with the full s spension of blame.   
39.  This principle is similar to the principle tha someone ought to do something only if she can do it.  See, 
e.g., David Copp, 'Ought' Implies 'Can', Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, in 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES 265, 271-75 (David Widerker & 
Michael McKenna eds., 2003); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:380 (Mary 
Gregor ed., 1996) (stating that "he must judge that he can do what the law tells him unconditionally that he 
ought to do").  
40.  Cf. Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and the Unforgivable, 36 AM. PHIL. Q. 59, 69-71 (1999) (emphasizing 
that even persons who commit atrocities can undergo positive moral changes in their character).  
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 First, suppose the criminal commits a monstrous crime in which she disrespects 
the rights of others to a monstrously bad degree.  H r crime is strong evidence that there 
is a monstrously bad deficiency in the degree to which she cares about the interests of 
others.  To restore fully the conditions of trust, she must demonstrate that she has fully 
rectified this deficiency.  To do so, she must act with an extremely high degree of 
benevolence for an extremely long time.  Given the unavoidable constraints on the 
duration of her life, it might be impossible for her to do so since the required time would 
inevitably extend past her death.  Second, suppose she commits a less serious crime, but 
does so very late in life.  To restore fully the conditions of trust, she would need to act 
with a high degree of benevolence for a long time that would again inevitably extend past 
her death.  In either case, she can restore the conditions of trust partially but not fully.  So 
she can warrant others in partially but not fully forgiving her for either crime. 
D.  Forgiving the Dead  
 Death per se does not warrant forgiveness.  When a criminal dies, she does restore 
the conditions of trust in some sense.  If others know she died, they are no longer justified 
in believing she is still disposed to commit crimes.  However, the judgment constitutive 
of forgiveness is not merely that the criminal has restored the conditions of trust.  It is that 
she has restored them in the right way, demonstrating to others that she has a good will in 
the sense of being appropriately motivated by the moral reasons against violating the 
rights of others.  A dead criminal has no will at all.   
 Assume, though, that the criminal restored the conditions of trust in the right way 
before she died.  Whether others can be warranted i forgiving the criminal after her 
death depends on what they are justified in believing.  On the one hand, suppose they are 
justified in believing she is still alive.  Then they can still be warranted in blaming her for 
the crime.  So when they learn that she restored th conditions of trust, they can be 
warranted in forgiving her because they can suspend their blame toward her in response 
to their warranted judgment that she restored the conditions.   
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 On the other hand, suppose they know she died.  Then they cannot be warranted in 
blaming her because a dead person lacks the capacities required to be blameworthy.  So 
they cannot forgive her because forgiveness involves th  suspension of an attitude of 
blame that was warranted prior to the considerations that make the judgment constitutive 
of forgiveness warranted.  However, the concept of forgiveness is still relevant in 
assessing the moral quality of the criminal's life. Although the others cannot forgive her 
when they learn that she restored the conditions of trust, they are warranted in judging 
that she was forgivable in the sense that they would have been warranted in forgiving her 
when she was alive if they had known she restored those conditions.41  When they learn 
that the criminal was forgivable in this sense, they learn that the moral quality of her life 
was better than they previously believed.   
E. The Elective Nature of Forgiveness   
 The decision to forgive a criminal is elective in the sense that others are not 
obligated to forgive her even when it would be warranted.42  In general, a person is not 
obligated to others to feel only warranted attitudes toward them or make only warranted 
demands on them.  She might have most reason not tofeel such attitudes or make such 
demands, and so feeling the attitudes or making the demands might be rationally 
deficient.  But the reasons at issue do not generate an obligation.43  Merely feeling an 
unwarranted attitude or making an unwarranted demand on someone would not cause her 
the kind of harm from which she has a right to be fre .  So a criminal is not warranted in 
demanding others to forgive her even if their forgiveness would itself be warranted.  
 Nevertheless, it is entirely appropriate for the criminal to request warranted 
                         
41.  Cf. GRISWOLD, supra note 14, at 120 (noting that the only mode of forgiveness available to victims 
of dead wrongdoers is in the subjunctive).  
42. See GRISWOLD, supra note 14, at 67-69; Sussman, supra note 24, at 87. 
43.  Although someone is not obligated to abstain from making unwarranted demands on others, she is 
obligated not to force them to fulfill such demands since such force would cause them the kind of harm 
from which they have a right to be free.  
 202
forgiveness for at least two reasons.44  First, as we have discussed, warranted forgiveness 
would promote several good consequences for both the criminal and others.  Second, the 
criminal's requesting warranted forgiveness would itself have good effects.  It would 
indicate that she desires to be trusted, and so it w uld increase the trust warranting effect 
of forgiving her.  Conversely, her not requesting forgiveness would indicate an 
indifference to whether others trust her and to the fact that they will incur the costs of 
insecurity in response to not trusting her.  So her requesting warranted forgiveness would 
play an important role in restoring the conditions f trust she undermined by committing 
her crime.  Thus, a criminal is not only permitted, but also obligated to request 
forgiveness from others when their forgiveness would be warranted.   
  VI.  Conclusion 
 When others forgive a criminal for her crime, they judge she has restored the 
conditions of trust she undermined by committing it.  More specifically, they judge she 
has restored those conditions by demonstrating that she has a good will.  So forgiveness 
expresses an attitude of moral approval.  But it in no way expresses approval of the crime 
at issue.  It does not involve a change in judgment about the seriousness of the crime 
itself.  Rather forgiveness expresses approval of the way the criminal has responded to 
her crime.  It involves a change in judgment about the moral quality of her dispositions.  
For this reason, forgiveness makes reconciling withthe criminal rationally possible 
without condoning the crime she committed.45 
                         
44.  See GRISWOLD, supra note 14, at 50 n. 8 (crediting Ken Taylor with noti g that when an offender 
requests or invites rather than demands forgiveness, h  "shows respect and sympathy for his victim").  
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